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 This thesis explores the complex voices of militants, associated with the capture of oil 
resources in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The persistent violent conflict involving militant groups 
in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is a major concern for many within the country and the 
international community. Understanding the conflict in the Niger Delta has triggered a wide range of 
discussions and debates among researchers, politicians and policy makers. However, these 
debates have overlooked the views of the militants, who are actively engaged in the conflict over 
resource governance in the region. Moreover the ideology of self-determination and resource 
control, which these militants use to legitimise their actions, seem to generate different meanings 
and labelling that tend to cloud an understandings of the conflict in the region. 
 In this thesis, I adopt the theoretical assumptions of the New Social Movement literature 
and the epistemological views of the Interpretivist Social Constructionist approach to explore (a) 
what features shaped the emergence of militancy and its diverse forms (b) how do militias make 
sense of their role as militants? (c) how does the role of militias impact on the politics of oil 
governance in the Niger Delta? I argue that militia actions that appear to challenge the 
legitimacy and authority of the Nigerian state to control oil resources, are embedded in complex 
webs involving formal and informal interactions of political elites and militia leaders. From analysis of 
this research, key dominant concepts such as Identity, opportunism and competition, emerged to 
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The recent March 28th, 2015, general elections, which witnessed a change of political 
power from incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan to new elected President Mohammadu Buhari, 
might lead to a renewed violence by militia groups in the Niger Delta. This prediction is premised on 
the continued voices of discontent that is based on history and politics of resource governance on 
the one hand, and the frustrations that hinge on ideological platform of ‘self-determination and 
resource’ control to access resource benefits on the other hand. Historically, the discovery of oil in 
the Niger Delta in 1956, generated hope, expectation as well as opportunities to improve the welfare 
and livelihoods of host oil bearing communities. However, the reality is a few elites comprised of 
national and regional politicians and military personnel’s, directly benefit from oil revenues, whilst 
communities see little or no benefits. As a result, a feeling of discontent, agitation and 
marginalisation in the region, gradually led to protest and armed conflict, in which militants have 
quickly gained prominence.   
From a wider discussion on the contestation of resources, the Niger Delta provides an 
ample experience of violent militia-based resource conflict, which suffused the region from the late 
1990s onwards and especially between about 2004 and 2009. This conflict, as well as causing many 
deaths, has had a significant impact on Nigeria’s oil infrastructure—with global economic 
consequences—and has spawned an on-going illicit industry in oil theft, home-grown refining, 
kidnapping and piracy. It has also, through the multiplicity of armed groups that grew up during this 
period, significantly complicated the already contested relationships surrounding oil resources in the 
region.  











Whilst, so much has been discussed and written on the Niger Delta conflict, the views of 
militants who have gained recognition and prominence within the mainstream political structures of 
resource governance in Nigeria vis-à-vis the Niger Delta, is rarely explored. It is unto this gap, that 
this research seeks to explore the voices of militants, who have so radically altered the political 
dynamics of the Niger Delta in recent years. To do this, I outlined three central questions (1) what 
are the features that shaped the emergence of militia and its diverse forms in the Niger Delta (2) 
how is militancy perceived in the Niger Delta and how do militias make sense of their role as 
militants and (3) how does the role of militants, impact on the political structure and culture of 
resource governance in the region.  
The thesis consists of seven chapters following this introduction. In chapter one, I begin by 
introducing the rationale and background context for this study and emphasising that, despite the 
legion of discussions and articles on the violent conflict involving militia groups in the Niger Delta 
region, the experiential views of militants who are actively engaged in the conflict, has never been 
explored. This is the main rationale underpinning my research.  On this basis, I have used New 
Social Movement theory (NSM) to develop a theoretical lens with which to understand the role of 
militia. The complexity of the Niger Delta conflict and the trajectories in which militants have come to 
gain significance, raises the question as to whether the militants can be seen as ‘social movements’ 
or identity based movements.  
In chapter two, I examine the literature on resource extraction and governance.  In so 
doing, I attempt to link macro structures and processes of resource governance with the micro lived 
experience of individuals and groups. The chapter also examines the literature on historical 
processes of Nigeria’s political economy; the ethnic identity politics of governance in Nigeria, and 
resource policies and state-society relations. These reviews are examined in order to build a 
context, rooted in history, of resource extraction and governance dynamics in the Niger Delta. 
Moreover, the review will help show that militants did not just emerge from random circumstances, 
but from a deep history of discontent, antagonism, oppression and mobilisation.  
In chapter three, I outline my methodology. I locate the epistemological and ontological 
anchors of my research, as well as, the complex methodological journey required to approximate the 
subjective world of militants who are ‘hard to reach’ and prefer to be ‘hard to reach’. I therefore 
adopted an ethnographic approach which allowed for immersion but also required patience and 
scrutiny of various motivations and expectations. Militants are not a homogenous group, and an 
important part of my methodological journey meant finding ways of allowing different voices to 
emerge and of course being aware of the power exercised in sharing information with me. In this 
way I managed to arrive at an emic understanding of oil governance in the Niger Delta.  
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Chapter 4, begins to go through the voices/narratives of militants and non-militants, in order 
to discover the interrelatedness of agency and structures of power. Specifically, the chapter explores 
the processes of how macro political structures of oil resource governance, simultaneously impacts 
differently on individuals and groups. Reflections of key historical events appear as dominant 
discussions for the formation of identity and the mobilisation of collective action by militia groups in 
the Niger Delta. In particular, the significance of a discourse around deprivation and social exclusion 
prior to the discovery of oil was key to the development of a collective or unified identity, Access to 
and control over oil then became the focus and context for grievance, deprivation and frustration for 
local communities in the Niger Delta.  This led the way to armed conflict. The Niger Delta Volunteer 
Force (NDVF) in 1966 militia action that was initiated by Adaka Boro, a former school teacher and 
policeman in 1966, is now the dominant point of reference for contemporary militias. 
The 12 Day revolt of NDVF in 1966 was largely unsuccessful because inter alia the 
militants could not mobilise sufficient resources (guns, money, network, allies), and the military 
regime being challenged was very strong. However, the revolt challenged the framing of the 
ideological battle for self-determination and control of resources; and is still used as the platform to 
justify and legitimise militia action by contemporary militias in Niger Delta region. Much of this can be 
traced back to the inspiration of Adaka Boro who is celebrated as a martyr, an icon and hero 
amongst ethnic minority Ijaws in the Niger Delta region. This highlights the importance of 
charismatic leadership for the successful development of identity formation and collective action 
 (Smelser, 1962).  
In chapter five, I appraise what it means to be a ‘militant’ in the Niger Delta region by 
drawing on perspectives of militants and non-militants. I also outline the internal organisation 
structure of a typical militia ‘camp’ in order to better understand a number of issues such as 
hierarchy, spirituality, resource mobilisation, network building and leadership. A key finding and 
argument from this chapter is that the term ‘militancy’ is not a straightforward one. Although from 
outside militants are viewed primarily as dangerous and violent, perhaps criminal; the insider 
perspective reveals a very different and almost heroic identity which plays between a sense of being 
oppressed on the one hand and an ambition to take control over key resources on the other hand.  
The focus of chapter six is on the external relations of militant groups, specifically relations 
between militant leaders, political elites and non-state actors such as multinational oil company 
representatives. The boundaries between these actors are very porous and the level of interaction at 




At the heart of the relations is a bargain which is highlighted at key moments such as 
elections, oil thefts, and informal payments to militant leaders, amnesties and so forth. In chapter 
seven, I reflected on three key dominant concepts: Collective identity, Opportunism and 
Competition/territoriality to understand the success of resistant movements in resource endowed 
environments. These concepts are intrinsically linked, and are also tied to understanding why people 
mobilise, how they mobilise to access resources, and how their mobilisation is impacted by and 
impacts the unfolding of governance arrangements. These arrangements which are quite informal is 







                 Chapter One: Militias in the Niger Delta as a Form of New Social Movement 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out to establish the context and conceptual framework that underpins 
the militancy in Niger Delta region. It provides the background context and rationale and examines 
contemporary views of literature on conflict in the region, and considers New Social Movement 
(NSM) theory as an approach for understanding militancy in the region. The chapter identifies key 
concepts such as collective identity, resource conflict and power in the process of examining the 
role and significance of militancy in the Niger Delta vis-à-vis Nigeria. Overall, historical context, 
process and culture are important to this research as they help to unfold a body of knowledge on 
how individuals/groups perceive ‘reality’ to inform collective action in the Niger Delta. Specifically, 
they tell the way claims are made and contested, within complex configuration of actors. In setting 
the context and framework of this research, this chapter begins by providing an introduction on 
Niger Delta region, to help the reader appreciate the web of interactions, meanings and varied 
interpretations of militia actions around resource governance. However, I argue that whilst crude 
oil appears to be context for militia action, it does not tell the whole story behind the actions of 
militancy in the region. As a result, very little is known about the conflict in the Niger Delta.  
1.2. Research Rationale and Background Context 
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria is a major oil producing area and, as such, it is central 
to the economic stability of the country. For a large proportion of the last decade, the region has 
been plagued by conflict in which a range of militia groups have emerged to play a significant role. 
In addition, discussion of militancy is often viewed from a conflict-theory perspective  (Courson, 
2009; Agbu, 2004; Obi, 2008), which by and large, have not engaged the views of militants.  
Moreover, the conflict involving these militants, present varied perception and labelling. They are 
seen and labelled in a particular form as oil thieves, kidnappers, or freedom fighters by the public 
and media.  Prior to conducting this research, discussion and debates on militancy in the region 
wasn’t seen within mainstream political economy of Nigeria, but it has now gained local, national 
and international recognition and concern. These recognition and concerns, gives a pointer to a 
complex configuration of actors within the structure of resource governance and the struggles for 
recognitions, that needs unravelling in order to understand how and why militancy quickly gained 
significance in Nigeria.    
In order to gain an overview of the Niger Delta conflict, I examine some literature on conflict 
to give insight to the nature of conflict in Niger Delta and how and why militancy emerged in a 
particular way in the region. Whilst there are no precise definitions of  conflict, it can be viewed 
within unequal distribution of resources and power, where people complete for money, power and 
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status, and where societal values do not necessarily represent the common interest of all members 
of a society, but the interest of a few  (Mattewman et al., 2007; Vold et al., 2002; Buechler, 2000). In 
particular, resource endowed environments are viewed as arenas for contested entitlements, 
frustration and competition  (Tilly, 2003), that reveal how protest or insurgencies emerge in shaping 
a particular political outcome  (Ross, 2008). Moreover, conflict can be violent or non-violent. Non-
violence are often forms of civil disobedience by individual or groups  (Vinthagen, 2006), while 
violent conflicts are destructive forms of action which usually  involve use of arms   (Jacoby, 2008). 
Although violent conflicts often occurs between ethnic groups  (Brown and Langer, 2012), it does not 
necessarily follow that all ethnic groups fight against each other  (Stewart, 2008), as ethnically 
diverse societies can also cohabit peacefully with each other.  Furthermore violent conflict can be 
seen as actions against the state by rebel groups  (Mason and Fett, 1996), fighting either to replace 
an existing government or to create a new nation state.  
According to Stewart (2008), the driving force that motivates people to engage in violent 
conflict, are primarily religion and ethnic identities, which are mostly linked to economic benefits or a 
political cause. Moreover, violent conflict can be based on ethnic identity groups who seek to 
achieve their own economic, social, and political positions through violent measures  (Stewart, 
2008).  Others such as Turton  (1997) and Fearon and Laitin  (1996), respectively considered the 
underlying political and economic situations within given nations, and its historical composition as 
the driving force for violent conflict. Such action being labelled as ‘militant act’ by the 
national/regional elites, are mostly mobilised around collective identity  (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), 
propel people to fight, kill and even die in the name of that identity.  Also, studies on organisational 
dynamics of militia groups  (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Weinstein, 2009) argue, that ‘militia groups’ 
emerge from frustration and perception of injustice across a section of a population with pre-existing 
identity bonds. They may face common constraints or opportunities, through engagement in illegal 
diversion of natural resources, patronage networks, smuggling, criminal kidnapping, and political 
activism/opportunities of immediate profits. 
Within the purview of violent conflict in this research, the protest and resistance of ‘militia 
groups’ in the Niger Delta region can also be seen in line with Tilly et al,  (2001)’s view, as organised 
effort by a significant group of people who feel alienated, dominated, or unequal and, therefore, seek 
to effect or resist change by acting within and outside the laws of the state.  They represent groups 
with common history taking action to seek specific change at the individual/ collective levels.  The 
action of militia also broadly reflect the issues of territorial space of action, individual or lived 
experiences, and physical environment  (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). They inform sentiments of 
belonging, a set of belief, values and meaning  (Crossley, 2002), where individuals/groups have an 
image of themselves within forms of socially constructed meanings of everyday life. 
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These constructed meanings of everyday life, also brings out the complexities of human 
action in relation to claims making, legitimacy and recognition within the context of resource-rich 
environment. These complexities do often arise from interactions over resource management and 
access to its benefits  (Adger et al., 2005b). This is particularly so, when such interactions are 
likely to produce winners and losers that is based on the exercise of power through domination, 
resistance or cooperation. It is on this ground that this research sets out to examine how militias 
take action and make claims and how they legitimise these actions to gain recognition. In 
particular, it will focus on how claims of ‘self-determination and resource control’ are framed, 
translated, and activated into collective action. It aims to identify some features that underlie the 
persistent conflict in Niger Delta, as well as, broaden our understanding of militancy. It is assumed 
that the direct engagement with militant will provide a rich body of knowledge on the Niger Delta 
conflict. Besides, it attempts to give insight to the bigger picture beyond the assumed context of 
resources. The following preceding section therefore attempts to give background information on 
the political economy of Niger Delta in order to appreciate some feature that promote tensions in 
shaping the conflict in the region. 
The Niger Delta region is politically defined as comprising nine out of the thirty-six states 
that make up the Federal Republic of Nigeria (see figure 1.1). This research will focus in particular 
on three of these states: Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states.  These states are where militancy has 
been most intense. The region, as a whole, is characterised by wetland and mangrove swamps 
and intersected by a complex network of creeks and rivers. It has an estimated population of over 
21 million inhabitants, which accounts for about 15% of Nigeria’s current population of 140 million. 
The rural inhabitants of the region engage primarily in subsistence activities, predominantly fishing 
and farming. 
The region is endowed with substantial hydrocarbon deposits but these exist within a 
fragile ecosystem that harbours a rich variety of flora and fauna. These hydrocarbon deposits, 
together with the environmental impact of extraction, lie at the heart of the lingering conflict in the 
Niger Delta, whereby oil is seen as the defining feature of the Nigerian State. It is what shapes the 
macro-political structure and economy of Nigeria, as well as the micro interactions and rising 
tensions that promotes violence in the Niger Delta region  (Obi, 2001; Odukoya, 2006) (see also 
the chapter on resource extraction). As a result, the host oil-bearing communities in the Niger 
Delta region are embroiled within a configuration of multinational oil firms, the Nigerian State, and 
regional and local political actors. The complexities of oil extraction, together with economic value 
of oil, figure centrally in the armed conflict in the Niger Delta region.  
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These structures are argued as operating through an oil complex  (Watts, 2004) that 
creates a sense of identity and dispossession, thereby provoking different forms of claims making, 
recognition and competition, since the discovery of oil in 1956. Competition for control of the oil 
resources of the region was a factor in the Biafra War in the early 1960s and this in itself was but 
one expression of a more fundamental conflict in the Nigerian state between the three dominant 
ethnic groups of the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. The underlying competition between these groups 
preceded the discovery of oil, but, since the 1960s, the oil revenue generated in the Niger Delta 
has provided an important context in which that competition can be expressed. These issues will 
be explored in more detail in chapter 2 on resource extraction and Nigerian politics but, in 
summary, within this picture of competition between the dominant ethnic groups, the people of the 
Niger Delta itself (who largely fall into a number of smaller minority ethnic groups) have been 
excluded.  Accordingly, the macro-political competition for control of oil revenue, is linked to the 
increasing number of militia movements in Niger Delta, which have sought to press the claims of 
the oil-bearing communities and to reverse their systematic exclusion from the resources of their 
homeland. Accordingly, these movements have generated a number of figureheads and key 
events over the years, including the twelve-day revolution of Adaka Boro in 1966, the peaceful 
protests of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People led by Ken Saro Wiwa up until his 
hanging by the military regime in 1995, and the Kaiama Declaration by Ijaw nationalists in 1998 
From a wider discussion on resource contestation, the Niger Delta provides an ample 
experience of violent militia-based resource conflict, which suffused the region from the late 1990s 
onwards and especially between about 2004 and 2009. This conflict, as well as causing many 
deaths, has had a significant impact on Nigeria’s oil infrastructure—with global economic 
consequences—and has spawned an on-going illicit industry in oil theft, home-grown refining, 
kidnapping and piracy. These with the multiplicity of armed groups that grew up during this period, 
further complicated the already contested relationships surrounding oil resources in the region. 
Thus, the oil complex that Watts talked about in 2004 can now be said to also include a large 
number of militias and their commanders, as well as disparate elements of the Nigerian military. 
These new actors on the scene, even if they might be considered to be just modern 
manifestations of older rivalries and claims making, undoubtedly, further complicate the task of 
creating sustainable peace in the Niger Delta. Thus, I argue here that, in the context of laying the 
foundations for peace, it is vital to attain an up-to-date and nuanced understanding of Watts’ oil 
complex which still exits. To achieve this, it is necessary to understand the claims making, 
motivation and ideology of militants, who have so radically altered the political dynamics of the 
Niger Delta in recent years. This insider view from in-depth empirical study of militias, which brings 
in the lived experiences of militias with the conceptual understanding of resource governance, is 
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seen as the contribution that this research seeks to make. To do these, I outline three central 
questions which I seek to address in this study. There are; 
1. What are the features that shaped the emergence of militia action, and its diverse 
forms in the Niger Delta? 
2. How is militancy perceived in the Niger Delta, and how do militias make sense of their 
role as militants? 
3. How does the role of militants impact on the political structure and culture of resource 
governance in the region? 
1.2.1. Contemporary Views of the Niger Delta Conflict  
This section engages with a number of literature to define the boundaries of research, as 
well as discuss the relevance of NSM as key contribution to this research. It considers militants as 
relevant key actors in understanding the historical process and ideology of the conflict in Niger 
Delta. Specifically, it aims to understand the local dynamics and complex narratives which gives 
significance to the conflict in the region.  
Contemporary studies on insurgency and writings on militancy in the Niger Delta region 
reveal a scarcity of ‘insider’ views. Amongst the few contributors is Guichaoua’s (2010) survey 
which describes the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), a militia group in the western region of 
Nigeria, as patronage networks of culturally based hybrid creatures with an ideology of self-
determination as their core reformist agenda (i.e. their claims making). However, the tactics and 
homogeneity of the OPC differ from the guerrilla warfare structure/organisation of militias in the 
Niger Delta region, where oil is the symbolic context of the conflict. Within context of the conflict in 
Niger Delta region, a plethora of literature exists. Whilst, the perspectives, views or approaches to 
the conflict may differ, they emerge with commonalities around political and socio-economic 
dimensions of resource governance  (Ukiwo, 2007, 2011a; Le Billion, 2005; Collier, 2000; Collier 
et al., 2006). For instance, Collier  (2007) referred to militants in the Niger Delta, as criminals 
motivated by economic greed (Sutcliffe, 2011) . A view that stands at odds with ideology of 
emancipation or claim of political and economic marginalisation, insurgents often profess. More 
so, the greed not grievance school of thought, see insurgents or militia groups as ‘criminals or 
bandits’, taking advantage of conflict, to exploit resources for personal gains  (Sutcliffe, 2011). 
Although, these views are relevant and holds true in certain aspects of this research, it however 
does not give a true picture of the conflict, because it ignores the historical processes and political 
structure of resource governance that propel grievance in the first place.  Historical grievances 
which triggered of militancy as voiced in this research (see chapter 4), as well as the work Ukiwo 
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(2011), provide ample evidence that comes strongly against the greed not grievance school of 
thought.  
In this thesis, I have attempted to engage the grievance and not greed debate, from the 
role of identity and ideology. Identity that is important in understanding how the actions of militants in 
Niger Delta, is tied to a particular history. Whilst, I contend to that greed plays an important feature 
of the conflict in the Niger Delta, I argue that the ideology of militants which changes overtime is 
critical for understanding the process of mobilisation in the conflict. As illustrated in chapter 4 of this 
research, there are some instances where ideology of militias, is strongly contested (Adaka Boro 
and the Ogele procession). In other instances (see chapters 5 and 6), the ideology tend to be 
weakened by negotiations between militia leaders and political elites or multinational oil companies, 
thus, revealing the porous boundaries of social and material transformation (exchange of guns for 
vote, money for pipeline protection, etc.) and enabling militia leaders to gain status and wealth (Ako, 
2011). These instances of militia activities, which are very much ‘greed/entrepreneurship’ a view 
rightly echoed by other writers such as, Watts (2007); Ukiwo,( 2007); Boas (2012). Nevertheless, 
this research indicates that militants have gained prominence within mainstream political structure of 
resource governance. The ideology and entrepreneurship which goes in tandem with significance of 
militants, enables access to a greater share of the national cake. Ideology is thus important to 
understand the evolution of militancy, especially the way it is used in mobilising collective action. 
As I earlier argued in section 1.3 of this thesis, resource governance, in the context of Niger 
Delta, is fundamentally about power and distribution or redistribution of resources. The 
demonstration of power within  political economy of resource extraction, partly explains the 
emergence of militancy and manifestation of violence in the Niger Delta  (Obi, 2001, 2008).The work 
of Obi (2008), which links the conflict in the region to vested interest of ‘global hegemonic forces’ 
that sees oil as vital and globally needed. These also  explains the militarisation of the region for the 
continued uninterrupted flow along with the protection of oil investment and workers, at all cost  
 (Osaghae et al., 2007; Ukiwo, 2011b). The exercise of political power is also explained from 
sophisticated technology needed in the oil industry. According to Ukiwo, (2011), “oil begins to flow 
only when interest of technology and power coincide” p19. These invariably means that even the 
technology needed for oil production, marginalises local host oil bearing communities, to spur the 
violence in region. The exercise of power in process of resource extraction is also evident in the 
legal framework of resource extraction  (Emeseh, 2011). The laws such as the land use act, of 1979, 
dispossess the rights of host communities in resource exploration or production, is voiced by 
militants and key informants in this research (see Chapter 2 section 2.3.4 and also empirical 4).  
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Another key highlight from existing literature and this research, is the labelling of 
militancy in Niger Delta region. Labelling explains how militants see themselves and how they are 
perceived by Nigerian state, oil companies, communities and media, to inform utterances and 
exchange of communication within structure and process of access to resources. Whilst the 
Nigerian state, see militants as criminals, bandits or restive youths, the militants, see themselves 
as freedom fighter, liberators or resource agitators (as voiced in this research). The state and non-
state actors, locals and the media seem to recognise that the activities of militant groups in the 
Niger Delta can mean different things to different people. Alternatively, they might be viewed 
positively as protectors of their community, or even as “businessmen” getting what they can out of 
the fractured environment in which they happen to live. These labels, however, have not allowed 
for a more informed and in-depth understanding of militia actions in the Niger Delta region, 
resulting in the need for this research. Therefore, labelling which reveal power relations and 
authority within social constructs as well as access to benefits, form an important lens of this 
research.  
However, whilst the labelling, reiterate the greed not grievance debates, it downplays the 
failures of political elites to maintain social order. Thus we need to look beyond the dominance of 
interest and greed, to identify how the macro political culture and contest of resources, impact 
differently on individuals and groups and how these impact influence the restructuring of strategies 
and tactics, livelihood patterns, and governable spaces in Niger Delta region ( illustrated in 
chapters 5 and 6).  Therefore, it can be argued that criminality of militancy, from the activities of oil 
bunkering, kidnapping for ransom, bank robberies and sea piracy  (Cuvelier et al., 2014; Ukiwo, 
2007), only tells the existence of petro capitalism  (Watts, 2004, 2007). A situation whereby 
resource revenues are controlled by few elites within patronage networks. Moreover, resource 
conflicts, provide incentive to wealth as well as, a means of, or motive for patronage. Such 
networks which exacerbates inequalities and alters local context of power, induce alternative ways 
of survival paths in communities (Gore and Pratten, 2003; Osaghae et al., 2007). As Boas (2012), 
rightly states, if we consider criminality of militants as greed, then it’s a greed born out of poverty 
and inequality inherent to Nigeria’s petro-capitalism. Therefore, militancy needs to be understood, 
as an attempt to address social injustice as well as, a mode of production and a way of living 
(Boas, 2012).  More so, the greed or criminality of militants explains the culture of impunity, and 
lack of accountability by ruling elites  (Courson, 2011). A criminality that aligns with the idea of 
resource curse, which establishes a relationship between crude oil and incentives for militias to 




Equally, social relation between varied layers of actors, which revolve around dominant 
interest, coheres with corruption, poverty and the violence in Niger Delta region. Violence which 
strongly relates to the nature of response by the Nigerian state that triggers the rise and 
significance of militancy as empirically voiced in this thesis (see chapter 4). Arguably, patterns of 
violence and repertoires of contention, also account for ideologies of state and non-state actors, 
as it influence shifts from non-violence to violent approach  (Wood, 2015) as illustrated in chapter 
6.  Militancy represents a  site of violence with varied interpretations of meanings  (Omotola, 
2010), which can be seen as a continuum of competitive struggle. Also, militant groups in the 
Niger Delta region are interlinked through formal and informal relationships with state and non-
state actors, which has encouraged a clandestine economy of protection, kidnapping and 
targeting of expatriate oil workers, as well as state-sponsored reprisals against rival warlords 
 (Orogun, 2003). On this account, the violent struggles for resource control in Niger Delta which 
inform claims of ownership, access and equity, can be argued as grounded in political culture of 
resource extraction.   
Although social movements often do not aim to overthrow regimes (Wood, 2015), when 
compared to civil wars, the violent actions of militias, (mostly from the poor and uneducated), have 
demonstrated the ability/ capacity (see also chapter 5 and 6) that threatens Nigeria’ oil production. 
Hence, it can be argued that the conflict in Niger Delta, present features of ‘New Wars’  (Kaldor, 
2013), as coalition of militias, under united platform as Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta 
(MEND), which liberalised the exercise and monopoly of state violence. Another feature of New War 
character of Niger Delta conflict, is the localised presence of crude oil enmeshed in communities 
along the rivers, swamps and creeks. The militias are well structured and organised heterogeneous 
groups  (Oronto et al., 2004) mobilised around informal social network ties, with the capacity and 
skills to handle weapons. However, their internal structures are hardly known. They are dynamic, 
and compete for territorial control, so as to secure access to varied forms of oil benefits. Moreover, 
members of militia groups tend to exhibit a striking devotion to, and dependency on, their leadership 
structures. These militia leaders are perceived in complex ways: they are dreaded by the local 
people or seen as “messiahs” by community members, who view the actions of militants as a 
legitimate means of gaining access to oil benefits to improve the welfare and livelihoods of people in 
rural communities. Whether feared or loved, militia leaders are now afforded status and recognition 
within formally recognised institutional structures of resource governance and informal social 
network ties in the region. As a result, militias were able to mobilise resources (money, skilled and 
unskilled individuals/network) and supports within identity, seen as asymmetric warfare, which is 
distinct from conventional patterns of warfare (Boas, 2012).   In sum, militancy, illustrates a violent 
conflict over the control of resources, illuminating the resource curse paradigm- presence of crude 
oil within decrepit livelihoods, corruption and mismanagement. Also, the conflict informs the 
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significance and relations to global political economy of resources, as well as the importance of 
identity politics within frames of New Wars. It reveals a porous boundary of social interaction 
between militia and political elites, divulging the failure of the Nigerian state to establish good 
governance, accountability and strong institutions. A view that further brings to fore the challenges of 
how themes of ‘good governance’ should transit to better outcomes, as demonstrated in empirical 
chapters of this research.  
Adopting a sociological lens, this work argues, amongst other things, that the emergence 
and actions of militants in the Niger Delta region is a reaction to their lived experiences and a 
reflection of a desire to seek specific change. They are engaged in ‘claims making’ which is 
intrinsically linked to perceived injustice and a lack of opportunity, and these claims are validated 
and activated in forms, and against targets, that are dictated by the unique political, cultural and 
economic circumstances within which they operate. I argue that they are not interest groups, as 
they do not carry out their activities only within the formally established political structure, but are a 
plurality of militant groups taking actions and expressing the meanings of their actions both within 
formal and informal socio-political space. 
In summary, the multi-dimensional effects of crude oil, guns, competing interests and 
territorial instability create a situation in which conflict is all but inevitable. Whilst there is 
considerable literature on these interrelationships, very little attention, however, has been paid to 
the inner meanings of actions as constructed by militants themselves. Undoubtedly, accessing the 
inner meanings, dispositions and ambitions of militia action from the viewpoint of militants is 
problematic. Whilst one might acknowledge that these militants may be criminals, oil thieves, 
kidnappers, robbers or private armies, there remains a need to unpick the complexity of these 
negative labels if we are to gain a better understanding of militancy in the region by exploring the 
intersection between the macro structure of oil governance and micro-lived experiences/subjective 
meanings, which militants bring into the Niger Delta conflict. I, therefore, argue that we cannot 
understand these complexities fully without accessing the ‘inside world’ of militancy. It is into this 
gap in current research, that this study attempts to offer an experiential, insider view of militia 







1.3. NSM: An Approach for understanding the Niger Delta Militancy 
The preceding section has attempt to provide some reasons why this research is 
important. This section aims to provide the relevance of NSM and why I have adopted the NSM 
approach to this study. It examines how NSM is defined and what its features and characteristics 
are. The later sections of this chapter will build on this understanding to show how NSM might be 
applied to militancy in Niger Delta and thus form a valid initial theoretical model for addressing the 
questions of this research. And through this lens, identify some specific concepts/issues, which 
would help to answer the research questions posed in the previous section of this chapter. One of 
the objective of this research, is to conduct an analysis of the construction of militia action from the 
perspective of militant. Thus, a potential theoretical model for accessing an “insider” view of the 
micro interactions, structures, strategies and tactics, which go together is New Social Movements 
theory.  NSM is deemed appropriate for this study as it offers, a strand of appealing ideas and 
arguments for understanding issues of identity, conflict and power.  
This research holds the view that resource governance is fundamentally about power and 
the distribution or re-distribution of resources. And what this thesis attempts to do, is to engage 
key actors called ‘militants’ involvement in that process of contesting power and access to the 
distribution of resource benefits. Thus it aims to explore the characteristics of militias, their 
organisation, aspiration/ambitions within macro structure and context of resource governance. In 
order to understand how power is been mobilised and articulated, I align with the ideas and 
perspectives of New Social Movement (NSM) that, helps me to analyse this particular agents 
called ‘militants’ within structure-agency relations of conflict over resources. In particular, it helps 
to identify the framing process of conflict over resources, which actuates key issues such as 
‘Identity and beliefs’. More importantly identity that hinges on solidarity, shared meanings and 
beliefs, which induce ideology and platform for collective action, as demonstrated in chapter 4 of 
this thesis. The identity helps to locate the context of what individuals and groups believe and how 
it affects behaviours, in this particular case, a behaviour of violence and its reproduction within the 
political economy of resource competition.  
In addition, NSM as the potential for examining the issues of (1) collective action, (2) 
organised structures, (3) shared beliefs, and (4) conflict and power, within macro political 
processes and contestations around  governance of resources. Especially, analysing the 
processes of collective identities and how these are constituted and legitimised. These four key 
themes, gives insight to processes and mobilisation of conflict, which are inherently tied to shared- 
meaning, beliefs and identity, whereby militants, are seen as social actors having the knowledge 
and capacity to self-reflect on their actions. More so, I find the NSM useful as it focuses more on 
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micro level agency and these allows me explore the role and activities of militants, in particular, 
how they position themselves within the structure and political processes of oil governance.  
The use of NSM is relevant for this research, as it offers a potential for understanding 
militancy and conflict from a micro perspective, as it offers a button-up approach that is useful for 
understanding the local dynamics, the mobilisation of youth/militias and how they see themselves, 
think and act within the context and political of power over the governance of resource. Moreover, 
it makes a connection between the organisation of conflict, beliefs and shared identity. In addition, 
this research contributes to broader literature by bringing the voices of these key actors (militants) 
from an insider perspective and viewing this from the lenses of New Social Movement (NSM). A 
voice that is heard, but misunderstood, or a voice that is not just heard or silenced. Nevertheless, I 
am not particularly tied to the ideas of NSM, but I find it useful because it helps in making sense of 
mobilisation of conflict, the shared beliefs and identity, which are tied together. Accordingly, I try to 
provide some definitions and characteristics of NSM in preceding paragraphs.  
Social Movements theory has come to be divided into “old” and “new” social movements. 
Although there is no agreed way of defining the difference between these, the term may take 
proactive or reactive forms according to varied ideological positions, social locations and context 
 (Melucci, 1989; Castells, 1997). It refers to groups of people with shared history and experiences 
who are taking action against the state or authorities  (Touraine, 1985). It is also viewed as, an 
organised effort by a significant group of people who feel alienated, dominated or unequal and 
are, therefore, prompted to effect or resist change by acting within or outside the law, or a 
combination of both  (Tilly et al., 2001). Likewise, the term entails a common purpose and identity 
within disruptive actions arising from claims making against opponents  (Tarrow, 1994). Social 
movements activate the dynamics and complexities of social interactions within clusters of political 
practices, where individuals engage in forms of claims making with those who hold the power to 
influence decisions and behaviours  (Guigni, 1999). When viewed in relation to militancy and 
militia actions in the Niger Delta, these definitions tell us that any form of movement may contain 
elements of history, context, claims making, domination, identity, collective action and power. 
Furthermore, the views of McCarthy and Zald  (1977) find relevance in analysing the conflict 
situation in the delta, as they sought to separate what constitutes social movement from a social 
movement organisation. They defined Social Movement (SM) as a:  
Set of opinions and beliefs in a population which 
represent preferences for changing some element of 
social structure and/or reward distribution of society 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977: p 1217) 
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A Social Movement Organisation (SMO), on the other hand, is a complex interaction of 
informal groups or organisations which identifies with, and attempts to implement its goals in 
accordance with the preferences of a Social Movement. When applied to this research, I argue 
that ethnic minorities particularly the Ogonis and Ijaws of the Niger Delta region, represent a social 
movement, whilst the militants are social movement organisations. Militants are groups with 
common histories and circumstances taking action to seek some specific change at the individual 
or group level. They are a plurality of informal groups, whose actions create identity and meanings 
to achieve a particular end. As McAdam and Snow  (1997) and McAdam et al.  (2008) argue, 
social movements constitute shared ideas and activities that are concerned with changing a 
pattern of social life. While individuals or groups with shared ideas for change do not necessarily 
constitute a social movement, when such individuals or groups are involved in collective action 
they can be viewed as a social movement, especially where, in contrast to interest groups, they 
are operating outside established political institutions.  
1.3.1. Characteristics of New Social Movement  
New Social Movements theory emerged as a response to a number of socio-political 
events in Europe from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s. It seeks to theorise the rise of 
contemporary social movements and their relationship with macroeconomic structures, including 
the role culture plays within such movements  (Pichardo, 1997). It presents a distinct view of 
social movements, as it focuses on issues such as the relationships between identity, personal 
behaviours and quality of life, including the connections between the macro socio-political system 
and how individuals fit into, respond to, or change such a system. It constitutes a paradigm shift 
from social movements of the industrial age  (Olofsson, 1988) by moving away from instrumental 
issues of industrialism to issues concerning quality of life that are common in post-materialistic 
societies  (Buechler, 1995). NSM engages issues that question the structures of democratic 
representation that constrain citizens’ participation in governance  (Offe, 1985). 
Another feature of NSM is its self-reflective character, which suggests that participants or 
members of movements constantly question the meanings of their actions  (Gusfield, 1994b). This 
self-reflection induces a conscious choice of action, dictating the kind of tactics and structure 
adopted by members of the movement. These structures are often fluid and carry an anti-
institutional posture, including the type of representative government they desire  (Kitschelt, 1993). 
According to Arato and Cohen  (1984), participants of NSM are not defined by class boundaries, 
but by common concerns, values and ideology rather than common structural locations. NSM 
places emphasis on the subjective consciousness of actors  (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). It 
represents a shift to post-material values, stressing issues of identity, participation and quality of 
life. NSM, therefore, is characterised by the increased politicisation of social life and it is the 
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plurality of the social arena and the proliferation of the political space that lies behind it. A central 
characteristic of NSM is the rapid spread of new forms of struggle in which every subject position 
is constituted within an unstable discursive structure  (Pichardo, 1997). The proliferation of these 
forms of struggle is a result of the increasing autonomy of individuals within the social and political 
sphere. Furthermore, the mode of mobilisation in NSM, is not bound to precedence or conforming 
to rule  (Gusfield, 1994a), rather they do take radical forms distinct from the tactics of working 
class movements like civil disobedience.  
NSM rejects the Marxist theories of social movements which dominated European 
thought during the 1960s and 1970s. The Marxist view centred on “working-class” actions that 
were principally concerned with economic redistribution. Scholars within the Marxist orientation 
were unable to provide a convincing explanation as to why students became the vanguard of 
protest, and why movements’ demands centred around quality of life rather than economic 
redistributive issues  (Epstein, 1990; Plotke, 1990; Touraine, 1981). NSM also rejects the 
rationalist notion of the “social” as groundless but tends, rather, to assume its plurality. According 
to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), society cannot be seen as a rational and intelligible entity, as the 
‘social’ can never be fully constituted in a positivist way. Popular mobilisation, therefore, is no 
longer based on the model of a homogenous total society, or seen in terms of a single conflict, but 
constitutes a plurality of concrete demands leading to a proliferation of political spaces. It is about 
the politicisation of everyday life rather than focusing on the macro state and economy  (Calhoum, 
2002).  
The proponents of NSM argue that every society is centred upon a particular mode of 
organisation and history, which gives rise to a central conflict  (Touraine, 1981, 1985). It departs, 
however, from the “crude Marxist” view that conflict is inevitably one in which the proletariats of 
capitalist societies seek to liberate themselves by forcefully seizing control of centralised state 
institutions in order to reform structures through the means of economic production. According to 
Touraine (1985), NSM refers to a specific type of conflict which evolves in line with the changing 
nature of societies. It is concerned with issues of territorial space of action, individual or group-
lived experiences, or the physical environment, including cultural, ethnic and linguistic heritage 
and identity. The central core conflict may often be expressed by embattled ethnic minorities 
 (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). NSM as a theory, therefore, addresses new forms of identity 
 (Melucci, 1989) within areas previously not central to contentious politics  (Ruggiero and 
Montagna, 2008), such as gender differences, peace, self-realisation and general quality of life. It 
represents a shift from conflict over material well-being to conflict over cultural fulfilment focusing 
on personal identity.   
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NSM is also associated with a set of beliefs, values and meanings that constitute 
sentiments of belonging to differentiated social groups  (Crossley, 2002), where members have an 
image of themselves with new forms of socially constructed meanings of everyday life. Within the 
purview of NSM, a movement is seen as the definition of the individual self, where actions are a 
complex mix of collective and individual confirmations of identity, drawing attention to the 
interaction between individual experiences at the micro level and the wider political economy of a 
system in which personal behaviours are bonded  (Crossley, 2002). However, there is the 
tendency to use the term New Social Movement too broadly to capture issues in all new forms of 
collective action, or the tendency to give the concept more explanatory power than it empirically 
warrants. The NSM approach has also been criticised for its narrow focus on normal daily ways of 
acting and reflecting  (Crossley, 2002).  
1.4. Militancy: As shared set of opinions/beliefs: identity 
Turning now to apply this understanding of NSM theory in relation to how the militants in 
the Niger Delta region comprehend their actions, I argue that the importance of the concept of 
identity within the militancy provides a point of contact with NSM theory. Within such theory, 
identity is the individual cognitive, moral and emotional aspect that relates to broader community, 
categories, institutions or practices. It is a perception of shared status that is distinct from personal 
identities  (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). According to Polletta and Jasper (2001), identity describes 
imagined as well as concrete communities. It is an act of perception and construction, which also 
includes pre-existing ties, interests and territorial boundaries. It is not fixed, but fluid, and is based 
on relational things and interactions with bystanders, allies, opponents and news media or state 
authorities.  
Identity as a motivator for social movements is, therefore, viewed as an alternative to the 
perceived gap of the collective behaviourist approach that views protesters as irrational individuals 
persuaded by the nature of system in given society (Polletta and Jasper, 2001).  Mobilisation and 
process theorists, meanwhile, focus rather on structural and organisational shifts which induce 
actors/agents to act collectively, while the collective identity approach is used by the political 
process theorist in explaining how structural inequalities are transposed into subjective discontent 
 (Mueller, 1992). Identity in the context of social movements, violent protests, and resistance or 
militia actions is a problematic concept, however. While such actions may involve a shared set of 
opinions and beliefs  (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), together with solidarity and identity within an 
interacting collective  (Touraine, 1985; Tilly, 2003),such commonly shared opinions or beliefs do 
not necessarily entail the presence of shared feelings of belonging  (Schlesinger, 1987).  
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According to Ruggiero and Montagna (2008), while shared collective identity defines the 
boundaries of a social movement (since only those who share the same beliefs and sense of 
belonging may provoke the collective action that is characteristic of social movements), this 
collective identity does not necessarily imply homogeneity, since individuals within groups may not 
act in the overall interest of the group. Indeed, social movements may well comprise factions, 
since the presence of shared beliefs and solidarities allows actors and observers to assign a 
common meaning to specific collective events which may not necessarily be part of a common 
process  (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). Thus, the boundaries of a social movement network 
are, therefore, identified by the specific collective identity shared by the actors involved in the 
interactions. Movements may also rely on pre-existing networks, organisational skills, solidarity, 
tactics and strategies, which are the pre-conditions for collective action, often linked to shared 
grievances and beliefs, discontent, or structural strains within systems. 
 Discontent in any given society is determined by institutional changes directly or 
indirectly affecting individuals’ everyday life, including the increasing perception that deprivation 
can be fought and redressed  (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008; Crossley, 2002).  Social 
movements may also emerge from the activities of specific actors who influence collective action. 
Such actors utilise the political opportunities to challenge existing institutional authorities. 
According to Smelser  (1962), movements are identified by initiating events: a particular individual 
event at the start of a chain reaction in a given society. These processes may take the form of 
inspirational leaders or other forms of mobilisation that encourage people to join a movement or 
engage in a particular movement action. It may be a sustained process, whereby people come to 
understand a movement goal and empower themselves to take action on behalf of that goal. 
In determining the extent to which NSM theory can provide a helpful framework for the 
understanding of militancy in the Niger Delta, it is necessary to consider the nature of the shared 
identity within and between the militia groups, particularly in terms of shared grievances and 
beliefs, and to what extent this shared sense of belonging can underpin and sustain collective 
militant action. This is further linked to the question raised by this research: do the militants have a 
shared sense of purpose, or is their sense of belonging an opportunistic and transitory collective 
identity? Another factor involved is the extent to which inspirational leaders play a role in shaping 
and defining that identity, within the historical structure of Nigeria’s political economy and current 




1.4.1. Militancy: As Collective Action/Strategic Choice 
As implied in the previous paragraph, a shared sense of identity is, in itself, insufficient to 
provoke a decision to take an active part in a social movement. According to Polletta and Jasper 
(2001), people will often opt to free-ride irrespective of having a common interest in an issue and, 
while a shared identity may help to encapsulate the reasons and inner meanings why people 
might be open to mobilisation, the actual decision to participate is informed by personal identities 
and personal strategic choice. The strategic choice of people to mobilise is conditioned by what 
they believe, what they are comfortable with, what they like as people, and who they are  (Polletta 
and Jasper, 2001). In many circumstances social movements that possess a sense of shared 
belonging and grievance may fail to progress to become active social movement organisations 
since the circumstances in a given society may not be conducive to persuade a critical mass of 
members to decide to participate directly in actions to further the group’s goals (e.g. other outlets 
for grievances, effective law enforcement, etc.). In addition, movements that are strongly based on 
shared identity need to be able to adapt to cultural transformations and changes in social norms, 
and in how groups see themselves and are seen by others, if they are to remain representative 
and relevant to their identity constituency. How a group frames its identity (exclusively or 
inclusively) is argued to depend on the setting and audience to which it is speaking  (Polletta and 
Jasper, 2001), the kind of opposition it confronts, and the organisational linkages it has to other 
groups or movements.  
One objective of this research is to explore how individual interests are linked to 
structures of movement organisations/collective action, and how meaning or labels attached to 
militancy/militia action, evolve and relate to the cognitive world of militants. Hence, a significant 
theme which partly informs militia action in the Niger Delta region is motivation for joining a militant 
group. Motivation plays a key role in understanding collective action. Authors such as Zald and 
McCarthy  (1987) argue that people do not join movements of collective action because they have 
a cause; rather, they join for personal gain. Others such as Ruggiero and Montagna (2008), also 
argue that a group’s oriented behaviour remains hidden until some selective incentive stimulates 
potential for collective action. These arguments which gives a pointer to resource contestation, are 
what I seek to explore from questions outlined in the previous section of this chapter. Moreover, 
motivation for collective action is most effective in environments where individuals or groups have 
the strongest networks to mobilise (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). These networks are activated 
from similar attributes or positions of individuals or groups, as well as from the opportunities and 
perceptions created by these network positions  (Breiger, 2004). Tilly (1993), on the other hand, 
explains why a complex web of interactions and relationship, further help to sustain conflict in a 
given setting, by arguing that: 
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The relationship between an activity, the sets of agents 
that control the means that might make the activity 
possible, the bargaining that goes on between the agents 
and the activity, and those who hold the resources, 
produce unexpected set of structures that themselves 
constrain the next round of action (Tilly 1993:p6) 
Mindful of these positions, this research will partly seek to explore the complex 
relationships of militant groups and between the individuals that make up these groups, including 
the interactions and incentives that tip the balance towards taking action. In addition, in reference 
to Tilly (as quoted above) the research will look at how these complex interactions between militia 
group leaders and other agents and actors inform and constrain how a group’s actions evolve. All 
of these issues are particularly pertinent in the context of the Niger Delta militancy due to the fluid 
nature of the groups themselves, with frequent splits, territorial disputes and rapidly changing 
allegiances and interactions with other major actors (such as the Nigerian military, politicians and 
the oil companies). In this fluid context, how group actions evolve and how group identity and 
purpose is maintained are important issues. 
1.4.2. Militancy: as organised structures, tactical identity/transformation 
In order to develop an understanding of how the militants of the Niger Delta region 
choose strategies, tactics and targets, as well as their group structures, NSM theory also argues 
that actors/agents have choices/options that relate to who they are. The old social movement 
approaches, such as resource mobilisation and political process theories, tended to lend 
themselves to classical models of decision making  (Polletta and Jasper, 2001), where 
actors/agents adopt strategies appropriate to their environmental constraints and opportunities 
based on a rational cost-benefit analysis  (Barkan, 1979; McAdam et al., 1988). Making decisions 
on the basis of collective identity, however, can be seen as an alternative to these instrumental 
criteria. Identity claims represent a protest strategy rather than instrumental logic. People may 
choose to adopt a particular tactic irrespective of whether they have the ability to attain their goals. 
Tactical identities also send unspoken messages such as: “we are people who do these sorts of 
things in this particular way”. The actions and decisions themselves serve to define the identities 
of members by saying “we are proud of the particular style of action we take”  (Polletta and 
Jasper, 2001). The tactical choice of the action or strategy of a movement may originate in 
collective identities that exist independently of the group  (Emmis, 1987). According to Pfaff 
 (1995), actors/agents construct, de-construct, celebrate or enact collective identity through 
strategies of protest in ways that can inspire increased participation and constrain the actions its 
opponents can take.  
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The question worth reflecting on, therefore, is to what extent can militants in the Niger 
Delta be categorised as making tactical choices, that conform with notions of the conscious 
expression of a collective identity or, as Whitter  (1995) puts it, as people with distinct problems 
and interests, having a common platform of shared knowledge of their environment. In other 
words, utilising the argument of Snow and Benford  (1992), to what extent do the militants of the 
Niger Delta construct their strategic actions from their shared understanding of their environment 
and of themselves? Or, as Tilly  (1995) argues, people do not employ routines of collective action 
they are not familiar with, as each society has a stock of familiar forms of action that are known by 
both challengers and opponents. This, then, might represent a way of exploring the varied forms 
of labelling for the actions of the militias of the Niger Delta that were listed earlier in this chapter. 
To what extent are these labels representative of this shared understanding of the communal 
boundaries of action? To what extent are the militias adopting familiar forms of action that send a 
recognisable message? How do militias’ identification with territories, social network ties, symbols, 
language and beliefs serve to construct prototypes of actions based on previous experiences of 
protest and violent actions in the region? Moreover, writers such as Epstein  (1991) and 
Lichterman  (1999) argue that the primary goal of movements is more about changing identity. 
Identity is not just about building solidarity, but changing individual selves and relationships in 
ways that extend beyond the movement. Therefore, movement’s transforms member’s 
subsequent biographies, whether or not the movement has an explicit goal. Moreover, members 
of movements, whilst acting to emancipate themselves from alienation or frustration, become 
subjects of their own histories, thereby redefining their identity and developing a new sense of 
self.  
1.4.3. Militancy: Conflict and Power 
The concept of conflict and power are central to understanding the militancy in the Niger 
Delta region. Indeed, resource endowed environments are often prone to conflicts. They are seen 
as arenas for contested entitlements and have been described as a theatre of struggles over 
property rights and the politics of recognition  (Nauman, 1996). Studying conflicts in resource-
endowed environments entails the careful documentation of an array of differentiated actors, 
social movements, state agents and institutional networks, as well as exploration of the ways they 
operate within historically and culturally constituted fields of power. Resource struggles also 
provide an understanding of how human practice and knowledge are subverted, contested and 
redefined in relation to a specific environment  (Peet and Watts, 1996). Resource-rich 
environments also induce claims or contestations with similar effects across a wide range of 
circumstances or events, often attributed to widespread frustration, extremism or competition 
 (Tilly, 2003). These contestations tend to widen the political and social space between claimants 
during contentious episodes, and this then further polarises and promotes collective violence, 
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raising the stakes for winning or losing and providing opportunities to initiate action against 
perceived enemies  (Tilly, 2003; Tarrow, 1994).  
Developing these arguments into the context of the conflict in the Niger Delta, it can be 
argued that the militancy reflects a situation of contentious politics, which involves government 
actors as monitors and claimants and indigenous social movements’ efforts in seeking legitimacy 
and recognition in management and access to resource benefits. In addition, everyday life for 
most movement members is marked by forms of political oppression and economic misery, in 
which some form of political power is needed for individuals to survive (Evers, 1985). There is the 
tendency, therefore, for movements, after mobilising around certain concrete issues, to gain 
access to established political structures. In order to expand their influence, movement leaders 
often become engaged with existing political structures, even where this may risk the movement’s 
existence. In other words, social movements cannot exist without some form of political 
expression to articulate their aims to a broader power structure from which they would otherwise 
be alienated. The political expression of social movements is, thus, a necessary part of their 
existence. 
1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to explain the context and rationale for this research, and argues 
that studies on the Niger Delta conflict have not explored the disposition and experiential views of 
members of militant groups, who are actively involved in the lingering conflict. The chapter 
provides a background of the context and geographical parameters of the study, as well as the 
genesis and scope of study. It also sets out the significance of this inquiry and articulates three 
research questions which the study will ultimately seek to answer. The chapter focuses on one 
particular sociological theory—namely, New Social Movements theory (NSM), as offering a unique 
insight into the world of militants as well as providing a framework of potential issues that can be 
explored further later in the research. Indeed, NSM coheres with issue of identity, power and 
individual/groups quality of life, as it provides some explanation as to how the macro political 
system of governance within a given society, intersects with individuals/groups lived experiences.  
Furthermore, ideas of NSM, contend with how individuals/groups fit into, and respond to 
changes within a given system of governance. In this particular case, actions/resistance of militant 
groups in response to resource governance (oil) in Nigeria vis-à-vis the Niger Delta region. In 
situating militancy within the ambit of NSM, some key features and concepts such as conflict, 
collective identity/action and power, find relevance in helping to describe and interpret militants as 
people with shared history and experience, taking action and making claims on behalf of 
communities in Niger Delta, against the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies. Within 
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purview of NSM, militants can be argued as representing imagined/concrete community, whose 
actions are based on perception and construction of meanings with pre-existing ties and fluid 
boundaries of interest.  
Given these accounts, I argue that the Niger Delta region can be broadly viewed in line 
with McCarthy and Zald’s  (1977) definition of Social Movement (SM), as people with a set opinion 
and belief which represent preferences for changing some element of the socio-political structure 
resource governance. It represents an area of contested entitlement that illustrates a struggle of 
power over right and recognition of resource ownership. The belief and preferences in Niger Delta 
region, is attributable to the emergence of militia movements, which can be seen as a Social 
Movement Organisation (SMO), that illustrates a set of belief and meanings that constitute 
sentiment of belonging. In order words, militants are collective agents with an identity that cannot 
be easily detached from ‘real’ interest of its members. Interestingly, the sense of shared meaning 
and sentiment of belong amongst individuals/groups, does not necessarily mean they are willing 
to pursue a common collective interest on behalf of the group  (McAdam et al., 2008). Moreover, 
the identity of militants as collective agents is not maintained in isolation, as they appear to 
interact within a complex web of formal and informal relations with state and non-state actors, 
which help to define it role and significance within the broader political structure of oil governance 
in Nigeria.  
In general, this thesis does not necessarily seek to argue that the situation in the Niger 
Delta should be seen as a classic example of a new social movement, given that—the cultural and 
socio-economic dissimilarities with the principally European and North American contexts in which 
New Social Movements theory has typically been articulated and applied are too extreme for that. 
Rather, it seeks to establish the extent to which the militancy in the Niger Delta exhibits aspects of 
a new social movement which serves as a template through which to develop potentially valid 
questions about the motivations, structures, interactions and development of militias in the Niger 
Delta which can then be tested during the course of the research. In summary, this chapter 
articulates the background, broad rationale and set of questions that the research as a whole will 
deal with. The following chapter will appraise a review of literature on the significance of resource 
extraction and governance. The aim is to provide insight on how macro political structures of 




Chapter Two: Significance of resource extraction 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the literature on resource extraction and governance. It attempts to 
link macro structures with micro lived experiences and locate the experience of Nigeria in the wider 
context of resource governance. Accordingly, the chapter looks at (a) global and regional politics of 
resource extraction, (b) the history of Nigeria’s political economy and identity politics (c) state-
society relations and policies of resource extraction, (d) political repression and the trajectory of 
militancy. Together these aims to inform the processes and features that help shape the emergence 
of militancy and the particular form in which it emerged. This introduction provides some key events 
in the Niger Delta, which propelled mobilisation.   
Within the Niger Delta region, the culmination of environmental degradation, gas flares, and 
the lack of participation or capacity to manage resources or seek redress regarding environmental 
policies, and the deep-rooted political frustration has induced a feeling of marginalisation and 
secession in the Niger Delta. By the late 1960s through to the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of 
movements and host oil communities began to mobilise against the alliance of oil companies and 
the Nigerian state. The first of these was led by Isaac Adaka Boro and his Niger Delta Volunteer 
Force (NDVF) on 23 February,, 1966. The NDVF threatened to secede from the Nigerian state by 
declaring a Niger Delta Republic. The claim and action of the NDVF was for self-determination 
 (Adaka Boro, 1982) and resource control, due to fears of domination and control of resources by 
the other ethnic majority groups in Nigerian polity. Isaac Adaka Boro’s twelve-day revolution was, 
however, crushed by the Nigerian military in early March 1966. A second uprising began in the 
aftermath of the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others on 10 November 1995. Ken Saro Wiwa 
was an environmental activist who had led the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP), which had consistently challenged Shell Oil Company and the Nigerian state over the 
environmental despoliation, human rights’ violations, and the unjust control over ‘their oil’. The 
subsequent hanging of the ‘Ogoni nine’ sparked widespread international condemnation and 
outrage and became a harbinger for intense conflict and the proliferation of armed groups and 
communities with burgeoning claims for compensation and recognition in regard to resource rights. 
The growing awareness of these issues led to the 1998 famous Kaiama Declaration by Ijaw 
youths in the Niger Delta. The Kaiama Declaration also helped to set the stage for armed struggles 
in the Niger Delta. It was an historic gathering of youths from over 500 communities, representing 
over 40 clans/kingdoms that make up the Ijaw nation. The gathering was aimed at considering ways 




The Kaiama Declaration made the following observations: 
 That it was through British colonisation that the Ijaw nation was forcibly put under 
the Nigerian state. 
 
 That but for the economic interest of the imperialists, the Ijaw ethnic nationality 
would have evolved as a distinct and separate sovereign nation enjoying undiluted political, 
economic, social and cultural autonomy. 
 
 That the division of the Southern Protectorate into East and West in 1939 by the 
British marked the beginning of the balkanisation of hitherto territorially contiguous and culturally 
homogenous Ijaw people into political and administrative units. 
 
 That the principle of Derivation in Revenue Allocation has been consciously and 
systematically obliterated by successive regimes of the Nigerian state. We note the drastic reduction 
of the Derivation principle from 100% (1953), 50% (1960), 45% (1970), 20% (1975), 2% (1982), 
1.5% (1984), to 3% (1992) and 13% in 1995. 
 
 That the violence in Ijaw land and other parts of the Niger Delta area, sometimes 
manifesting in intra and inter-ethnic conflicts are sponsored by the State and transnational oil 
companies to keep the communities of the Niger Delta divided, weak and distracted from the causes 
of their problems. The various points made in the Kaiama Declaration will be examined in different 
sections of this chapter. In particular, the chapter will examine the issue of resource governance and 
revenue distribution in Nigeria, beginning with a comparative examination of how this issue has 
affected protest, resistance or violence in other resource-rich environments before focus on Nigeria 
vis-a-vis- the Niger Delta.  
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2.2. Global and Regional Policies of Resource Extraction 
Mineral resources influences a complex configuration of power and interest. It is truly a 
double-edged sword  (Maconachie, 2008). On the one hand it attracts sovereignty  (Ross, 2004), 
gives hope of improved welfare and livelihoods. On the other hand, it brings about frustration, social 
exclusion, violence and form of insecurity. Moreover, the processes of managing resources, often 
create complexities in respect to governance for both formal and informal institutions  (Adger et al., 
2005b). According to Adger et al.,  (2005a) structures of resource governance can be based on the 
exercise of power through domination, resistance or cooperation. It also has the potential to raise 
questions of legitimacy. A number of case studies have shown that many resource-endowed 
countries lack effective public authority, legitimacy or capacity to manage resource revenues 
 (Unworth, 2010; Maconachie, 2008; Moore et al., 2009). Case studies in Sierra Leone, Peru, Bolivia 
and Ecuador, illustrates how the centralisation or de-centralisation of resources, induce struggles of 
recognition and political interest amongst individual/groups, that either weakens or strengthens 
institutional capacities (Maconachie, 2008; Unworth, 2010). It also shows how structures of resource 
governance fail to take sufficient account of pre-existing political and institutional arrangements.  
Studies from Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador illustrate how structures of resource governance 
change the configuration of interest, with implications at the local and regional levels. Peru, for 
example, adopted a policy of fiscal decentralisation, which enabled the transfer of a significant part 
of its mining tax revenues back to both mining and non-mining regions. The case of Peru is different 
with Nigeria, where the structure of resource governance reversed from the regions to the centre. In 
the Nigerian case, the inconsistencies in the distribution of oil revenue is a major concern to the 
ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta  (Ikein, 2003; Ikporukpo, 2004). The significance of resource  
inform frequent shifts in the process of sharing oil revenues among the geo-political units of the 
country has served to create disparities in the region’s development  (Osuntokun, 1979).  According 
to Ikein  (2003), the centralised structure of resources, empowers the federal government to collect 
the bulk of oil revenues to the disadvantage the oil-bearing communities from the benefits of the 
allocation system. Ikporukpo (2004) supports this view by arguing that the controversial nature of the 
revenue derivation principle is shown not only in the number of attempts to reach an acceptable 
criterion, but also in the diversity of literature debating the issue. These inconsistencies and 
contentions have led to calls for a true federalism, wherein resource revenues should be shared on 
the basis of site derivation and the level of tax contribution to the central government as practiced in 





Contrarily, the case of Peru, the transfer of revenues to the regions led to politics becoming 
more competitive and fragmented, thus weakening local political mobilisation and well-defined 
regional interests. Consequently, while Peru had a competent central management of its public 
finances, it lacked coordination amongst the various layers of governments which ultimately 
undermined its resource management  (Unworth, 2010). In addition, Unworth (2010) study noted 
that public–private partnerships with mining companies created new actors and interests at the local 
level, which made coordination efforts more difficult as new sources of conflict emerged. In addition, 
local governments lacked the capacity to manage resource revenue within the policies adopted. 
Instead, the policies exacerbated pre-existing public, social and institutional problems which resulted 
in greater socio-economic inequalities between regions and the spread of social conflicts both in 
mining and non-mining areas. However, the case of Bolivia differs from Peru’s decentralised policy 
of resource governance. Bolivia had centralised control of its natural resource revenues, similar to 
Nigeria.  
Consequently, the rise in revenues from the resource boom between 2003 and 2008 
triggered demands from regional political actors and municipal and regional governments for the 
redistribution of resource revenues  (Unworth, 2010). The resultant conflicts led to the State 
engaging in bargains with local authorities and actors over resource revenue allocations. In contrast, 
Ecuador had a similar policy of revenue decentralisation to Peru, but with differences in its nature 
and structure. Ecuador only decentralised non-oil revenues to sub-national governments, while oil 
remained under the control of the central government. Ecuador’s policy of resource governance 
made no explicit provision for oil revenues. This exclusion and centralisation of oil revenues made 
the government the main gatekeeper for accessing public funds  (Unworth, 2010). These cases 
show how, globally, the distribution of resource wealth is both contentious and induces political 
discord and instability and the use of resource wealth to dominate power. What can be drawn from 
this section is that whatever side of the coin we view resources, it still triggers dissatisfaction or 
interest that leads to competition. It also gives pointer to the fact resources in itself is not the cause 
for conflict, but the nature and structures that generate conflict. It thus, coheres with Maconachie 
(2008) argument that oil is indeed, a double-edged sword. 
2.3. Historical structure of Nigeria’s socio-political economy 
Oil and politics are inevitable pairs in Nigeria. It is what drives the contest over the power to 
control access to oil wealth. Oil gives hope of wealth and provokes issues of sovereignty  (Ross, 
2004); it is lucrative and powerful  (Kapucinski, 1982); and it is a tangible and valuable resource that 
is built into the structure of the Nigerian state. Five major historical events are critical for 
understanding the on-going resource conflicts in Nigeria. These are: (1) the amalgamation through 
British colonialism of completely distinct entities in 1914, (2) the politics of ethnic identity, (3) the 
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discovery of oil in 1956 and the accompanying fears of ethnic dominance within the system of 
governance, (4) the crushed twelve-day revolution led by Isaac Adaka Boro following the declaration 
of the Niger Delta Republic, and (5) the hanging of environmental activist Ken Saro Wiwa along with 
his kinsmen by the Nigerian military regime, which aroused increased environmental consciousness 
among the oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta region.  
The year 1914 remains a memorable date in Nigeria’s political history. It is the point where 
over 250 distinct ethnic nationalities were amalgamated into a single entity by British imperialism 
 (Tamuno, 1970; Awe, 1999; OKowa 2005). The amalgamation of distinct ethnic identities is argued 
to have induced a dysfunctional society with inequitable federalism and limited state autonomy 
 (OKowa 2005; Muhammad, 2007).The complexity of Nigeria’s governance system is often 
attributed to the tendency for particular ethnic groups to seek to protect their own identity with 
perceived primordial customs  (Ojie and Okaba, 2005). As a result, it is reflected in the formation of 
political parties in the country. Amongst these nationalities are three major ethnic groups: the 
Hausa-Fulani, predominantly in the North; the Yoruba in the Southwest and the Igbo’s in the 
Southeast, within a broader religious division between a largely Christian South and a largely 
Muslim North. 
 For most of the colonial period Nigeria was administered by the British in two provinces 
broadly consistent with this religious divide, but in 1960, prior to independence, these two regions 
were expanded to three (see Figures 2.1.) following fears of ethnic domination and political-
economic competition. Whereas the South equalled the North in terms of size and population under 
British rule, the secession of the Southern Cameroons to join the Republic of Cameroon in 1961 
meant that the North became more dominant politically. It is important to note that each of these 
major ethnic regions also had a large number of ethnic minorities under their dominance, which has 
been argued to be a form of internal colonialism  (OKowa 2005). The country’s population now 
stands at 140 million people with 36 states, a federal capital and 774 local government councils. 
Within these configurations, the Northern Hausa-Fulani consist of 30% of the country’s population, 
the Western Yoruba 20% and Eastern Igbo comprise 17% of the total population, whilst other ethnic 
minorities, notably the Ijaw, Nupe, Tiv’s, Kanuris, Ibibio, Efik, Edos and Itesekiris etc. constitute 33% 
spread across the 36 states, although mostly in the South–South and Middle belt regions of the 






2.3.1. Processes of State Formations in Nigeria  
The processes of state formation were traceable to British rule. The Northern region was 
administered indirectly through its emirs as intermediaries  (Muhammad, 2007), whilst the Eastern 
and Western regions, which had traditional kingdoms and chieftaincy structures, were administered 
directly by British colonial officers. These varied patterns, however, influenced the lobbying of the 
centralised colonial authorities for resources along ethnic lines  (Thompson, 2004). The 
decentralised structure of Nigeria’s economy prior to discovery of oil in 1956, and its independence 
in 1960, induced a regional framework that empowered the different regions as legitimately 
autonomous  (Aka, 1995). Each region exercised independent jurisdiction within its defined 
territories  (Osuntokun, 1979; Awe, 1999) which encouraged economic growth and competition in 
agricultural products, especially cash crops. The early economy and revenues from palm oil and 
coal from the Eastern region, cocoa from the Western region, and groundnuts from the Northern 
region influenced the growth and development of Nigeria prior to the discovery of oil.  
However, the process of regional autonomy became disrupted through military rule. This 
replaced the prevailing regional systems of governance with a unitary system based around states 
 (Okoko, 1996). Consequently, military intervention in the early 1960s, witnessed the creation of 
states due to ethnic agitation.  States create was seen as an attempt to loosen the stronghold of the 
dominant ethnic groups by opening up opportunities for greater self-determination for ethnic 
minorities that had previously been submerged within the larger regional configurations  (Barkan et 
al., 2001). The effect, however, was to strengthen the relative power of central government vis-à-vis 
the now numerous but smaller unitary states. The evolution from regions to states, therefore, was 
precipitated by the fears of ethnic minorities being dominated in the political process. These fears of 
ethnic dominance had earlier led the British to modify their policies for a viable federation four times 
 (Barkan et al., 2001) in 1922, 1946, 1951 and 1954, out of which emerged the formation of three 
regional governments (see Figure 2.1 )The development of the current framework of Nigeria’s states 
has been a long and complex process. Accordingly, the military regime from 1966 to 1979 inherited 
a structure of four regions (See figure 2.1.) but created a new structure of twelve states in 1967. This 
is seen as response to a number of secessionist threats during this period, firstly the twelve-day 
revolution in 1966 led by Isaac Adaka Boro which declared the Niger Delta Republic and then the 
Biafra civil war in 1967. 
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Figure 2.1. Phases of State formation in Nigeria. Source: Nigeria Zip Code, 2015. 
 
 
The demand for states remained persistent during the period of military rule, it fuelled by the desire for ethnic 
groups to benefit from the redistribution of oil revenue. As a result additional states were created in 1976,  
bringing the total number of states to nineteen  These were subsequently increased by military decrees to thirty 







2.3.2. Ethnic politics and issues of identity 
The adoption of a federal constitution in 1954 laid the grounds for multi-party democracy at 
independence in 1960. This democracy entailed dividing power amongst central and regional 
government for national integration and cohesion notwithstanding diverse ethnic identities  (Barkan 
et al., 2001). The federal constitution at independence provided platforms for the formation of 
political parties which rather emerged along ethnic lines. Political parties developed within the 
dominant ethnic regions by organising themselves around these regions  (Tamuno, 1970). Thus, the 
National Council for Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) dominated the Eastern region by organising 
itself around the Igbo; the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) appealed to the Hausa–Fulani ethnic 
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group; whilst the Action Group (AG) dominated the Western Yoruba region  (Osaghae, 1994). This 
tripartite division of political expression is argued to have ignored the aspirations of ethnic minority 
groups that could not break the political oligopoly of Hausa–Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo  (Muhammad, 
2007; Osaghae, 1994; Ndehfru, 2009).  At independence in 1960, the Tafawa Belewa-led 
government was seen in the South as  dominating the country by the Hausa–Fulani ethnic group, 
which subsequently triggered the January 1966 coup d’état, that was labelled ‘the Igbo coup’  (Otite, 
2000; Ojie and Okaba, 2005). Subsequently, the 29 July 1966 counter coup by Northern military 
elements is argued to have been, in part, motivated by the desire to control access to resource 
benefits  (Nnoli, 1978).  
Despite these provisions enshrined in the constitution for party formation, the parties that 
were formed during the 1979 elections continued to be regional parties reflecting their ethnic 
domains. Thus, the Hausa–Fulani North had the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Eastern Igbo 
states had the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), whilst the Western Yoruba had the Unity Party of 
Nigeria (UPN). Even during the 2011 elections the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the 
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) were formed by dominant Northern political elites, the 
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) controlled the West, whilst the All Peoples Grand Alliance (APGA) 
was dominant in the East. These formations of parties along ethnic lines continue to defy 
constitutional provision and structural reforms aimed at changing the character of Nigeria polity.  
This competitive struggle by each of the larger ethnic groups to dominate the political space is 
constraints to peace and stability of Nigeria  (Ojie and Okaba, 2005; Thompson, 2004; Yagboyaju, 
2005). The present political crises in relation to a power shift of the Presidency to the southern part 
of Nigeria, referred to as the South–South in the political zoning debate, the demand for return of 
power to the North, and the killing of Christians by Muslims in the North, following the aftermath of 
the 2011 presidential elections, are strong indices of the effect of ethnic politics and power play in 
Nigeria. These incidences points to the argument that Nigeria is a mere geographical expression 
and not a nation state  (Yagboyaju, 2005). 
Critics often attribute the role of ethnicity in Nigeria’s geo-polity to the British colonial policy 
of direct and indirect rule that consolidated ethnic differences and, in some cases, created new 
ethnic identities  (Osaghae, 1994; Nnoli, 1978; Post and Vickers, 1973; Thompson, 2004). For 
instance, Post and Vickers (1973) have traced the origin of ethnicity in Nigeria to the Land and 
Native Rights Ordinance Act of 1910. This Act sought to discourage free migration of Southerners to 
the Northern region of Nigeria. Other policies, such as Sabongari and Native Authority policies, 
differentiated civil from ethnic citizenship, and created new meanings of ethnic identity in Nigeria’s 
polity  (Otite, 2000). Nigeria’s political landscape remains unpredictable since its independence in 
1960. Political crises occasioned by competition between the three major ethnic nationalities for 
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leadership at the federal centre, led to its first civil war from 1967 to 1970. The Hausa–Fulani is seen 
as the imperial power of the federal government  (OKowa 2005) which continues to influence a 
struggle by the Yoruba and Igbo to wrest political power from the Hausa–Fulani. This struggles for 
power continues to set the stage for the political development of the country.   
2.3.3. Structure –Agency relations 
Nigeria’s structure of governance is organised in ways whereby the access to oil wealth is 
competitive and mostly controlled by elites  (Dode, 2005). The structures inform the dimensions of 
predisposed wealth, and the mode of acquiring wealth  (Anikpo, 1991). According to Nzimiro (1981), 
the military and political elites have the power to decide on how the economy should be run, how 
amenities should be shared and who should enjoy what privileges or rights. Besides the dominant 
ethnic hegemony, the Nigerian state is constituted in ways in which the dominant hegemonic class is 
enmeshed in a struggle over the control of resources  (Ake 1985; Aka, 1995). Accordingly, the 
fundamental values and social orientations of Nigeria is seen as feudal.  According to Okowa 
(2005), what appear to be institutions of liberal democracy in Nigeria, are nothing but fraudulent 
pretence. As a consequence, Nigeria’s political structure is said to be driven by systemic corruption 
and oppression  (Okowa 1994). Systemic corruption is a situation where corruption becomes 
institutionalised and raised to the level that it becomes almost a structural parameter of society—
where it becomes a fundamental part and parcel of the culture of a society. This corruption is 
intrinsically linked to oil wealth which provides the motive and the means for the corrupt acquisition 
and exercise of power. In a situation where wealth can be made overnight by being connected to 
powerful actors and elites of the state, people have come to realise that ‘hard work’ does not pay. 
The state, therefore, is the key institutional element that engineers systemic corruption, enabling the 
corrupt to successfully aspire for political leadership to control the state resources  (OKowa 2005; 
Okowa, 1989). 
In the past fifty years of oil production, about $300–$400 billion is said to have accrued to 
Nigeria’s central revenue, with very little to show for it  (Guichaoua, 2009; Frynas, 2000; Obi, 2008; 
OKowa 2005). Oil and gas account for over 80% of government revenues and 95% of foreign 
exchange earnings in Nigeria  (Guichaoua, 2009). Within this, gas by itself accounts for over $4 
billion in annual revenue  (Obi, 2008), in a country described as a rentier state  (Frynas, 2000), 
where resource revenues are extracted from taxes, rents and royalties. The monthly amount 
distributed to the thirty-six states from gross oil revenue for April and May, 2011 was published as 
being N615.061 billion and N582.973 billion, respectively, which is approximately £2.4 billion and 
£2.1 billion  (Ujah, 2011). Over 80% of these revenues, however, find their way out of the state 
coffers to just 1% of the ruling elite class, leaving 99% of the population to scramble for the 
remaining 20% of revenues  (Afeikhena, 2005).This serves to pitch the political actors against the 
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99% of the rest of the population that are equally torn apart by struggle to access the resource 
benefits that are left. Afeikhena (2005) argues that the struggle to access oil wealth is what 
influences and determines state–society relationships in Nigeria for decades. It is what has widened 
the gap between the state and civil society.   
For Thompson  (2004), the Nigerian state has no social contract between it and the people. 
Governance is about maintaining order, balancing budgets, and overseeing the extraction of raw 
materials for export. It has never been about the provision of public service for its citizens. Public 
trust and values amongst citizen was not created between the rulers and the ruled and as result, the 
state institutions have never sought or gained the respect of the people. Moreover, political parties in 
Nigeria place more emphasis on short-term winning of state resources by gaining access to the 
levers of power. According to Pakin (1982), the experiences of civil and military regime in Nigeria 
has created an authoritarian and repressive society, where the political space is left only to those 
within particular clientele networks to participate in the politics of resource distribution.  Thus, the 
state’s structure of resource governance and management becomes a social closure  (Parkin, 1982) 
these networks to maximise reward/resources, by restricting access to resources and opportunities 
to themselves  (Yagboyaju, 2005; Anikpo, 1996). 
2.3.4. Policies of resource extraction 
A central issue which generates the mobilisation and emergence of movements in the 
Niger Delta, is the laws of resource extraction in Nigeria. The resource revenue derivation principle 
was introduced into governance in Nigeria during the colonial era by the Philipson Commission in 
1946  (Adebayo, 1998) to enable regions to benefit from non-declared revenues according to the 
proportion of that region’s contribution to the central purse. Prior to the discovery of oil the resource 
derivation principle allowed 100% of revenues from agricultural products to the existing regions 
between 1954 and 1957 The principle was short-lived, with introduction of a new revenue 
commission—the Raisman commission—was set up in 1957. The commission argued for reduction 
of the derivation principle from 100% to 50% (see figure 2.1), in order to close the fiscal gap, or 
imbalance of revenue, between the Northern and Southern parts of the country, given that revenues 
from the Western region were flourishing from the export of cocoa  (Adebayo, 1998). 
In sum the various constitutional amendments from Richardson Constitution in 1946, the 
Macpherson Constitution of 1952 and the Louis Chick Constitution of 1954, which earlier favoured a 
regional structure of colonial, were abolished by subsequent military regimes during the period 
between 1966 and 1979. In contrast, the military regimes promulgated decrees that centralised 
resource allocations. Accordingly, virtually all rents, royalties and taxes were collected and 
controlled by the federal government  (Aka, 1995; Ikporukpo, 2004; Ogon, 2006).  
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In 1970 the percentage of revenue derivation accruing to oil bearing states in the Niger 
Delta, was reduced to 45% from the prior constitutional provision of 50%. It was reduced further to 
20% in 1975, following the increasing demands for state creation and federal capital development 
Resource revenues were further reduced to just 2% in 1981, 1.5% in 1982, and 3% in 
1993, before increasing to the present 13% in 1996. This increase is attributable to a conscious 
awakening which prompted protest and agitations across the Niger Delta region, following the 
hanging to death environmental rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa and 8 kinsmen from the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1995. The death of Saro Wiwa provoked outrage and 
increased awareness over environmental rights throughout the Niger Delta, eventually compelling 
the convening of a National Constitutional Conference to discuss the continued unity of the country. 
The pattern of reduction in the resource derivation principle demonstrates the dominance of military 
and political power and its effectiveness in alienating the oil-bearing communities from the decision 
making over resource governance  (Ikporukpo, 2004; Ikein, 2003). Subsequently, oil-bearing 
communities are effectively seen as spectators regarding decisions affecting their livelihoods and 
environment  (Orubu et al., 2004).  
Another aspect in the process of centralising resource revenues is illustrated by the military 
decree 51 of 1969, which vested the ownership and control of oil resources under or upon any land 
to the central government. The Petroleum Decree specified the affected land as all land including 
land covered by water within Nigeria, territory or the continental shelf of the country  (Ikporukpo, 
2004). The legislation limited the rights of ownership to oil that allowed communities/individuals to be 
compensated through rent payments for land acquired. Payment of rent, however, was in its turn 
stifled by the Land Use Act of 1978, which brought land under the control of the Nigerian state. The 










Figure 2.2: Changes in the Revenue Derivation Principle 
 
The introduction of the Resource Allocation Act (RAA) and Derivation Principle (DP) by 
military regimes, also, centralised resource management. The RAA is a formula that uses certain 
criteria such as equity, population size, social development, landmass and revenue generation in 
distributing the resource pool from the centre to the states and the federal capital. The DP, on the 
other hand, is a specific percentage of revenue made available to resource-endowed states by the 
federal government.  




As a result states had their revenue allocation from the central government reviewed 
upwards from 22% to 32.5% between 1977 and 1982 (figure2,3) while the local government 
councils, that had zero allocation prior to 1977, had their revenues increased from 3% to 10% 
 (Barkan et al., 2001). In 1995 the federal government had its allocation further reduced to 48.5%, 
with state allocations also being reduced to 24%, while local governments had an increase to 20%, 
with the remaining 7.5% set aside for ecological funding and ‘special projects’. The 2011 allocation 
to the federal government was 52.68%, with states at 26.72%, and local governments 20.60% 
 (Ujah, 2011). Appropriately, policies of resource revenue allocation and its distribution remain the 
most contentious issue from oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta. This continues to threaten 
the peaceful coexistence and stability of Nigeria’s polity. Under the circumstances, the access to oil 
wealth gives the power to influence, directly or indirectly, the content of state policy. The use of 
landmass and population size to distribute resource revenues is argued as defining citizenship 
within the Nigerian state  (William, 2002). According to Williams (2002), the belief in numerical 
strength and geographical size by majority ethnic groups to hold power, has succeeded in 
generating a sense and feeling of alienation among ethnic minority groups. The existence of such an 
overriding philosophy with respect to the control of oil wealth has enabled the dominant ethnic 
groups to define citizenship status as that of first-class citizens, and minorities as a set of second-
class citizens within the Nigerian state. 
Thus, the Niger Delta minorities are viewed as being affiliated to majority-based Hausa–
Fulani first-order political groups  (Osaghae, 1994, 1991) whereby whatever accrues to the 
minorities depends mainly on the influence and power of the majority groups. The minorities can 
only develop from the reflection of political power held by majority ethnic groups within the federal 
units of the Nigerian state  (Osuntokun, 1979; Osaghae, 1991). Also, Ejobowah  (2001) criticised the 
practice of Nigeria’s federalism and its dependence on oil, arguing that the federal system in the 
multi-ethnic context of Nigeria lacks a diversified economy to sustain the practice of federalism. 
Others such Yeri-Obidake and Zuokeme  (1985), argue, ethnicity is the bane of national integration 
as revenue accruing from oil is the ‘psychological glue’ holding the Nigerian state together.  
2.4. Political repression 
Indeed, mineral resource is a source for conflicting interest in societies, as state and non –
state actors make claims in ways that led to violence. Resources propels the construction of 
identities and wells the demonstration of power. This is further shown from Selverton’s (1993) 
studies of how cultural, economic and political structures of exclusion triggered uprising in 1990. 
According to Selverston, indigenous Indians in Ecuador experienced struggles between class 
domination and ethnicity-centred movements. It reveals how leftist ideologies and struggles for land 
and political power conflict with the goals and ambitions of indigenous communities.  
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The struggles of these movements shifted from a class-based to an identity-based struggle 
for land. This experience is similar to the Ogoni uprising in Nigeria. In the Ogoni context, local 
resistance as collective action is directed at resisting further alienation of rights, expropriation of 
resources, and degradation of the local environment. Furthermore, oil exploration and the pollution 
caused by the activities of Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in Nigeria have induced 
alienation, protest and resistance across host communities in the Niger Delta  (Obi, 2001). The 
Movement for the Survival of OgonI People emerged to seek self-determination in their quest to 
compel Shell and the Nigerian state to accept the right to control their land. The Ogoni resistance 
illustrates an underlying structural conditions that give rise to collective actions that is globally linked. 
The crises in Ogoni demonstrate the globalised significance of oil resources, as the oil multinational 
companies control immense power, political clout and global spread  (Obi, 2001). According to Obi 
(2001b), Shell is located in a global structure of material accumulation, which gives it the power to 
control certain locales at varied social levels of extraction and dispossession.  
Claims of participation or autonomy are often the crux of protest or resistance  (Selverston, 
1993; Dinerstein, 2010; Ramos, 2006; Watts, 2007). Indigenous movements continue to challenge 
the state’s resource policies. For example, the impact of neo-liberal economic policies and state 
reforms in Argentina initiated a process of collective action that mobilised around heterogeneous 
movements  (Dinerstein, 2010). The state’s privatization and restructuring is argued to have 
dismantled the pre-existing quasi-welfare policy of social development. The contested character of 
unemployed movements examined in Dinerstein’s (2010) study, shows the relative power of 
collectives and the autonomy to resist leftist ideologies and political manipulation of the state. 
According to Dinerstein (2010), the unemployed workers’ movement emerged out of spontaneous 
protests, lacking organisational coherence at first in making their demands known, but built itself up 
to facilitate a collective identity and influence state resources through confrontation, protest and use 
of social projects in communities. These processes of mobilisation influenced the institutional 
framework in which social demands could be made.  
Similarly, the land tenure laws in Ecuador affected the environment and livelihood patterns 
of indigenous people  (Selverston, 1993), who became excluded social group from Ecuador’s 
economic and political development.  Indeed, these struggles by indigenous minorities reveal the 
structural imbalances in the political system and ways in which minorities seek to alter the structural 
defects in the polity  (Selverston, 1993). These arguments echo those of Omeje  (2005), Oronto et 
al.  (2004) and Ikporukpo  (2004), views of how environmental laws of resource extraction in Nigeria 
adds to the concerns and livelihoods of host communities in the Niger Delta region. Environmental 
laws such as the Petroleum Decree 51 of 1969, the Anti-Sabotage Decree of 1975, and Land Use 
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Act of 1978, is seen to dispossess the rights of ownership and participation in decisions affecting the 
welfare and livelihoods of host oil communities in the Niger Delta.  
The Nigerian state is seen as protecting its monopoly of resource governance and interest 
at all cost, given that it relies on rents, royalties, taxes and profits from its equity shares with the 
multinational oil companies. Hence, it inevitably protects the prosperity and interest of oil companies 
at the expense of host oil-bearing communities  (Omeje, 2005). This exclusion from the policy 
processes of resource management has resulted in emerging movements in the region, that see  Oil 
companies as replicas of colonial interests that profit from the extraction of raw minerals, and show 
disregard for indigenous ownership and participation through their lack of commitment to the plight 
of host communities  (Ikein, 2003). Similarly, Kilgour  (2002) argues that multinational oil companies 
have no basic commitment to host communities in the countries in which they operate, as they 
prioritise oil competitiveness over ethical concerns. Host communities are in a disadvantaged 
position to negotiate on environmental policies that affect their livelihoods, as state laws effectively 
give impunity to the oil companies whilst turning host communities into spectators  (Orubu et al., 
2004). The non-participation of host communities in decisions affecting their livelihood is also 
evident in issues of oil spillage and the mode of compensation for spillages. Oil companies privilege 
themselves in determining the cause of spillages  (Ibeanu, 2002). 
Under this circumstances, contemporary political economy of Nigeria is seen to be built on 
using the instrument of state power for self-enrichment. The presidential system of governance, 
which operates at all levels, means that the state governors and local council chairpersons are 
directly elected by eligible voters. Similarly, state cabinets, besides the legislative members, are 
appointed by governors, subject to approval from the state legislators. The functions and 
responsibilities of the legislative branch of governance, however, are viewed as a rubber stamp 
under the control of state governors  (Okowa, 1989; Muhammad, 2007). More so local councils 
constitute the weakest tier of government institutions in Nigeria. This is attributed to the inconsistent 
policies of the federal government, as successive administrations alter the resource allocation 
policies. They have very little autonomy in respect to either policy making or budgeting, which 
explains the poor performance of grassroots development in communities.  
In conclusion, we have seen how Nigeria’s state–society relationship is built on the logic of 
self-enrichment. Those who hold political power are mainly interested in the glamour and privileges 
of state offices rather than building capacity and institutions  (Yagboyaju, 2005). Politics and 
governance, meanwhile, are structured in a client–patronage network in the struggle for power to 
control state resources. Those who hold power rely on ethnic patronage for survival, making it 
difficult to control the corruption that is endemic in Nigeria.  
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The decision to centralise oil revenues through the promulgation of decrees imposed 
through thirty-six years of military rule and adopted by sixteen years of democratic dispensations, is 
variously argued as exploitation and injustice in journals, articles, and published and unpublished 
documents in the Niger Delta  (Okowa, 2000; Okoko, 1996; Ogon, 2006; Tuodolo, 2007). The 
centralist structure of resource governance and patterns of its distribution have only helped in 
transferring oil wealth from the Niger Delta to other parts of the Nigerian state  (Ogon, 2006). 
2.5. Identity formations: individual and collective agents 
Auyero  (2003) explored the lived experiences and contention of Argentina’s 1990 uprising, 
revealing the ways in which popular collective struggle is lived, and felt individually and collectively 
in protest from the participants’ point of views. Auyero’s work on the lived experiences of two 
women, involved in uprising in Argentina gives insights of how protesters’ lives cannot be separated 
from their histories of uprising. It tells how particular biographies of individuals shape their actions 
and how such contentious actions had affected their lives. It shows how protests are not just rooted 
in biographies, but also within an array of relationships and meaning. It also gives insight to a sense 
of shared understanding  (Auyero, 2003) of protesters. Collective action and contention, give 
insights to understanding of the ways in which protesters, collectively and contentiously, think and 
feel about their joint actions, than causal mechanisms that led to the protest (Auyero, 2003).  
Besides, the ways in which meanings are constructed and explained at the individual and collective 
levels, inform a structuring of a particular kind of subjectivity in contention  
2.6. Trajectory of militancy 
Recent studies on militia movements and deviance have criticised previous attempts at 
defining militias as being too narrow  (Freilich et al., 2006). Militias have been defined as locally 
based private armed groups with command structures. They characteristics of military training and 
exercise, and claim to fulfil necessary public functions and protect community against tyranny 
 (Barkun, 1997). Also, Freilich et al. (2006), define militias as movements having a strong ideology, 
having intense hostility against the state. They affirm themselves through group-based activities, 
including paramilitary manoeuvres. Their ideological component consists of lack of trust, fear and 
hatred of the establishment. Militias are often composed of like-minded individuals, whose purpose 
is to plan and prepare a defence against perceived threats or to disseminate information that calls 
for such action  (Freilich et al., 2006). They are often alienated from state and popular culture, 
having community-oriented local support and seek to act out their ideology by raising public 
consciousness about the perceived injustices perpetrated by the state and the need to defend 
against such injustices. Informal social networks are amongst the ways of recruiting members: i.e. 
friends recruiting friends,   (kLandermans and Oegema, 1987). Militias are also labelled as criminals 
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or freedom fighters  (Krueger and Maleckova, 2002), as shown in exploration of meanings from the 
politically motivated violence and acts of terrorism perpetrated by Hezbollah. Krueger and 
Makeckova (2002) reasoned that acts of terrorism by Hezbollah are a response to longstanding 
perceived feelings of political conditions which is unconnected to economic activities.  
Comparatively, the militancy in the Niger Delta is associated with violent act that underlie 
ideology, deprivation, frustration, criminality and ‘youth restiveness’ According to Ayakoromo (2010), 
militancy in the Niger Delta started with a positive ideology, which drew attention to deprivation and 
social exclusion. However, the spate of violence and youth restiveness degenerated into all sorts of 
criminal activities, with varied splinter militia groups engaging in extortion, oil bunkering, and the 
vandalism of pipelines, piracy, and the kidnapping of oil expatriates. He believes that wealthy 
individuals and top politicians in the Niger Delta, employed the services of militias as private armies 
for their personal political gain, only to then abandon them after having achieving their objectives 
 (Ayakoroma, 2010). Political patronage, involving exchange of guns for votes, is believed to have 
heightened and sustained the momentum of militia activities in Niger Delta.  Militia activities opened 
up space to access resource benefits for both the politically connected militia leaders, state 
governors and government officials in the Niger Delta. It became a source for making money from 
the government treasury  (Ayakoroma, 2010), through monies meant for security during crisis.  
Inter/intra communal conflicts over land boundary adjustments for oil benefits are also 
source for emergence of militancy in Niger Delta region  (Efemini, 2005). Unclear boundary 
demarcation from the creation of states and local government areas heightened tensions and gave 
rise to clashes over ownership of oil fields, farmlands and waterways. The struggle for oil benefits is 
argued to have developed a collective response to the tensions amongst communities as wealthy 
and influential political actors procured arms to fortify their communities against external attacks 
 (Peterside, 2005). Peterside (2005) gives the example of Eleme and Okirika, local communities in 
Rivers State, where claims over land ownership at the site of an oil refinery resulted in bloody 
clashes. The site of the oil refinery was a contentious space between both communities as they 
each lay claims to the land. These claims and counter claims led to the first violent clashes involving 
the use of small arms and light weapons in Rivers State. These clashes witnessed the emergence of 
militia combatants in Okrika, known as the Bush Boys. These militia youths were treated as 





The goal of indigenous minority movements has shifted from class-based struggles to 
identity-based struggles. Resource-endowed environments induce expectations of improved welfare 
and livelihoods, along with frustrations, alienation and forms of protest and violence, within complex 
formal and informal structures and interactions. This chapter illustrates how centralised or 
decentralised policies of resource extraction impact on indigenous ethnic minorities, in terms of 
power and identity, in taking decisions affecting their livelihoods and welfare. Identity politics and the 
issue of domination informed the early emergence of militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
These, along with policy shifts in the laws of resource extraction and its distribution, inform the 
proliferation of social movements with claims and demands affecting their environment and 
economic livelihoods. Protest, resistance or violence reveals how lived experiences are felt 
individually and collectively. It provides insight into how those involved in collective action cannot be 
separated from their histories, as protests not only imbibe individual bibliographies, but also inform 
an array of relationships and meanings of action. It shows a sense of shared understanding. This 
literature also informs the broadening sense of meanings of militancy, from a definition of well-
structured private armies with ideologies, having intense hostility against the state, to like-minded 
individuals disseminating information for collective action. They are often alienated from the state 
and popular culture and acting with support from their immediate community in carrying out their 
actions against perceived injustices. Militants are also labelled criminals and freedom fighters, with 
varied motives which might be either political or economic. This labelling is more complex in terms of 
the Niger Delta, where the lines of criminality and the quest for economic justice seem blurred, 
within networks and patterns of mobilisation, including political patronages. 
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Chapter Three: Epistemology and Methods 
3.1. Introduction 
 An objective of this research is to analyse the complex voices of militants in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria. These voices which present different meanings and interpretation, 
gives a pointer to what constitutes knowledge and reality within a social setting and context. In this 
chapter, I aim to position the research within philosophical and methodological considerations. 
Consequently, I attempt to explain (1) the negotiation processes that underpin the epistemological 
stance of this research (2) the fieldwork and the methods used in generating data (3) my experience 
and position as an insider and (4) the procedure used in analysing the data and conclusion. 
However, since the chapter is more or less about expressing how I went about conducting this 
research, a few lines of this introduction section discloses my learning experiences and challenges 
thus far. 
In broad view, the process of social research is complicated and intense   (Devine, 1999). It 
informs experiences that are often contradictory with layers of individual thoughts or perceptions, 
and as a result social research, can be seen as an act of confession  (Howes, 1981), negotiation, as 
well as challenges. This holds true, conducting research in a highly tensed and complex 
environment, with layers of actors in a struggle over resources, which becomes quite challenging in 
many ways. A challenge I encountered being insider is having what,  Malinowski  (1922) calls 
foreshadowed problems and preconceived ideas- having a set of question or ideas to be proven 
prior to engagements at the field, than allowing events unfold based on questions at the field. Truly, I 
had my own preconceptions, given my past experiences as an activist and having conducted field 
research to understand what the concept or slogan of ‘participatory development’ meant to oil-
bearing communities in Niger Delta. The research outcome from my MPhil programme in 
Aberystwyth, Wales in 2007, induced my belief that the Nigerian state and multinational oil 
companies, are responsible for the grievances and frustration in which militants emerged. This 
preconceived idea, became my first ‘negotiation’ with my supervisors, which changed my initial 
beliefs or thoughts. In essence, negotiation broaden and give new insight or perspective to how we 
understand a given phenomenon, by adjusting our basic questions or orientations  (Devine, 1999).  
A second challenge or experience in this research, that the construction of knowledge and reality by 
the militants of the Niger Delta takes place in a context far removed from that of academic discourse 
and, therefore, the translation of that meaning, through the researcher, and then on to academic 




3.2. Negotiating ‘Process’ 
The term militancy in Niger Delta means different things to different people. These 
meanings are learned or created from feelings, emotional attachment and attitudes which are highly 
fluid within time and space. Consequently, understanding ‘reality’ from the ways in which militants 
collectively and contentiously think, feel and voice reasons for their actions, cannot be stable, 
repeated in exactly same way or described objectively with statistics or numbers. Neither can the 
thought processes or emotional states of militants can be predicted based on previously observed 
and explained ‘real fact’. On this grounds, I reject the positivist point of view that reality is stable, 
observable and can be repeated  (Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Levin, 1988).  
In rejecting the positivist stance to understanding knowledge and reality,  I align with the 
assumption that social life is an unfolding process in which the individual interprets his/her 
environment to act on the basis of that interpretation  (Bryman, 2008).  Furthermore, understanding 
of truth and meanings, are relative to our cultural context and physical environment in which we live 
 (Putnam, 1983). Likewise, context and concepts do matter in our ideas of reality. They structure 
what we perceive, how we get around the world and how we relate to other people  (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980).  In this context therefore, metaphors are important. Metaphors tend to pervade our 
thoughts and everyday life. They frame how individuals think, feel and act. According to Lakoff and 
Johnson  (1980), people’s conceptual system which includes a range of values, ideas and beliefs, 
are products of our being and thus influence the ways in which we interact with our physical and 
cultural environment. In addition, metaphors inform our subjective mental framework and how our 
world functions. However, the understanding of ‘truth and meaning’ is not strictly personal either. 
When meanings are considered as entirely private, and each individual understanding is termed 
‘truth’, it then becomes a case that exceeds the boundary of subjectivity. As a result, human sense-
making becomes a chaotic, unnatural or forced process  (Huizing, 2007). Moreover, people act 
towards things based on meanings and purpose these meanings have, given that the social world 
around us is constructed, shaped and influenced by our experience, knowledge and desire 
 (Limpanitgut, 2009). 
Consequently, I argue that the ways in which militias make sense and give meaning to their 
action is socially constructed and based on history and context, and therefore the understanding of 
‘reality’ is interpretive and inherently qualitative. Interpretivist approach serve as a potent tool for 
understanding how militants makes sense of their actions, particularly how this are actions are 
framed within ideological platforms to legitimise action. Besides, the experiential world of militants 
points to the fact that, there is no single reality, which inform the argument that our concept of reality 
is achieved through meanings and social interactions within contested field of power  (Arce and 
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Long, 1992). Moreover, interpretivist approach prioritises concept such as ideology, language, 
identity and power, which underlie real world of militants. Besides, the judgements of militias which 
is not true or false, echoes how intersubjectivity, which coheres with interpretivist constructionism.  
Concepts such as Ideology and language, give insight to meaning, action and interaction of 
individuals in a social setting  (De Koster et al., 2004). These concepts find relevance in analysis in 
this study, particularly the ideology of ‘self-determination and resource control’ held by militant 
groups, which serve as platform to legitimise militia action in Niger Delta region. Ideologies are 
constructs we make through knowledge and shared ideas with others.  Ideology informs how 
knowledge is negotiated between people within a given dynamic context. Language on the other 
hand reflects how we name or label things  (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).  Labels inform the process 
and relations of power and how power is constructed, framed and sustained. According to Wood 
(1985:5-7), labelling is an “act of politics involving conflict and authority, which portrays position of 
status, which are created, bestowed and deployed”. Labels induce expectations or behaviours, as 
well as, shape the form of interaction and negotiations that give meaning to specific event  (Wood, 
1985). Correspondingly, ideology and language induce shared intersubjective states in 
understanding knowledge and reality. It therefore means reality is not only socially constructed, but 
intersubjectively constructed  (Owen, 2006), where knowledge is shared reflexively between two or 
more persons  (Reich, 2010). Hence intersubjectivity can be seen as a tool that relates to issues of 
identity and struggles for recognition  (Honneth, 1996), and this is particularly so in Niger Delta 
region, where militant groups are able to establish their own intersubjective states of identity, to 
justify collective action.  
The sense of shared meaning or intersubjective states of militias in Niger Delta, broadly 
echoes mutual awareness  (Laing et al., 1966), where individuals/groups agree or disagree within 
common definition of a situation/ issue or view of a physical object. This sense of shared meaning or 
shared subjective states of individuals or groups  (Scheff, 2006), on role and awareness of 
individuals/groups environment, defines and shapes the willingness to act. The willingness to act or 
constructed shared meaning  (Seale, 2004), is seen as an everyday resource to interpret an element 
of society and culture. According to Gillespie and Cornish (2010), when individuals or groups have a 
sense of shared meanings, then they share a definition of the situation. It coheres with the argument 
that, individuals/groups do become aware of the capacity to exercise control over their lives  (Lane 
and Sawaia, 1995). In addition, it implies the individual/group interpretation and understanding of 
their own world representation and feelings, and that defines their unique individuality, which 
becomes seen as part of group identity that plays a role in the study of intersubjectivity.  
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According to Philip  (2007), an intersubjective state, is a necessary condition for formation 
of identity, which infers on personal experience and feelings  (Coulthard et al., 2007), expressed 
through organised action.  Rommetveit  (1985), on the other hand, sees it as overlap of individual’s 
subjective view or meaning within a particular mode of communication, where a speaker assume 
beforehand or takes for granted something that is yet to be discussed with a listener. Accordingly, 
intersubjectivity can be achieved when participants, who are engaged in an activity have same 
prolepses  (Rommetveit, 1979).  
Likewise, interpretivist approach is inherently qualitative. Since qualitative research is 
based on assumption that reality is constructed by individuals interacting with their social world 
 (Merriam, 1998), it therefore means, qualitative approach adopts interpretivist constructionism to 
understand human experiences  (Nelson et al., 1992). In this respect, emic approach which coheres 
to this research, see insiders as engaging intersubjectively with research respondents, in order to 
understand their lived experiences  (Clifford, 1983),  and it is on this grounds that emic/ethnographic 
approach becomes relevant and important in this research.  For this reason,  the ethnographic/emic 
approach, entails entering and studying the everyday life of people by participating in their lives, talk 
with them, observing and interpreting them within their lived context  (Madden, 2011). It is a process 
of learning about local meanings, participating in local activities and reflecting upon these lived 
experiences, to enable rich analysis of different perspective of a phenomenon. In order words, 
ethnography inform the emic/ insider’s point of view that describe thought and action primarily in 
terms of actors words and self-understanding that is culturally and historically bonded in context  
 (Geertz, 1983; Morris et al., 1999).   
It aims to describe and understand meanings as opposed to merely explaining social action 
(Henning, 2004). Moreover, researchers that adopt qualitative methods, use concepts and 
constructs as meaningful words that can be analysed, in order to provide an in-depth understanding 
of a phenomenon under study. In addition, it is based on the intensive study of the features of a 
phenomena under investigation with the aim of acquiring a holistic view (Miller and Brewer, 2003; 
Patton, 2002). Consequently, qualitative research helps in unravelling contextual descriptions of 
varied perspectives people experience in given situation, many of which are often contradictory in 
terms of behaviour, beliefs, opinions, emotions or the relationships of individuals. Contrarily, 
qualitative approaches have been criticised for use of small sample size in research, as a result, 
these raises  concerns to how generalised conclusions can be drawn  (Du Plooy, 2001). Also, 
results from qualitative methods cannot be replicated in the same way by other researchers. In 
addition, there is the tendency for researchers establishing close contact with research participants, 
which may lead to bias or loss of objectivity. 
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The ontological and epistemological considerations examined in this section have 
developed a position in which this research is conceptualised as engaging with the militants of the 
Niger Delta from an ethnographic and emic perspective in order to capitalise on the intersubjective 
potential of the researcher and in recognition that knowledge and reality are fundamentally socially 
constructed phenomena and that, therefore, a full understanding of the “reality” of the conflict in the 
Niger Delta requires a fully developed intersubjective common orientation between researcher and 
subject such that existing research has, arguably, failed to achieve. In the context of this thesis, 
therefore the shared (or discordant) knowledge and understanding expressed by militants is 
accessed and interpreted within context of the researcher’s experience and then re-communicated 
in the context of academic discourse.  
3.3. The Fieldwork:  Research Site  
A considerable amount of time was spent in conducting this research within the months of 
July 31st, 2010 to January, 31st 2011. Seven locations across Rivers and Bayelsa States in Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria were chosen as case study sites (see figures 3.1 and 3.2). These included 
Port Harcourt Town, Diobu and Abuloma in Rivers State and Yenagoa and other selected 
communities within the South Ijaw local government areas of Bayelsa State. The specific sites in the 
South Ijaw local government areas are not named as a matter of ‘my discretion’ in respect to the 
confidentiality of the participants, even though the respondent did not bother.  











The sites in Rivers State were densely populated areas: mainly ghettos and semi-urban 
areas that could be reached within an hour’s drive from Port Harcourt town. These sites were 
chosen based on my prior knowledge of criminal gangs and violence in these areas. A third site was 
at Obubra, Cross Rivers State, also within the Niger Delta region. The takes about four hours to get 
to Obubra by road from Port Harcourt. Obubra was a campsite for militants who had accepted the 
Federal Government offer of an amnesty. It was the site for militants undergoing disarmament, 
demobilization, and training and rehabilitation.  Yenagoa is a new state capital following the creation 
of Bayelsa state by the military regime in 1996. It is accessible by road and takes about two hours 
from Port Harcourt, a much older state capital in Rivers state. The unnamed four sites in Bayelsa 
State are interior communities that can only be reached by water transport from Yenagoa. It takes 
between three and four hours by boat to reach these sites. These communities are considered to be 
battlefield zones and prone to violence, with militias still in regular engagements with the Joint 
Military Task force (JTF) of the Nigerian state. The sites are surrounded by oil wells, platforms and 
pipelines that are heavily guarded by the JTF. 





3.4. Negotiating Access 
Negotiating access is argued to depend on the quality of the interpersonal relationship 
between the researcher and the researched  (Lee and Newby, 1983). As an insider, who is native 
Ijaw, I had privileges, in the process of generating data for this study, so I began re-establishing 
initial contact. I relied mostly on my prior known activist and key informants who are non-militants. 
They include the leader of the Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA), a former president of the Ijaw 
Youth Council (IYC), a national coordinator of the Network of Freedom Fighters (NFF), and a 
Founding Director of the Ijaw Council for Human Rights (ICHR). These organisations, I know have 
deep knowledge of the dynamics of Niger Delta conflict. This key informants/groups, are also known 
have been involved in a lot of peaceful, non-violent protest and advocacy since the early 1990’s. I 
am of the suspicion, they have strong ties to armed groups that subsequently metamorphosed into 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) a widely known organisation involved 
the persistent violent conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Other key informants included a 
former president of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), an umbrella body representing all Ijaws youth 
movement and organisations worldwide. The IYC is key and fundamental rallying point for the 
violent and non-violent activities of the Niger Delta Struggle.  
These key informants and activist, help in shaping the direction of generating data for this 
research. Maintaining friends and prior contacts is thus, key for ‘insiders’, especially when an activist 
suddenly becomes a researcher in his/her own environment. This is necessary given the sensitivity 
of this research, which can be seen as posing potential harm or threat to the researched. Besides 
accessing a hidden, little known, and fluid militia groups, within highly complex web of networks, 
requires well known key informants, which ‘outsiders’ may not be privileged to have.  This shaped a 
collaborative process and nature of generating data for this research. It was collaborative in the 
sense that it involved a set of complex interactions and iterative process, which can be described as 
a dual performance between me as a researcher, the key informants and research respondents, in 
negotiations to getting the right target audiences and reliable data.  
3.5 Negotiating ’People and Data’ 
A central objective of this research is to explore the multiple voices of militants, associated 
with capture of resources in the Niger Delta region. Thus, this section provides my key experiences 
of how I gained contact with individuals, who are significant actors to the conflict in the region, from 
my insider perspective. In negotiating the process of gaining contact with individuals, who are 
considered to be ‘militants’, I argue here that, an ethnographic approach has potential value for 
accessing and generating data from lived experience of individuals or groups of people. On this 
account, a qualitative case study approach becomes valid and suitable for this research. Case 
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studies provide an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of people by focusing on segments 
of individual’s experiences, events and situations  (Guba et al., 1998; Yin, 2003; Silverman, 2010). 
Case study lay emphasis on historical context and processes, and avoid generalisations, in 
understanding actions from the perspective of actors, rather than taking a deductive stance (Platt, 
1988). Moreover, the approach enhances the understanding of individuals/organisations  (Yin, 
2003). Furthermore, case studies focus on understanding a particular case within  complex  human 
interaction and under natural conditions  (Key, 1997). In the context of this study, the use of case 
study is seen to serve as a method that explores the historical processes and meanings behind 
militia action, which gives significance to a particular phenomenon (Militancy). 
As discussed in chapter 5, the militants of the Niger Delta region have a well organised 
structure and hierarchy. Given the sensitivity and security concerns, it was challenging to establish 
contact with the top hierarchy of militias known as ‘Generals,’ as they prefer to remain hard to reach. 
However, the middle and bottom rang of the hierarchy, appear proliferated in ways, where everyone 
seems to know something about militancy, but no one is necessarily willing to admit being a militant. 
This is the same with ‘militia camps’, where people may have an idea of what these are, but where 
no one may be willing to give information about these camps, given the security concerns. Hence, at 
the top level, it is assumed that militants do not exist, although some individuals/groups are being 
labelled as militants. As a result, the 35 interviews conducted in this research, I would argue, are a 
representative sample of people with shared beliefs: the interviewees all acknowledged having an 
idea about militancy or admitted to being militants, having engaged in collective action as militias.  In 
addition, the interviewees all had an understanding of what my research was about were willing to 
assert their voices as key informants of this study. In other words, the individuals interviewed for this 
research were those who may not openly admit being militants, but appeared to be caught up in the 
web of militancy. They acknowledged the questions of this research aims to explore and understand 
their role, representing a group of people who are hard to reach.    
In this context, a purposive sampling technique was best suited for this study. Purposive 
sampling aims to discover, understand or gain insight, learned from a select sample of a population, 
and based on the unique characteristics, conveniences, or networks of a phenomenon (Merriam, 
1998).  It relies on the judgement of a researcher’s selection of cases with a specific purpose in 
mind, as the unit representative of a population. In this particular case, the identification of 
individuals who embrace the idea of militancy. During the initial negotiations, I discussed about the 
aim/objective, as well as scope of my research with key informants into gaining contact with 
individuals who engaged in collective action as militants. The sample sizes were, however, not fixed 
prior to the fieldwork of data collection, as I had no prior specific target or number of interviewees in 
mind. Moreover, sample size has been on the availability of the target population (militants) in the 
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field. In this regard, the possibility of investigating an entire population may seem far off, if not 
impossible  (Berg, 2004). Therefore, I cannot claim that I carried out this research in the entire Niger 
Delta region, or consider the outcomes as a representation of the total population of the Niger Delta. 
Rather, the interviewees are seen as representative group of individuals that are key actors involved 
in militia action or have an idea of militancy in Niger Delta region. As a representative sample, it is 
therefore, considered as an aggregate of cases that conform to a designated set or specification, i.e. 
individuals having common characteristics that the researcher is interested in studying (Mouton, 
1996). Accordingly, I observed, interviewed, had conversations, made notes, and read local 
newspapers, whilst engaging with individuals that assumed the role of militias. This was bolstered by 
interviews with non-militias in order to complement views that would provide an in-depth 
understanding of the conflict in the Niger Delta region.    
As stated earlier in this chapter, trust and prior interpersonal relationships were key to 
gaining contact with individuals, whose ages ranged from 24-72yrs. It is worth noting that at the time  
fieldwork  the target population of the research, were commonly addressed by public/print media, as 
‘ex- militants’, following the granting of amnesty and the integration of militants back into society. 
Thus, they were no longer confined to militia camps, hidden within the creeks and swamps of the 
Niger Delta region. The integration of militants from their hidden camps back into society meant that 
I had to sieve through a larger population of people in Port Harcourt and Yenagoa. My personal 
experiences as an insider, and having lived in both cities, narrowed my scope of search for 
individuals who had in-depth knowledge about militancy, and those who had actually engaged in 
militia actions. Prior to embarking on my field work, I made repeated phone calls to the key contacts 
mentioned earlier. Upon arrival in Nigeria on the 30th of July, 2010, I began scheduling interviews 
through phone calls to known key informants in Port Harcourt and Yenagoa. 
 My first set of interviews began in August, 2010 at Port Harcourt in Rivers State, as I met 
Stone, a long-time friend and environmental rights activist in his early forties. Stone, a non-militant, 
reflected on his lived experience of militia activity at his native community of Buguma. Other 
contacts in Port Harcourt included: Alaere, a female activist in her mid-forties and executive 
chairperson of a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), as well as Kponi and Kowa, both non-
militias in their late sixties, who were university researchers. Whilst in Port Harcourt, I took time off to 
visit a class mate of mine, which led to a scheduled meeting with Iburo, a traditional chief from 
Okrika community. Okrika community is widely known as one of the ‘hotspots’ for militia activity in 
Rivers state. My interview with Iburo, snowballed into meetings with other militias, including 
Buluowei and Boye from Borokiri and Gbundu water fronts, both slum areas in Port Harcourt. Both 
were unemployed youths in their mid-30’s and early 40s, and belonged to two separate militia 
52 
 
groups; the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Volunteer (NDV) 
located in Rivers state.  
 I travelled to Yenagoa, Bayelsa State by the second week of September, 2010 and spent a 
month scheduling appointments and formal interviews with key informant such as Pato, in his mid-
forties, and Oweifa, Alabo, Inemo and Otuan (as mentioned in section 3.4), all in their early and mid-
fifties.  These key informants, enabled access with Okpuogidi, a senior ranking member of a militia 
group in Yenagoa. My first meeting with Okpuogidi, who is in his late thirties, was more of an 
introduction, as he preferred having a scheduled meeting in his community, at Southern Ijaw. A 
week later, I boarded on a speed boat and travelled 2 hours from Swahli-Waterside in Yenagoa to 
Okpuogidi’s community in South Ijaw area. The interview was eventually carried out at the 
community’s dilapidated primary school building. The visit also afforded me the opportunity to 
engage in conversations with local youths, which gave me a sense of how youths define, who is a 
militant, and how they perceive the impact of militia activity on the community. These conversations 
further led to interviews with Ololo, a 38 year old member of same militia group as Okpuogidi.  
As the fieldwork progressed, I developed a separate friendship/relationship with the idea of 
initiating informal conversations around issues of militancy. These led to meeting individuals such as 
Otuogidi, a taxi driver in his late thirties, who apparently was a member of a militia group in Bayelsa 
state. My informal conversation with Otuogidi in Pidgin English took place whilst he was taking me 
home in his taxi, and this blossomed into a ‘social friendship’ which led to subsequent interviews with 
him. The friendship which developed from the use of Otuogidi’s car during the period of my stay in 
Bayelsa, created further avenues for meeting other militias, like 35 year old Kavelli whom I met in a 
drinking bar in Yenagoa at Otuogidi’s birthday celebration. I took the opportunity of a birthday 
invitation to schedule further interviews with Kavelli and Otuogidi at designated eateries, were I 
bought them food and drinks for myself and others. My social friendships opened new opportunities, 
such as the visit to a night club called V10 with Otuogidi and Kavelli at Yenagoa. Whilst chatting and 
drinking at this busy night club, I got a sense of how militia leader’s social lives are framed, before 
leaving the club at about 3 am. I travelled to Kaiama community a week after for a scheduled formal 
interview with 72 year old Pa Okosiowei, the only surviving member of the first militia action of 1966 in 
the Niger Delta region. I met Pa Okosiowei through a very close friend of my family. My engagements 
continued with Otuan in Yenagoa, who informed me of his journey to Obubra Camp in Cross Rivers 
state the following month in November, 2010.  During this period of the fieldwork, ‘assumed militants’ 
were undergoing a rehabilitation training programme at a community called Obubura in Cross Rivers 
state. Otuan, being one of the coordinators of the federal government Amnesty training programme, 
wanted me to pay a visit to Obubra.  For me, such an invitation was a great opportunity for gaining 
close contact with target population sample of this research,  
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Accordingly, I left Yenagoa for Port Harcourt by the end of October, 2010.  There, I spent a 
week catching up again with Alaere, Kowa, family and friends, before travelling to Obubra in Cross-
Rivers state by mid-November, 2010. My visit to Obubra was indeed rewarding, as it narrowed down 
my search for ‘militants’, given that about 2,500 people of the 4th batch of rehabilitation programme, 
were present at Obubra training camp. I spent 3 nights at the camp with Otuan, and was introduced to 
BV commander, whom I interviewed in the morning of my first night at Obubra.  Whilst at the Camp, I 
took the opportunity of walking around to engage in conversation with trainees, which gave me a 
sense of the ethnic composition and characteristics of individuals at the training camp. The second 
day I spent in Obubra camp, I surprisingly came across Akpainfoko, an unemployed graduate, whom I 
taught years ago at Niger Delta University in 2004/05.  Akpainfoko informed me of his role as 
secretary to a militia group that operated in Bayelsa state, hence his involvement as a trainee at 
Obubra camp. The surprise meeting with Akpainfoko, propelled my interviews with Timidi, Besu and , 
Ebougha, at Obubra.  These individuals, whose ages ranged between 32-42 years, belonged to 
different militia groups in Delta and Bayelsa state. I also met with 68 year old Kpein, the director 
coordinating the affairs of trainers and trainees, as well as, a 54 year old militia leader, who simply 
introduced himself as ‘General 00X’ during my interviews at the camp.  
3.5.1. Observations 
It is argued, our observations are structured within power, politics and history. Observation 
require being reflexive, to register aspects of the field setting and of human behaviour  (Madden, 
2011). Proportionately, whilst negotiating to generate data of this research at the field, I observed 
that an informal process of engagement, built relationship and trust, especially in a very sensitive 
research area such as Niger Delta region. Although I see myself as conducting ‘scientific academic 
research’ that may ethically require formal process and written consent in generating data, the case 
of Niger Delta environment, especially for ‘militants’ is far different in many ways. Firstly, our society 
in yet to get acquainted with culture of research were people are often interviewed with pen and 
paper. It is either seen as invading private space or leaves people wondering what the researcher is 
all about. Secondly, given the sensitivity of this research, militants were highly suspicious of my 
motive, as a result, most felt quite uncomfortable with me using a formal approach with well 
structures and prepared questions to ask. Despite my being Ijaw and an ‘insider’ asking a ‘militant’ 
after a hard search of weeks, and months, for written consent, with well thought written 
questionnaires and pen, would greatly mar the entire process with highly biased response, where 




So, in the processes collecting data, I also observed that militias had a very well organised 
hierarchy and command structure. This observation induced my patience to ensure quality, and 
rigor, by striving to get hold of at least a few high ranked members like ‘commanders’ or ‘Generals’, 
rather than having the –‘Okorofos’ recruits and low ranked members constituting the bulk of my 
data. In doing so, I realised that the low ranked members, were more open in revealing the ‘hidden 
secrets’ of what’s going in these ‘Camps’ than those in high hierarchy. This may be attributed to 
either a feeling of being ‘short charged for services rendered’ by leaders or they felt more relaxed 
and comfortable revealing the ‘unknowns’ to me as a ‘brother’, of which I also observed I was 
frequently called during my encounter as a researcher.  
During my encounters with some of the top ranked members of the militias, I noticed they 
kept stating the obvious well-known issues of environmental pollution, gas flares, and repression 
from the Nigerian army, as reasons for embarking in violent action against the state and oil 
companies. The top ranked members hardly disclose what goes on behind the scenes in ‘camps’ 
What goes on behind the scenes even as a fellow Ijaw and insider, does not necessarily guarantee 
getting the entire picture of militia world. Interestingly, whilst also socialising at night clubs, were 
most militia leaders hangout, I noticed “militia General” arriving with posh cars and guarded with 
well-armed policemen at this night clubs. My instant feeling then, was ‘we’ say in local jargon, they 
have ‘arrived’, meaning they are now rich, having acquired status and recognition by the state and 
multinational oil companies. These observations at the field, enabled me capture the mental picture 
of the realities on the social lifestyle and accorded status of militant leaders 
3.5.2. Interviews 
In-depth interviews constitute part of my data collection methods for this study. They are 
said to be less structured and intense than standardised questionnaires  (Bryman, 2008), as it 
provides a detailed, rich-textured and information on one or more individuals  (Maanen, 1983).more 
importantly in-depth interviews enables dialogue and negotiation between the researcher and 
researched, which strengthens the views and status of the interviewee as a valid, valuable 
contributor and collaborator in construction of knowledge, rather than just a studied subject  (Berg, 
2004). Furthermore, in-depth interviews allow the interviewer to construct open-ended questions that 
frees the respondent to express him/herself, with the aim of soliciting subjective responses. The 
process allows for deeper responses through probing questions, which increases the richness of the 
data obtained. However, interviewees in this method, can easily become fatigued, it may introduce 




Accordingly, I utilised an informal and formal approach in collecting data. By informal, I 
meant going to the field without well planned written out questions to ask militants, but memorising 
the key questions I need to ask at the field, which were basically (a) why did you become a militant, 
(b) what does a ‘camp’ look like (c) what do you do in this camps, (d) what were you doing before 
joining a militia group? These questions mostly in ‘pidgin language’, broadly aims to elicit how militia 
understand they make sense of their collective action, and contentiously think about the actions and 
more importantly, the processes and context of how these actions quickly gained prominence. The 
approach opened   avenues to probe further, where I was privileged to have audio record 15 out of 
the total 35 interviews conducted for this research. I considered the audio recorded as extremely 
rare privilege, despite verbal consent. The consent to have interviews or discussions recorded 
where mostly refused, even with assurances that my interviews was purely an academic research 
exercise. Those that agreed to have the interviews recorded did so based on trust that their identity 
would not be disclosed in any form, as each respondent had the option of being referred to by an 
alias in order to protect their identity. Some of those that agreed to have the discussions recorded 
did not bother to insist on an alias, trusting me to use my discretion, and in such cases, I chose to 
mask their identities. 
Most of the interviews or discussions took place in the day, mostly in ghettos, slums, noisy 
areas, eateries or anywhere that suits the respondents. The interviews generally lasted between 45 
minutes to an hour, sometimes more, depending on location, the mode of the interviewee or how 
discussion progressed. There were frequent distractions during the field research, especially during 
permitted recordings of interviews. In these situations, I tried to make the research respondents feel 
in control and comfortable in directing the research process. The process of formal interviews 
referred here is by scheduling to visit or being invited by key non-militants informants at offices and 
homes. This was indeed an intellectual ‘business like’ arrangement. My key informants and I were 
much more relaxed to engage and talk. I had more time to ask probing questions in getting 
‘convincing details’, which should validate, complement or identify, contrasting views or ambiguities, 
particularly regarding context and meaning of militancy. However, there were slight differences in 
the interviews administered to non-militants. These differences lie on historical context and ideology 
of militancy.  
3.5.3. Conversations/language  
Language in terms of understanding jargons, or slangs is key for understanding this kind of 
research. It has been argued that language is significant for researchers whether insiders or 
outsiders, in studying cultures with languages boundaries, either through differences in dialect within 
areas, or slangs, argots and even languages that are particular to an individual (idiolect)  (Madden, 
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2011). More importantly, insiders may also face a challenge of translating ideas in a language they 
understand as insiders, into academic discourse that can be read and understood by readers of the 
research. Suitably, negotiation and language serve to establish relationships in a field setting. They 
get people to talk and to keep them talking during a conversation. According to Madden (2011), 
conversation is everyday act which constitutes human interaction. This indeed hold true as slangs 
and jargons were commonly used during my encounter with militia. Some I knew, others I learnt by 
asking what they meant.  An example I learnt some new jargon, such “gbenge the best,” or “bust 
and clamp” – these are pidgin phrases picked up during field conversations with militias. The former 
means, confronting oil companies with threats to create opportunities and negotiate for money or 
award of contract. The latter means blowing up pipelines and getting the contact for its repair. 
Equally, I had conversation at newspaper stands, nightclubs and mamaput joints (eateries) as way 
triangulating to validate comments and observations at the field. During these conversations, I 
realised that the numbers of militants in the Niger delta were far less than the figures presented. I 
also realised some people supported the actions of militias, seeing it as a way compelling oil 
communities to intervene in improving the living conditions of communities in the region, others 
viewed militants as criminals and opportunist.   
3.5.4. Field Notes 
 Field notes can be faithful representations of real events, and unit of analysis that defines 
individual or groups  (Madden, 2011). They are brief and factual and can be used in analyses, 
interpretations or conclusions. According to Madden (2011), most field notes do often take place 
within a noisy environment of active fieldwork, jotting down as much information and details as 
possible. Field note also formed part of my data collection methods, also, mine was mainly, in terms 
of tracing the network connections and relationships, whilst listening as they talk. I tried tracing the 
nature of emerge of militia leaders, which community they came from where did they go to, or how 
they became known. However jotting down notes whilst listening at the same time to respondent 
was challenging at keeping pace with what is been said. Again, telling a ‘militia’ to stop halfway from 
discussion or conversation, to write down what is been said, may create its own suspicion, despite 
consent. As it may seem getting too serious, as I may lose that emotional space of comfort, since 






3.6. Negotiating ‘Reflexivity’ 
Writers have argued that changing locations of researchers from institutions to a more 
private/personal environment can raise unexpected ethical, emotional and methodological issues 
not covered by professional codes of conduct  (Yee and Andrew, 2006). Indeed, a number of ethical 
and methodological issues did arise during the fieldwork for this research. First, is the back and forth 
scheduling of appointments, and distraction from noisy environments where appointments where 
fixed. This was quite frustrating considering the cost in terms of time and resources in getting hold of 
research respondents. Interviews were mostly scheduled at bars, highly populated slum areas, and 
unusual places with lots of distraction. The choices were obviously out of my control as a 
researcher. There were instances where I had to stop audio recording in order for the research 
respondents to attend to phone calls, friends passing by and even remembering pressing personal 
issues that led to the rescheduling of interviews or conversations. In such circumstances, 
rescheduled appointments could take days, or a week or more. I found that it was important to 
remain patient through these challenges and exercise, since it was important to complete interviews 
in order to ensure detail and substance in the data rather than just a high number of interviews.  
Secondly, I became aware of the positioning of power between myself and the research 
respondents throughout the research process. Despite the fact that I had specific information or 
themes I wanted to explore, the interviewees had the power to choose how to respond in giving any 
answer that they found desirable in responding to my questions. Thirdly, I also recognised the 
inevitable subjectivity and biases I would encounter during the fieldwork. For me, being a native 
(Ijaw), that considers myself as an insider, conducting research on individuals/groups that are 
predominantly Ijaw, created a platform and leverage toward building interpersonal relationships with 
‘militants’ and key informants/ non-militants. For ‘external outsiders’ who are non-Ijaws, these 
opportunity of relationship cannot or may not be easily done. My contact with key informants, 
activists and perceived militants led to the direction of the research, snowballing in organic and 
unpredictable ways, thus placing me in a position where I found myself been controlled by the 
researched. Despite insiderness, I found myself been directed on where to go and who to meet. This 
brought home to me how vulnerable I became at the field. Nevertheless, it did not mean, I did not 
know what I was looking for, but was simply tagging along, and revealing a power shifts in 
processes of generating data of this study, where consent became a multifaceted balancing act 





One example of these unwritten code of conduct is ‘dropping something to open road’. This 
local jargon implies a form of unofficial giving and of showing appreciation when meeting someone 
for information, although whether this was necessary depended upon particular circumstances and 
the particular information sought. In the context of the Niger Delta, following local jargon and 
practices is a form of abiding by local ethics and norms that are inevitable. It cannot be avoided in 
the context and nature of this research. It was also important to be cautious in maintaining an 
appropriate personality and appearance in order not to make the researched respondent feel inferior 
or feel that I was well-off, which would have increased my exposure to ‘dropping something to open 
the road.’  These experiences reflect Goffman’s  (1959) remarks that individuals act intentionally or 
unintentionally to impress others by keeping up performances.  
Hence, consciously and unconsciously, I generally found myself communicating in the local 
pidgin-English dialects with my research respondents, and sometimes picking up new vocabulary, 
such “gbenge the best,” or “bust and clamp” – these are pidgin phrases picked up during field 
discussions or conversation with identified militias. The former means, confronting oil companies 
with threats to create opportunities and negotiate for money or award of contract. The latter means 
blowing up pipelines and getting the contact for its repair. My insiderness, therefore, opened up new 
avenues that revealed deeper insights into the activities of militia groups. It also created a platform 
for gaining trust and rapport that allowed respondents to speak more freely and openly about their 
experiences. For me, there was no need to fake friendship to make research respondents divulge 
information, as some writers have argued  (Duncombe and Jessop, 2002). My insiderness enabled 
the development of trust and encouraged militia members to open up, as shown below: 
“We did not go with arms first, we only went with one 
“Kpaikpo” (Dane gun) and flag. The law was that arms 
should not go first. Only three persons went to the flow 
station and shut down the station, and when they pin the 
flag, no armed men’s guns would function. Their bullet 
and rifles would not function again. That is the oracle. 
From there we called our troops to come and join. In that 
particular night, only ten persons took over the flow 
station, after the three persons, until the next morning. 
By then Ama was there, Dobo was there too, so many 
others during that strike. So the government intervened, 
at the end of the day, they settled some amount of 
money, about thirty something million naira. It was from 





The above statement from a militia commander obviously reveals trust in relaying his story 
about the hidden cultural secrets used by militants in armed confrontations. I felt there was a 
genuine risk in this statement as the commander revealed his lived experiences and the actors’ real 
names, which I have chosen to edit out in the above extract. There were other situations where my 
relationship with the research respondents developed to a deeper level, where I was no longer seen 
as researcher but as a close confident that could offer advice. I experienced this at the training camp 
for militants at Obubra. Many respondents became comfortable in asking me to suggest what skills 
training might be suitable for them. Perhaps, they viewed me as an expert, although I could only 
give honest advice based on my knowledge, while been wary of blurring the lines between myself 
and the research subjects. My field encounters also provoked an emotional response that I 
continually struggled to deal with. Many statements or narratives of events served to rekindle my 
own experiences of protest and advocacy in the Niger Delta region. My activism in terms of 
organising protest to confront on issues of oil pollution and poor livelihood conditions of 
communities, induced empathy.  
These ethical issues cannot be avoided, but managed in order to present, unbiased non-
judgemental views.  An instance of how I struggled with emotions draws on the field conversations I 
heard with a militia member that lost his six children within the space of one week due to a cholera 
outbreak in his community. Drinking water is a major feature linked to issues that triggered that 
armed conflict, as communities get their drinking water from polluted rivers and streams, which they 
also defecate in. His story reflected my own activism, but I had to manage my emotions and see 
myself in a different light as a researcher in a different circumstance: that is an evolving process. 
There were instances at the fieldwork, where I tried to reveal as little about myself as possible in 
order not to influence responses. These were night clubs, ‘mamaput’ joints (eateries) and 
newspapers stands, where the commonly known ‘apologia of militancy’ are discussed. In these 
instances, I tried initiating a conversation by provoking the notion of self-determination and resource 
control to trigger response from by me in these areas. I would not consider this as disguise or lack of 
ethics, but part of public opinion as Ijaw, insider from observations that feeds into my data as a 
researcher. Likewise, in many instances of field conversations and interviews, when I tried to tease 
out how militancy emerged, I was made to reflect on my insiderness. As a respondent commented, 
‘bros you know wetin dey Na’– meaning, I know or I am supposed to know that militancy is all about 
business. His statement was quite challenging, as he felt I had a clue of militant activities. On 





“You (me) can recall that the Pere of Amabulu was the 
pioneer chairman of the Supreme Egbesu Assembly 
(SEA)…You (me) also remember the Oboama flow 
station, were Felix Tuodolo was going from community 
to community to sensitize the people, and the soldiers 
opened fire at them.” 
What the respondent is doing here is illustrating the intersubjective states and prolepses, 
between the researcher and the researched. The shared reflexive experiences, obviously served to 
highlight my subjectivity and its influence on the construction process of reality, which makes our 
involvement inevitable  (Quilley and Loyal, 2005). In addition, sieving through a highly tensed, 
conflict-ridden population to identify ‘real militants’ was another challenge I faced. Despite my 
insiderness, I had to take precautions on who to meet for interviews, as every youth in the Niger 
Delta is conceived as or has potential of being labelled as a militant. More so, the aftermath of 
amnesty programme introduced by the Nigerian state created a welfare package that witnessed 
claims by many as militants, in order to gain access to the training and opportunities and money. I 
also realised being an insider, the researched takes for granted his responses, believing I know 
them (prolepses), thus I  filled in gaps through triangulation with other militias or key informants, as 
certain information may not be elaborate or over-emphasized.  
The process is to ensure a valid data, as it is argued that reliability and validity of data is 
based on experiences of the researched  (Leydesdorff et al., 1996; Gluck and Patai, 1991). 
However, reliability and validity of data does not entirely lie in the hands of the researched 
experiences.  Consequently, there is the possibility or situations where bias, and memories of 
accounts by the researched, is also questioned, given that reliance upon memories may distort the 
truth. Also, there is the potential for the researched to tell only what they think researcher wants to 
hear, excluding other vital details, especially when they perceive the information would become a 
public document. Furthermore, given that there is no simple or universal truth to a story, since 
stories are based on one’s own perception, I triangulated to gain the intersubjective state of common 
beliefs, as well as, utilising the shared experiences of the situation in the Niger Delta.  
3.7. Positionality 
This research is hinged on a non-positivist stance to argue that scientific research do not 
produce objective truth  (Humboldt, 2008), but claims to truth that rely on particular assumptions and 
perspectives of reality. Moreover, reality is not just socially constructed, but intersubjectivity 
constructed. Furthermore, external conditions in which individuals or groups therefore live in, are 
major influences to how we think, feel and act. Being a native Ijaw and conducting research with 
Izon militants, constitutes insiderness, which create some privileges as well as, challenges of 
engagements in the field. I view the shared meanings and perceptions of militants in Niger Delta as 
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co-construction of knowledge, which appeal to our shared subjectivities and lived experiences. It is 
an iterative and collaborative on-going process with the researcher and the researched subject 
mental and emotional states being immersed into the research. As a result, it engages in a face-to-
face contact with the research subjects, which induced reciprocity in building trust and friendship, 
without doing them any harm to the key informant or militants, who have move on with their lives, by 
been reintegrated back to the society.  
Being a native Ijaw and researching my own environment had its privileges and challenges 
as I could not control what happened in the field. My insiderness was limited in terms of the 
positions or power in relation to researched respondents and in determining who to interview, what 
they said in the process of discussions or interviews or where to go in in order to locate members of 
militia groups. In terms of negotiating objectivity and subjectivity as regards to my research, I did not 
feel distant or disengaged from the research respondents, rather I felt emotionally connected with 
the research processes and interviewees, albeit whilst paying careful attention to feedback, in order 
to grasp the multifaceted perspectives and views of militancy. I acknowledge, the argument that, all 
research is viewed as a practical activity that requires the exercise of judgment within context 
 (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983), rather than simply adhering to methodological rules. Therefore, I 
make no pretence that this research is value-free, as the perspectives, I have chosen and the ways 
in which I intend to analyse and interpret the data reveal elements of subjectivity. I also, consider 
this research to be a collaborative effort and process between me, the research data and 
interviewees, in providing a common sense construct of a particular phenomenon. The process only 
makes me a co-constructor of social knowledge, taking into account the intersubjective elements 
that come into play in the process of the research  (Finlay, 2003). 
 I had difficulty, however, in locating my identity in terms being an outsider or insider 
throughout the field research, as I kept struggling to distance myself from being emotionally involved 
in the everyday realities that I am part of. At best, I can only present a view of the way things are, 
without making any judgement. Another aspect of locating my identity as an insider or an outsider is 
the use of conventional third person discourse in academic writing or the first person discourse 
associated with a more personal literary style. Writers have argued that the third person style 
emphasise a more “scientific” distance from the work, and a striving to navigate the boundaries 
between fact and fiction, subjective and objective, and what is true and imagined  (Richardson, 
2000). I argue, however, that in the context of research such as, this the use of the third person may 
in fact cloak the dilemma and compromise implicit in such judgements, hence, I have chosen on 
occasions to use the first person stance. This is to emphasise the challenges of constructing an 
independent knowledge in relation to the collective identities of the research subjects, as well as, 
acknowledging the personal and reflexive nature of my authorship of the research. Furthermore, my 
62 
 
passion and subjective biases are borne out of shared experiences and narratives with the 
interviewees of this research.  
3.8. Process of Data Analysis 
 The process of analysing data generated in this study is suitably an interpretative 
approach. Although, interpretative data analysis is criticised for its often fragmented or conflictual 
narrative accounts  (Walsham, 2006), it engage a grounded theory procedure that involves a back 
and forth reading of interview transcripts and field notes with the purpose of discovery, labelling or 
understanding. Grounded theories are appropriate for single-case studies and studies that require 
small number of participants, and the pattern of data analysis offer insight, that enhance 
understanding, and provides a meaningful way to explore new subjects. In grounded theory, coding 
is often systematic and informal, relying on the researcher’s ability to detect clusters of words that 
could develop further description and interpretation. The researcher is seen as performing the 
function of identifying issues and concepts and measuring their relative value, as well as researcher 
having the flexibility to modify his/her approach as needed, including detecting latent content 
inherent in the subject’s statements. The drawback, however, is that being an instrument of analysis, 
the researcher often lacks the same precision and objectivity that a physical instrument or test might 
afford. 
Accordingly, I engaged the process of multiple reading and interpretation of transcribed 
audio recoded interviews, words and texts from newspapers and notes from 
conversation/observation. I attempted categorising the data into dominant themes/concepts within 
(1) the historical context of emergence (2) the meaning, motivation and ambition of militancy and (3) 
the role and significance of militancy.  I engage reflexively in the process of analysis by breaking 
down narratives into paragraphs and sentences that is devoid of any personal feeling or bias, as I 
seek to present a non-judgemental view of militants. The objective of this reflexive and interpretative 
account of militants and non-militants is to gain a broader picture of how and why militancy gained 
prominence within the macro political structure of resource governance in Niger Delta. Accordingly, I 
searched for common recurring themes from the historical, context, and process of militancy.  Key 
concepts from literature such as collective identity, power and opportunism guided the process of 
categorising data.   
In carrying out this study, I attempt to emphasise the shifting frame of militia collective 
identity questions of; who is a militant (meaning) what and how they do, what they do (internal 
organisation, strategy and tactics) by scrutinising utterances words from the transcribed interviews, 
and text extracts from newspapers. The implication of this process is to make explicit the context of 
varied meaning of militancy, the motivation/ambition and network of relationships that gives 
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prominence to militancy. Besides, the utterance and texts scrutinised will also inform the processes 
of social change, which militants appear to be seeking within the macro political culture of resource 
governance in Nigeria. It will reveal the constraints or opportunities on role of militants in Niger Delta 
conflict. In trying to make sense of the primary, I also attempt to illustrate how the subjective 
experiences of militants and common ideology or belief is framed and transformed into new 
meanings and interpretation. It is however pertinent to note, that the analysis or finding of this study 
is, mainly concerned with providing a sociological understanding of militancy; what it is, and how it 
evolves and recurs in sustaining the conflict in the region. I do not intend to present an absolute 
definitive reality of the lingering conflict and militia action in Niger Delta region, but provide a 
description and interpretation of the role and significance of militancy. Above all, I assume the 
violent actions of militants in the Niger Delta region, is one that perpetuates, recreates a repertoire of 
contention.  
However, the process of interpretation is argued as political activity  (Walsham, 2006), 
where the researcher is not positioned as being neutral or insiders been holistic in analysis of 
interviewees text or adding variation in the findings. In addressing the issue of neutrality, firstly I 
have no doubt that the data generated for this research is informed by the lived and shared 
experiences of the research subjects; hence it is subjective not value-free. Secondly, I also consider 
this research to be a continuous process that changes in time and space, by making constant 
contact with key informants and the researched, and also been aware of  issues presented . Whilst 
acknowledging the key informant and militia’s discretion in disclosing information to narrate their 
stories and experiences, I also have preconceptions as to what to look for in describing and 
interpreting the research data. Conversely, my ethnic background may be seen to create subjective 
biases for analysis, as it would rely on my thinking and choices, thus creating concern on the 
outcome of this research from assumption perception or interest. 
3.9. Conclusion 
This chapter examines relevant review of literature in order to underpin this research within 
epistemological and ontological lens. It advocates for interpretivist social constructionist perspective 
as suitable for exploring a particular kind of reality, and argues that the ‘reality’ of militancy/militia 
action in Niger Delta, is a socially constructed phenomenon.  In addition, I hinge on the assumption 
that our ideas of what constitutes knowledge, never objectively reflect external reality   (De Koster et 
al., 2004), as it is often a creation from our experiences, perceptions and values. Therefore, our 
choices and actions are often based on social context and values we attach to things within our 
physical environment.  
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 Among militants of the Niger Delta, we can say that there is intersubjective state 
relating to the meaning and collective actions in the region, and this assumption is likely to be 
reflected in empirical chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this study. Broadly speaking, there are challenges 
faced by academic researcher’s seeking to deconstruct intersubjective states. These challenges 
are more profound for ‘insiders’ who is at the least, familiar with intersubjective states of the 
researched. I acknowledge my positioning, that might create bias or emotional attachment in 
providing a valid constructed reality of militias. However, scholars argue that an element of 
insiderness can be a useful way of engaging with intersubjectivities of research subject, provided 
researchers maintain some measure of detachment  (Quilley and Loyal, 2005).  Given that 
everyday life is itself a meaningful intersubjective creation  (Prus, 1996), then the immersion into 
the live world of active militias in the Niger Delta, informs ethnographic approach. The choice of 
ethnographic approach, lies in its naturally occurring source of data and its ability to combine 
different forms of data. I argue here that an ethnographic approach, from the perspective of an 
insider, has potential value for accessing the lived experiences of militants in the Niger Delta. 
In exploring the nature of knowledge and the complexities in social science research, in 
terms of acquiring and translating broadly valid meanings from subjects of research, that are 
socially and culturally remote from the language and values of the research medium, this 
sections has thus far shown that there is no “easy” point of access to the fully nuanced life-world 
of militants. Whilst being an ‘outsider’ conveys advantages in some research situations, there is 
the risk of ‘outsiders’ been constrained from attaining any level of intersubjective understanding.  
Moreover,’ outsiders’ might end up imposing external values and judgements that might subvert 
a full understanding. These risks are relatively great in a research context such as the Niger 
Delta, where research subjects are likely to view outsider researchers with suspicion. Also, 
tapping into the intersubjective world of the militants might be fraught with substantial cultural 
and practical challenges. In this context, therefore, I argue that as a researcher, who is both an 
insider in some sense, to the world of the militants, and insider to the academic discourse, 
places me in a position to be able to attain a unique and valuable access to the research 
subjects (in this case the militants of the Niger Delta), whilst also being in able to reflect and 
analyse the lived world of militia, in a more nuanced intersubjective discourse of academia. As a 
researcher engaging with militias, the interface of communication provides an important reminder 
that the very act of communication can itself may change and reshape both the researcher and 




Furthermore, perceived power imbalances between the researcher (interviewer) and 
militant actor (interviewee) might lead to discontinuity in the process of gathering information and 
reformulation of ideas and meanings.  Although my beliefs may be reformulated through the 
process of interface with interviewees, there is also the possibility that, the questions I posed, the 
ways they are articulated and the interviewees’ perception of my goals, can itself, influence to 
reinforce or reshape the interviewees’ perceptions in articulating perceived thoughts. Whilst face-
to-face engagement, therefore, is suggested as preferable methods for this study, it is not does 
not necessarily provide an objective account, but is equally subject to processes, whereby 
investigation or exploration, and interaction, creates its own unique and subjective experience. In 
a nutshell, the epistemological and ontological considerations examined in this chapter have 
developed a position in which this research is conceptualised as engaging with the militants of 
the Niger Delta from emic perspective. This is done to capitalise on the intersubjective potential 
of the researcher’s insiderness, and in recognition that knowledge and reality are fundamentally 
socially constructed phenomena.  In addition, an in-depth understanding of reality that is specific 
to time and space, requires a fully developed intersubjective common orientation between the 
researcher and militias, in ways that existing research on the Niger conflict, have arguably failed 
to achieve. The reviews of literatures that highlight the relevance intersubjectivity, interface and 
insiderness, in the process of construction of knowledge and reality, are further evident at the 













Chapter Four: The Emergence of Militancy in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria 
4.1. Introduction 
A number of social movement organisations have emerged in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria over the last decade. These movements, which appear to be challenging state power and 
authority, have remained, to a large extent, unsuccessful in claiming rights or changing the structure 
of oil governance in the country. Despite confrontations with these movements, the state still 
maintains its monopoly and exercises control of resources, which are arguably managed through a 
culture of impunity, with a few state and non-state actors directly benefiting. For many inhabitants of 
the Niger Delta, life is becoming increasingly precarious. Worse still, the activities of multinational oil 
companies have had a profound negative environmental impact: waters are polluted, and fishing 
activities and other methods of making a living have been degraded, leaving communities in squalid 
conditions  (Tantua, 2009). Frustrated with a history of discontent and distrust, indigenous local 
militias have emerged, becoming recognised for taking direct action in ways seeking specific 
change. 
This chapter aims to describe and interpret the context and processes of emergence of 
militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Thus, this first empirical chapter examines some 
features that facilitated the emergence of militancy in the Niger Delta region. Overall, context, 
political culture and process are important concepts in this research, as they help to unfold a body of 
complex interaction and relationships around the underlying role and significance of militancy. 
Specifically, this chapter aims to gain an understanding of the reasons why, and how, militancy has 
emerged and evolved in a particular way in the Delta, and how the openness or closure of state–
society relations help in sustaining the lingering conflict in the Niger Delta region. In this particular 
case, it is a conflict that raises concerns around the territorial space of action, the lived experiences 
of individuals or groups, and the physical environment.  
The emergence of social movements, such as the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), the 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and, most recently, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), are seen primarily as minority struggles, especially for 
Ogonis and Ijaws who seek recognition and rights by making claims and demands. These ethnic 
groups are at the forefront of a perceived struggle against injustice which appears to coalesce 
around legitimacy over resource governance. This governance has been challenged by these ethnic 
groups at various platforms of collective action that hinge on the ideology of “self-determination and 




Aspects of this chapter also identify the nature of the state’s response to these protests, 
which has led to increasing tension and resistance in the Niger Delta region. The structure of 
political power, the coercion around it, and localised presence of oil, appear to arouse a conscious 
awakening amongst ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta region. It has induced a sense of belonging 
amongst individuals and groups, which seems to challenge the legitimacy of the state over rights to 
land and resource ownership. In addition, the legislative law of resource extraction and the 
distribution of its benefits, also known as the “derivation principle” in Nigeria, have also triggered a 
conflict over access, participation and recognition among movements in the Niger Delta region.  
In this first empirical chapter, an attempt has been made to gather information, from field 
interviews, personal observations and experiences, and local newspapers concerning (a) case(s) of 
political oppression from key moments and events attributed to the emergence of militancy, and (b) 
the role of the state in response to agitation which has contributed to a proliferation of movements in 
the region. A second empirical chapter will examine closely how militancy is defined or perceived, 
the different types of militia leadership, recruitment, and loyalty within a typical “camp” structure of 
militants. Together, these will shed light on militancy/militias, and how individual interest and 
collective action involve socially constructed meanings that are not easily discernible or 
straightforward in the Niger Delta. 
A third empirical chapter will explore the relationships and interactions that inform a rise in 
number of militant groups and what gives significance of militancy in the Niger Delta region. The 
chapter will also look into the fusion and fission of militancy in terms of unity, competition and splits, 
amongst militant groups. Together, the chapters will aim to address the key central questions earlier 
outlined in chapter 1 of this study. However, it is pertinent to note that this research is primarily 
concerned with a non-judgemental, experiential view of militants rather than the causal mechanisms 
that led to militancy. Although the views of non-militants were sought, they are meant to validate, or 
complement the gaps of the narratives of militants. 
4.2. Feeling of Oppression: 1956-1999 
In order to gain an understanding of why and how militancy emerged and the particular in 
which it emerge, this section will closely examine some features linked to contemporary actions of 
militants in the Niger Delta. A key historical event attributed to the emergence of militancy was the 
feeling of political oppression experienced by ethnic minorities prior to the discovery of oil in Nigeria. It 
signalled early political tensions which established boundaries of majority–minority ethnic struggles for 
political power in the early 1960s. The fears of political domination of ethnic minorities in the Niger 
Delta region are highlighted in the following interviews. For instance, Kowa an academic researcher 
and a key non-militant, who was also a former vice president of Ijaw National Congress (INC) point out 
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the historical roots of contemporary militia action by referring to a perception of oppression. He also 
reference to a Willink  (1957) committee report (see below) constituted during British colonial rule. The 
report noted the peculiarity of the Niger Delta situation, and the quest for regional autonomy by ethnic 
minorities, who felt undermined in policy decisions made by Eastern majority Igbos.  
… we had no doubt that the feeling of neglect and lack of 
understanding is widespread in the region. We consider 
that a case be made out for special treatment of this 
area. This matter requires a special effort because the 
region is poor, backward and neglected.  
The peculiarities of the Niger Delta in terms of the terrain and livelihood patterns, is quite 
distinct from other regions in the country. This distinction tend to impose challenges of its 
development needs. These distinctions were noted Willink report that highlight the fears of 
domination which were expressed as a lack of the minority’s representation in policy decision-
making, and challenges of infrastructural development in the region. However, the minorities 
demand for a separate region was denied at the time; as seen above, the report made 
recommendations that the region be accorded special government attention in terms of physical 
infrastructure and development. Kowa further maintains that the Willink committee acknowledged 
the region’s neglect and lack of development, and understood that individuals or groups might one 
day be compelled to take up arms against the state. The recommendations of the Willink report are 
said to inform the basis for development interventions in the Niger Delta region from successive 
regimes, such as the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1961, the Niger Delta River Basin 
Authority (NDRBA) in 1979, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC) in 1992, and the Niger Delta Development Commission1 (NDDC) in 2000. The fear of 
domination resulting from a lack of representation within the political structure of governance, and 
challenges of physical development, coincided with the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta region. 
Interestingly, the discovery of oil in 1956 is seen to have incited and highlighted a perception of 
minority status for the Ogonis and Ijaws, as emphasised by Kowa. 
               4.3. Perception of Minority Status 
Militancy in the Niger Delta region is a combination of a 
series of struggles, dating back to the Adaka Boro revolt 
[…] because of the peculiarities and minority status of 
the inhabitants of the region, we needed to be separated 
from the Eastern region […] These events existed before 
Oil came into prominence. 
                                                 
1 These were interventions to address the growth and development needs of the Niger Delta region. 
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Kowa curiously notes the significance of geo-political tensions that existed prior to 
discovery of oil and the changing trends within structures of governance in the country. Oil became 
the context and struggle for political power. The exploration of crude oil, gradually turned Nigeria’s 
political economy into a mono commodity economic, upon which the country now heavily depend 
on. Prior to 1956, the constitutional provision stipulated a structure of regional autonomy that 
allocated 50% of resource benefits to regions, based on the derivation principle (see Chapter 2 on 
resource extraction). This percentage was gradually reduced by the state causing protests from 
minority ethnic groups, shortly after Nigeria’s independence in 1960.The centralised structure of oil 
governance, amongst other features, initiated a struggle for power along ethnic lines, which became 
evident in the nature of political party formations throughout the country. The ethnic struggles for 
power threatened the cohesion and unity of the country, as the three major ethnic groups aligned 
themselves around different political parties: the Hausa–Fulani chose the Northern People’s 
Congress, the Eastern Igbo became attached to the National Council for Nigeria and Cameroons, 
and the Western Yoruba organised themselves around the Action Group. Other ethnic minorities 
were, however, submerged through these alliances with the dominant political parties. The fear of 
domination, and struggle for political power which triggered boundaries between majority–minority 
ethnic identities, coupled with the discovery of oil incited a localised sense of belonging amongst 
minorities, are some aspects of structural conditions that paved the way for armed conflict to unfold 
in 1966 and, subsequently, for the Biafra civil war to erupt in 1967, fuelled by ethnic Eastern Igbos. 
4.4. Collective Agency: Ideological battles and threats of secession 
A significant feature linked to current militia action in the Niger Delta region, is the influence 
of charismatic leadership. The fear of domination and oppression, highlighted by Kowa in the 
previous section, is seen to have spurred the emergence of Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), a 
movement initiated by a former school teacher, and an undergraduate of chemistry, named Adaka 
Boro in 1966. The NDVF is seen as a movement speaking on behalf of communities that is excluded 
from rungs of political governance and, thus, engaged in violent action using threats of secession in 
making claims and demands for inhabitants of the Niger Delta region. Moreover, the NDVF is 
perceived by many ethnic Ijaws as carrying a history of martyrs that provides the mechanism and 
platform for contemporary militias to build on a set of ideas for collective action. The actions of 
Adaka Boro became, what can be argued within the broader literature of social movement as 
initiating events  (Smelser, 1962), a situation where the actions of a particular individual or series of 
events trigger repeated action over a period of time, or situation of routine forms of activities and 
recurring actions that becomes well known to both challengers who engage in collective action, and 
their opponents  (Tilly et al., 2001). For many minority Ijaws today, Adaka Boro is seen and 
celebrated as a hero, whose actions have inspired current militants in the Niger Delta region. A 
historical account of militancy is incomplete without reference to Adaka Boro, who inspired 
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commitment from NDVF members and who recognised the political constraints in framing claims 
and demands in response to structural conditions of injustice, seen to directly impact negatively on 
individual lives in the Niger Delta region. 
4.4.1. Significance of Ideology: agency and the framing of oppression 
Some aspects of analysis in this section refer to the broader sociological idea of Gamson’s 
 (1995) motivational framing, which triggers what he termed “the call for arms”. This is a situation 
where particular individuals or groups are agents with a rationale for engaging in collective action, 
including the construction of appropriate words known to that particular group. Thus, a memorable 
event from the action of Adaka Boro indicates how the NDVF, as agents, were able to present a 
particular incident to demonstrate oil governance and the physical environment of the region. The 
NDVF illustrates aspects of how individual lives/experiences relate to the broader picture within this 
context. These aspects can incite collective action, as noted in text extracts accredited to Boro2.  
Ijaws are seen as victims of a woolly administration. Year 
after year, we are clinched in tyrannical chains and led 
through a dark ally of perpetual political and social 
deprivation [...] the day will come for us to fight for our 
long-denied right to self-determination. 
Boro’s statements, which are expressed in metaphors, tend to describe the socio-political 
condition drawn from the context of oil and a feeling of oppression, to justify militia action in the 
region. Also, aspects of Boro’s claims inform effort to frame his ideology within prevailing conditions 
of poverty and frustration. They seem to compel mobilising support to challenge the legitimacy of the 
state, and demonstrate partially how structural conditions of injustice are articulated to encourage 
collective action. Moreover, in a related statement to justify militia action, Boro acknowledged being 
labelled a robber, thief, bandit and terrorist, a view that appears insignificant in his attempt to shift 
the focus away to issues of oppression anchored around petroleum. This labelling, from a broader 
understanding of literature, signifies an act of judgement, from a preconceived opinion that gives a 
commonly held image of individuals/groups  (Wood, 1985). Thus, Boro’s statements below describe 
how efforts to legitimise forms of claims, involve socially constructed meanings of collective action, 
contradictions, including preconceived labels and opposing views to the actions of the NDVF. 
 
 
                                                 
2 The Twelve-Day Revolution.  
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Today is a great day, not only in our lives, but also in the 
history of the Niger Delta. Perhaps, it will be the greatest 
day for a very long time […] we are going to 
demonstrate to the world, what and how we feel about 
oppression. Before today, we were branded robbers, 
bandits, terrorists, or gangsters, but after today, we shall 
be heroes of our land.... remember your seventy-year-old 
grandmother who still farms before she eats, remember 
also your poverty-stricken people, remember too your 
petroleum which is being pumped out daily from your 
veins and then fight for your freedom (Adaka Boro, 
1966:116) 
Interestingly, oil became the central focus, shifting from the perception of a ‘minority status’ 
to be primarily defined as the context for militia emergence in the Niger Delta region. This was 
evident in the interview with Owunaru3, a former militia member of the NDVF, now in his mid-
seventies. His comments inform a belief and a sense of belonging, from shared experiences of 
deprivation, which is viewed through the exercise of power—in this case, how power relations 
intersect with individual lived experience. 
... We felt short-changed, in the scheme of things. I mean 
we had oil being exploited to benefit other parts of the 
country; whilst our own area remained underdeveloped 
and backward […] realising that the resources are from 
our area, we felt the solution was armed struggle.  
The perception of deprivation seen from the statements of Boro and Owunaru is 
contentious discourse and shows contemporary views of militants and non-militants in the Niger 
Delta region. It urged a platform of collective identities/actions, and a sense of deprivation, to 
present the idea of ‘self-determination and resource control’ as an emancipatory struggle, as shown 
from interviews with Timidi an unemployed active militia in his thirties, who insisted that the lack of 
basic socio-economic amenities in communities had triggered militia action in the region. His 
response, like many others, made reference to Adaka Boro and Ken Saro Wiwa as leaders who 
have inspired current militia action. This informs how the context of oil provokes collective action, 
growing out of a previous situation of conflict to construct a prototype that describes what to do in 
particular circumstances, as well as a rationale for such action.  
We have been fighting for the cause of the Niger Delta for 
years. People like Isaac Adaka Boro came on board, he 
died, and Ken Saro Wiwa came […] you know we are the 
people that are feeding the whole country, but if you 
come to my community, there is no electricity, no roads, 
no drinking water, nothing, and nothing. 
                                                 
3 The only member of the NDVF still alive at the time of this writing. 
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Similar views were also expressed by another active militia, Akpainfoko, a school dropout, 
in his thirties, who highlighted unemployment as a significant feature pushing vulnerable youths into 
joining militia groups. Together, these comments reflect an overall sense of deprivation and 
frustration, and present militancy as a struggle against poverty, a struggle involving hope and 
despair which is felt individually and collectively in the region.  
Our youths lack employment and jobs. We have oil in our 
community, it is others that are operating in our places 
and enjoying the benefits […] when you hear about the 
struggle, struggle, the Niger Delta struggle, we have the 
oil, and we cannot taste it? 
Another feature that links this sense of deprivation and frustration to the emergence of 
militancy in the Niger Delta region is the role of the media. The media is amplifying the militia conflict 
in the region by drawing on public sympathy by granting interviews to militia leaders regarding the 
situation in the Niger Delta. This was evident in a statement accredited to Okusbaba, a militant 
leader involved with a local newspaper (The Dispatch, 25 April 2009) who, like others, attributes the 
socio-economic conditions in the region as justification for militia action.  
… there is no federal government presence in our area. 
As far as I know, there are no good schools. There are still 
thatch buildings and dilapidated structures as schools. 
Schools without furniture, no laboratory, no library, no 
teachers, you name it. 
This sense of deprivation and injustice was also apparent in the interviews of non-militants, 
who expressed their lack of participation and recognition within the structure of oil governance in 
Nigeria. For instance, Kponi, an academic researcher in his late sixties, questions the structural 
relationship of power which induces a conscious awakening amongst the indigenous people of the 
Niger Delta region. According to Kponi: 
When people become conscious of injustice, which in this 
case, is a question of the relationship between people in 
the Niger Delta and others, they react; they revolt […] an 
expression of their disgust to what is happening, the 
disappointment, and people becoming disillusioned by 
the system. 
This view coincides with Kpein’s view below, another non-militant in his mid-sixties, who 
traced the history of militancy to the early threat of secession, linking it to minority status and the 
lack of physical infrastructural development. These responses reflect a set of beliefs and sentiments 
within socially constructed meanings of everyday life. It draws our attention to how interactions at a 
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micro level intersects with broader political structures, in which the actions of individuals or groups 
coalesce.  
This militancy started in 1998, thirty clear years after 
Adaka Boro’s Tuntunba declaration, declaring the Niger 
Delta a republic. The Nigerian government thought the 
present militancy to be another flash in the pan, and 
condemned what they felt to be the insignificant 
population of the Niger Delta that cannot resist the 
Nigerian military force […] even if Ijaw lands are not 
developed, we cannot do anything. 
When viewed broadly from a sociological point of view, the narratives in this section offer 
insight into how conflict can emerge from a particular structure or history of a given society 
 (Touraine, 1985). In this instance, it demonstrates how minority status and the feeling of oppression 
can induce a shared sense of identity among the lived experiences of individuals/groups, which can 
then provoke collective action. Identity, in the context of this research, refers to perceptions and the 
construction of territorial spaces of interest or action, that are imagined or real communities  (Polletta 
and Jasper, 2001). This is an integral part within the context of oil that cannot be easily detached 
from shared beliefs and experiences in the Niger Delta region. Furthermore, the ideology and 
actions of Boro, within the context of oil, fostered a sensitivity and platform for collective action. The 
events around the NDVF can be also argued as the attempts of a movement mobilising support for 
collective action within an ideology aimed at influencing or changing the power relationships of oil 
governance—an ideology framed within the context of oil and perceived as impacting negatively on 
the quality of life of individuals/groups in the Niger Delta region. In addition, Boro’s actions draw our 
attention to Benford and Snow’s  (2000) idea of frame articulation and amplification, which involves 
linking events and experiences in compelling ways that highlight and emphasise events or beliefs as 
being more salient than others. It also describes how individual experiences at a micro level can 
relate to macro-political structures, in which personal behaviours coalesce  (Ruggiero and 
Montagna, 2008). 
Truly, the statements and responses in this section partly reflect how individuals and 
groups fit into or respond to institutional structures and power relationships around the governance 
of oil in Nigeria vis-à-vis the Niger Delta region. It outlines how shared expectations or beliefs are 
linked to discontent, which can then trigger claim-making efforts by the NDVF. This discontent is 
expressed in terms of neglect, and as a lack of participation and recognition within the oil arena, 
which is symbolic of the construction of meaning and collective action in the region.  
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4.5. Political repression: The role of the State 
In the following section, I argue in line with the theoretical assumption that violence is a 
site-specific phenomenon within historical processes and events, and often linked to the wider social 
interactions of material transformation and power relation (Homer-Dixon, 1994). I also maintain that 
violence is the result of human beliefs, concepts or values, acquired from their environment which, in 
turn, propels people to act in conformity to those ideas  (Tilly, 2003). 
A third factor contributing to the emergence of militancy in the Niger Delta region was the 
role of the Nigerian state in response to protest and agitation. The militarisation and coercion used in 
the “protection of oil facilities/installations” has merely served to intensify tension, and the region 
remains an area of contested entitlement with struggles for power and legitimacy over resource 
rights and recognition that focus around issues concerned with resource laws, degradation and 
continued gas flares. The long years of successive military rule (1966–99) appear to have shaped 
the militarisation and present behaviour of violence in the Niger Delta. It broadly informs how 
collective agents perceive and respond to coercion as a technique for social control, that urge 
individuals/groups to join in collective violence  (Tilly et al., 2001).  
Aspects of the militarisation of the Niger Delta region were observed from field experiences, 
from interviews with militant and non-militants, and from the local media. The presence of a joint 
military task force, comprising army, navy, air force, state secret-service and the police, to provide 
security for oil companies, attests to the belief that oil is of fundamental importance and the key to 
armed conflict in the Niger Delta. The repeated strategies of militants and the militarisation of the 
region by the state points to politics of contention; a situation that involves the government 
exercising control through coercive means over resources. The use of force by the state is evident 
from a local newspaper’s comment describing how state brutality facilitates militancy in the region. 
Pato, a key activist and informant interviewed, insisted that the repressive nature of the state is 
shown from the number of security outfits and acronyms established for the Niger Delta region—
Operation Fire-for-Fire, Operation Sweep, Hakuri 1 and 2, Operation Flush 1, 2 and 3—all designed 
to intimidate the people of the Niger Delta region by demonstrating federal authority in enforcing law 
and order. In addition, the response of multinational oil companies to agitation from the surrounding 
communities is the continued deployment of private and state troops, described as an ‘army of 
occupation’, to demobilise Ijaws. This response is also reflected in a local Newspaper of Guardian of 
2nd May, 2004, which noted more police and military officers prefer working with the oil companies 
than servicing the country.  These goes to also illustrate the lucrative value of oil to the Nigerian 
state, from the deployment of security agents to the Niger Delta region.  
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4.6. The spread of contention: The Ogoni Uprising 
A number of cases have so far been mentioned to describe state brutality in response to 
protest and agitation from movements in the Niger Delta region. However, the cases of the ‘Ogoni 
uprising’ and the ‘Ogele procession’ are seen to represent key historical moments of state brutality, 
as well as a conscious awakening to the necessity to resort to arms in making claims over the 
legitimacy of rights and the protection of the Niger Delta environment. These events were noted by 
Kponi, a key informant, who took into consideration the political constraints faced by the NDVF in 
1966, and the Ogoni uprising by the Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1995, 
pointing out the response of the military to agitators from both these movements.  According to 
Kponi: 
Adaka Boro was unprepared to engage in the kind of 
struggle that he embarked on. You cannot just secede 
from a monster like Nigeria […] Ken Saro Wiwa was more 
of an intellectual trying to put agitation into a struggle, 
but then Ken was dealing with a monstrous structure, the 
Nigerian military, that did not understand the finesse of a 
revolutionary struggle. 
An interesting aspect of the comment by Kponi, tells how the openness or closure of 
regimes shapes the success or failure of movements. Thus, the NDVF’s attempt to secede under an 
authoritarian regime is argued to have failed, given the use of power against threats of secession 
from an insignificant amount of resources available to NDFV members in 1966. The mention of Ken 
Saro Wiwa, in reference to agitation from the MOSOP, signifies a collective agent representing a 
common interest for the Ogonis, in seeking environmental rights and protection from the activities of 
the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). According to Kponi, the MOSOP began its 
confrontation with claims and demands of compensation for the degradation and pollution caused in 
Ogoni land from oil exploration activities, demands which eventually led to the prosecution and 
death of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other members of the MOSOP, by hanging, on 10 November, 
1995.  The MOSOP members were prosecuted over the alleged murder of four prominent Ogoni 
chiefs, who were termed vultures and pro-government agents for opposing the Ogoni Bill of Rights 
for Self-determination. The murder of these chiefs resulted in the raiding and levelling of Ogoni 






The authoritarian nature and brutality of the state is also reflected in the manner in which MOSOP 
members were sentenced to death, by hanging with acid poured over their bodies. Their bodies 
could not be identified for decent burial by Ogonis. The death of these members also stirred up 
international outrage and condemnation, in what Kponi describes as kangaroo judgement and 
murder. In a related event of similar circumstances, Kowa, a non-militant and one-time vice-
president of the Ijaw National Congress (INC), a socio-political/cultural group, narrates his personal 
ordeal during the Ogoni crisis. His account reveals similar experiences of state repression which, in 
part, reflect on how individuals are constituted as agents, as well as members of a wider collective in 
particular circumstances or collective action. 
At some point during the Ogoni uprising, tensions were 
so high, and I argued that the Ijaws must begin to 
increase their activities, not in terms of militancy, but in 
terms of advocacy […] at the end of the day, my house 
was burnt by a group called the internal security of 
Abacha4 […] mine was just to use words, a cry for justice. 
Kowa recalls how the non-violent approach adopted by Ken Saro Wiwa ended up fuelling 
the need for armed conflict, by showing how the regime was not receptive to embracing peaceful 
dialogue and advocacy.  
The only language the oppressors understood was the 
language of AK-47, because Ken Saro Wiwa never carried 
any AK-47. He was involved in a peaceful movement, 
calling the attention of the international community to 
the injustices going on in the Niger Delta […] as I said, I 
narrowly escaped being killed, and my house was set on 
fire. Lots of horrible things happened under the Abacha 
regime. Apparently, the youths came to the conclusion 
that the only language Nigeria understood was that of 
AK-47. Let AK-47 talk to AK-47. I suspect, I have never had 
the opportunity of talking to these young men. 
4.6.1. Protest of climate change: The ‘Ogele procession’ 
As outlined in the previous section, the Ogoni uprising was the beginning of a conscious 
awakening and a spread of contention across the Niger Delta region. The “Ogele procession”, which 
followed in the aftermath of the Ogoni uprising, remains a remarkable event for Ijaws. It represents a 
non-violent means of protest, using traditional drum-dance in expressing grievance. The event 
witnessed a gathering of Ijaw youth organisations and symbolises a turning point in Ijaw history. It 
signalled the beginning of, and the need to engage in, armed violence as declared by Otuan, an 
                                                 
4 Nigeria’s former Head of State under the military regime. 
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eyewitness and participant at the event. Otuan’s vivid picture of events, expresses one interpretation 
of the ways in which struggles of collective agents are lived and felt individually and collectively. 
....We were going about the struggle in a well-structured 
and non-violent way. We carried placards and leaves 
without weapons or guns. But throughout the protest 
expressing our grievances, the federal government used 
military might, not police, but military might […] along 
the hospital road junction, some soldiers led by an army 
captain opened fire on us. They stood in three lines; the 
first group kneeled on the ground, another group a little 
higher and others standing. I was with the boys. They 
opened fire and four of us were killed. I personally carried 
a boy from Ogbia, whose stomach was torn by a bullet, in 
a wheelbarrow to a clinic nearby. 
This peaceful protest eventually took a different direction, becoming a violent affair with the 
arrest, detention and death of three people by the military. Afterwards, the military declared a state 
of emergency with dusk to dawn curfew and all forms of gatherings were banned in Yenagoa, 
Bayelsa State. According to Otuan, soldiers mounted road blocks, scrutinised and detained locals. 
At night, soldiers invaded homes, intimidating residents, and beating and raping women. The fallout 
of the Ogele procession incited a new meaning and understanding amongst Ijaws. It induced a belief 
that violence is not only necessary, but an appropriate approach to engage with the oil companies 
and the Nigerian state. These beliefs are seen in the interview with Pato, an activist and eyewitness 
at the Kaiama event, who insisted that the introduction of arms became necessary, given the state’s 
refusal to engage in dialogue in meeting the claims and demands of Ijaws. Non-violent protest was 
seen as not sufficient in addressing agitation in the Niger Delta region.  
[…] The picture we gained from that moment was that 
the government was not open to peaceful negotiation or 
resolution of the crisis […] it was the violent introduction 
by Ijaw youths that drew the attention of the 
government. The government does not believe in 
advocacy, so the process of advocacy has not helped the 
engagement of communities in the Niger Delta with the 
federal government. 
The belief that armed violence was the only option available to the protesters is also 
maintained by Oweifa, an active militia, who stated that the presence of soldiers in oil installations 
necessitated the need for arms confrontation. Like many other interviewees, he believed the Ogoni 
uprising and Ogele procession were a rude awakening for the Ijaws that required them to commune 
with the gods and deities of Ijaw land. The involvement of gods and deities was a significant part of 
militia strategy and tactics, which helped bind militants together (also see chapter 5, section 5.4.2). 
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The need to evoke the gods is a unique aspect of culture and identity of Ijaws in times of 
provocation. According to Oweifa: 
… we had to consult with the ancestors of Ijaw land; our 
deities had to be reawakened. We had to ask them 
questions, regarding when to engage in war against the 
federal government and oil companies. 
4.6.2. Other responses to protests 
A number of cases of state brutality were also evident from my lived experience and 
personal observations in the Niger Delta region. Previous approaches using non-violent forms of 
protest from communities often yielded little or no positive outcome. The early forms of 
demonstrations usually involved activities such as taking over oil platforms, disrupting work at oil 
company sites, and sending letters of petition to oil companies through community delegates or 
representatives. Protests at targeted sites of oil facilities, usually manned by state and private 
armies of the oil companies, resulted in arrests, detentions and, in extreme cases of violence, 
deaths. Instances of such cases of violence and death were noted in an interview with Otuan, as 
well as reflecting my own insider knowledge and observations of state-propelled violence in the 
Niger Delta region.  
Even at the community level, you remember the case of 
the Ogboinbiri community that was burnt down by the 
soldiers several times, Ikebiri 1 and 2, Agip controlled flow 
station; people protesting were killed by the soldiers 
[....]. So we had now reached a point that even if we 
embarked on peaceful protests, they kill us. This was 
what actually triggered the desire for us to get arms to 
defend ourselves. 
The above statement  inform part of the signs of protest over access to oil benefits, which 
began in the mid 1980’s , when various community based groups began mobilising against oil 
company operations and expressing their dissatisfactions, mainly centred on economic deprivation. 
In related instances demonstrating how armed conflict emerged in the Delta, Stones, another key 
informant, recalls how reactions to the destruction of fishing nets by the oil companies induced a 
mobilised armed youth force in communities. According to Stone, the reaction to the disruption of 
fishing activity by local fishermen is often tense, as oil companies employ the services of private 
armies to intimidate, threaten or detain locals protesting in such situations. These reactions have 




… there was this incidence in 2005 where a tugboat 
destroyed the fishing nets of the locals, and the boys had 
to take up arms to confront them and make them pay. So 
because these skirmishes and confrontations were not 
curtailed through dialogue or positive engagements, the 
youths became powerful. 
4.6.3. Protest against resource policies 
A core feature which seem to propel the emergence of the militancy in the Niger Delta 
region are the laws concerning resource and extraction. These laws are perceived as dispossessing 
land without consent from inhabitants of the region. Having lost the ownership of land, communities 
are left to lay claims to compensations from the state and oil companies for oil pillages and pollution 
of the environment. Thus, a key historical event that emphasised the laws of resource extraction 
was the Kaiama Declaration (KD) in 1998, in the aftermath of a spiralling effect from the Ogoni 
uprising in 1995. As mentioned previously, the death of Ken Saro Wiwa after the Ogoni uprising 
spurred a conscious awakening towards a unified platform amongst individuals and groups across 
communities in the Niger Delta region. By 31 December,1998, following a series of consultations 
and town hall meetings, a congregation of Ijaw youth organisations gathered at Kaiama community, 
hometown of Isaac Adaka Boro, to declare what they termed “Operation Climate Change”, a 
peaceful protest against continued gas flares, degradation and pollution, and to help the socio-
economic well-being of inhabitants in the Niger Delta region. The Kaiama Declaration raised the 
core issues surrounding the resource laws, as well as emphasising the inspired roles played by 
Adaka Boro and Ken Saro Wiwa, pointed out by Otuan below: 
When we started this struggle, please permit me to go 
back so that you can understand what we actually hold as 
the struggle, before the arms factor came in […] what 
actually triggered the modern day consciousness, the 
wakeup call was what Ken Saro Wiwa started with the 
Ogoni people, even though we have in our background 
what our brother and mentor, the late Adaka Boro 
started. 
Whilst giving a genealogy of current militia action, Otuan also points to the laws, which are 
regarded as inciting a proliferation of movements in the region. However, he gave a contrasting view 
of Adaka Boro’s actions for self-determination, which attempted to give independence to the “Niger 
Delta Republic” in 1966, noting that the ideology behind the contemporary struggle was not to 
secede from Nigeria, but to gain the attention of the state regarding the denial of the Ijaws right of 
ownership to their “God given wealth”. According to Otuan, the Land Use Act of 1978 and the 
Petroleum Act of 1969 are obnoxious, as they strengthen the state power and authority that denies 
the rights of minorities to participation, recognition and access to oil wealth.  
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… how we can repeal some of the obnoxious laws, like 
the Land Use Decree, the Petroleum Act of 1968–69 and 
Decree 13 of 1996. These are some of the decrees that 
make us slaves in our community. Decree 13 says that 100 
meters surrounding every river bank belongs to federal 
government. So many of our communities reside in areas 
that belong to the federal government. Oil companies can 
come and carry out explorations, while the federal 
government sits, wherever they want to sit, at Lagos or 
Abuja, and decide to allot our communities into oil blocks 
and sell them to somebody. And that person could come, 
anytime, and everything in that community belongs to 
him, including the community. So we felt that is not right. 
It is not applicable in any part of the country. 
Similar comments were also expressed by Kowa, who took into consideration the history of 
resource laws prior to the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta region. He maintains that a Mineral 
Ordinance Act of 1914 established by the colonial regime, set the legal pace and exercise of political 
power and authority over resource governance in Nigeria. The Act, which was amended in 1925, 
conferred powers on colonial administrators to grant resource prospecting rights without the 
participation and recognition of affected people or communities. According to Kowa, the 1925 Act, 
which was replaced by the Ordinance Act of 25 February, 1946, stipulates that all mineral resources 
upon any land, rivers, streams or water are vested with the crown. These amended acts of resource 
laws became the legacy passed on to successive military and democratic regimes, which became 
part of Nigeria’s 1999 constitution. As Kowa puts it: 
Derivation was the central key of the pre-independence 
constitution [...] the principle became increasingly 
silenced [...] so people started protesting that at the 
beginning we had agreed, different nationalities of 
different regions should control their own resources. 
Now we have found oil in the Niger Delta, federal 
government has suddenly jettisoned that fundamental 
agreement, in order to take over oil resources 
throughout the land using decrees. 
These narratives illustrate some of historical features which generated tensions and the 
subsequent armed conflict. The centralised laws of resource extraction is seen to challenge the 
legitimacy and identity of ethnic minorities such as the Ogonis and Ijaws, over rights to resource 
ownership. Furthermore, the presence of oil in the Niger Delta region has given rise to organised 
movements. These were evident from the Ogoni uprising and the Kaiama Declaration, which began 
to question the neglect and degradation of the environment, including rights to resource governance.  
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This conflict, from a broader sociological view, symbolises a proliferation of new forms of 
struggle  (Pichardo, 1997), whereby the position of individuals or groups are situated within an 
unstable discourse.  In particular, a discourse within the context of resource laws, which provoke 
collective action.  
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter situates the emergence of militancy within a number of key historical and 
political processes of events in Nigeria-vis-à-vis, the Niger Delta region. The chapters illustrates a 
contestation of political power and representation between Nigerian state and individuals and groups 
making claims and demands over resource rights and ownership. When viewed broadly, these 
events infer to the ideas of contentious politics Tilly’s (2003), which inform a series of interaction that 
is sustained between the state which welds political power, and these movements claiming to speak 
on behalf of a constituency that lack formal representation, in efforts to change in distribution or 
exercise of power.  
  In this chapter, four key episodes of contention, contributing to the emergence of militancy 
in the Niger Delta region were identified. Firstly, the fear of domination from the political process and 
perception of oppression, which signalled the beginnings of tension and grievances in the country. 
These were evident from the early quest of minorities for a regional autonomy and struggles for 
political power amongst the ethnic nationalities of Nigeria, which established boundaries of majority–
minority ethnic identities. These events, coupled with a localised awareness of the value of crude oil, 
facilitated the first militia action in 1966 and subsequent Biafra civil war in 1967. Both threatened to 
secede as the Niger Delta Republic and the Biafra Republic, respectively.  
A second significant factor which facilitated the emergence of militancy and the particular 
form in which it appeared, was charismatic leadership. The emergence of the Niger Delta Volunteer 
Force (NDVF), led by Adaka Boro in 1966, induced a united platform and dominant discourse for 
both militants and non-militants across the Ogoni and Ijaw communities in the Niger Delta. The 
actions of Boro presented a framing of events in such a way that they became the basis for similar 
patterns of recognised activities  (Goffman, 1974). In this particular case, the framing of structural 
conditions of injustice and a shared belief to incite collective action with repeated forms of claim 
making and recognition. The actions of Boro show how events can be modified and interpreted 
within existing ideas and beliefs of individuals/groups  (Benford and Snow, 2000).  
Moreover, the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta region in 1956 spurred a segmented and 
localised perception of political oppression, which enabled the NDVF to project a political ideology of 
self-determination which became the platform and currency for ethnic minorities and contemporary 
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militias to engage the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies. Interestingly, whilst framing 
structural conditions of injustice in the region in terms of poverty and frustration, Boro acknowledged 
he had been labelled a robber, terrorist and bandit, a view that seems insignificant in relation to the 
ideology of self-determination, within the context of oil governance and political opposition faced by 
the NDVF in 1966. Nevertheless, the unsuccessful attempt by the NDVF, a movement which can be 
broadly seen as a network of informal interaction between the plurality of individuals engaged in a 
political and cultural conflict, on the basis of shared collective identity  (Diani, 1992), left much to be 
desired by ethnic minority Ijaws, who perceived Adaka Boro as an iconic hero and an inspirational 
leader, with the power to influence current militia action.  
A third feature that contributed to the emergence of militancy in the Niger Delta region was 
the role of the state. The militarisation of the region was a threat that heightened tensions and 
violent conflict which, when viewed from a sociological perspective, can be described as an arena of 
contested entitlements  (Nauman, 1996), a theatre of struggles, where the politics of recognition 
were played out. In this particular case, it was a conflict that required the government to adjudicate 
how the protests of the Ogonis and Ijaws shaped a particular form of identity and collective action. 
These collective actions also inform how knowledge of a particular environment is shared reflexively, 
within sets of constructed meanings. It partly demonstrates the political opportunities or constraints 
available for the success or failure of movements, and state capacity for repression.   
A fourth significant feature which contributed to the emergence of militancy was the 
legislative laws of resource extraction. These laws are central to the conflict surrounding the Ogonis 
and Ijaws, as well as other ethnic minorities of the delta. It partly defines the identity and collective 
actions of movements within the macro-political structure of oil governance in Nigeria. These laws 
are perceived as strengthening state power and authority, as all lands and resources are vested 
within the state. This is a view which many of today’s militia movements acknowledge and seem to 
have combined with a sense of identity and the ideology of self-determination, in order to legitimise 
their actions with claims and demands against the state and oil companies in the Niger Delta region. 
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Chapter Five: Meaning, Motivation and Ambition of Militants 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines in more detail the meaning of militancy and internal organisational 
dynamics of militants in terms of hierarchy, recruitment, goals and role of militia leaders and nature 
of its social networks. Specifically, it explores the meaning of militancy from the views of militants 
and non-militants, the typologies of militia leadership, and the motivation behind becoming a militant, 
how people are recruited into the hierarchy and the typical structure of militia organisation. This aims 
to clarify the contested meaning of militancy and how militias make sense of their actions as 
militants. 
Chapter Four examined the emergence of militancy, and issues around identity, political 
repression and ideological struggles for self-determination, to inform a number of features which 
urged a collective identity/claim-making effort by Ogonis and Ijaws, against the Nigerian state and oil 
companies in the Niger Delta region. In this chapter, we shall look more closely at how militancy is 
constructed and defined, the motivation, recruitment, hierarchy and roles within the organisational 
structure of militants. From personal experience and field observations, the terms militant and 
militancy seem to mean different things to different people in the Niger Delta region. Militants are 
labelled or framed in various ways, as oil thieves, criminals, kidnappers, cult gangs or restive youths. 
Militants, on the other hand, see themselves as freedom fighters, liberators or resource agitators. 
This labelling tends to cloud an understanding of the conflict in the Niger Delta region; thus, an 
objective of this chapter is to explore the context of meaning from the disposition of militants. It 
examines a particular kind of reality that focuses on different meanings and interpretations at both 
the individual and collective levels.  
A central argument of this research is that the emergence and actions of militancy is a 
reaction to lived experiences and a reflection of the desire to seek a specific change. They are not 
interest groups, but a network of interacting groups engaged in a political and cultural conflict based 
on their shared identity. They do not carry out their activities simply within formally established 
political structures, but groups of individuals who take action, rightly or wrongly, in expressing the 
reasons behind their actions within formal and informal political and social spheres. Moreover, the 
meaning of militancy is not straightforward. They are not true or false, and they are not a given, but 
socially constructed. It is on these grounds, that I argue that the socially constructed cognitive world 
of militants is, itself, a complex one, replete with influence and values (cultural and spiritual) that 
may seem contradictory or alien to those outside this world. As a result, unravelling these 
complexities inform how knowledge can be manipulated through the discourse of language, a theme 
explored earlier in the epistemology and methodology chapter of this research. 
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In addition, militants appear to have a well-organised structure of hierarchy with 
mechanisms that ensure followers remain loyal to their leaders. However, these structures are not 
fixed, but fluid, through processes that are not necessarily moral but transactional, and based on 
informal networks, money and guns. By morality, in this instance we do not mean acting in 
accordance with universal principles, but according to how norms or values justify and legitimise 
action, whether good or bad, harmful, exploitative or socially regressive  (Wiegratz, 2012). Also, we 
argue that militants in the region are heterogeneous groups that mobilise around hidden networks of 
territorial spaces called ‘camps’. In a general sense, camps do not exist, but everyone knows what 
they are and that they define the spaces controlled by militant leaders. Militant leaders are known, or 
label themselves, as ‘Generals’ which, in a sense, depicts status, recognition, strength and control of 
a large number of followers. These generals are perceived in complex ways; they are dreaded by 
some, or seen as ‘messiahs’ by others, who perceive their actions as a legitimate response to long 
years of neglect in improving livelihoods in host oil-bearing communities. 
 
In the following chapter, I shall attempt to describe and explain (a) how non-militants and 
militants perceive militancy, (b) cases of how one can become a militia leader, or general, (c) the 
membership in terms of recruitment and motivation to join, and how militants are assigned roles and 
responsibilities within the hierarchical structure of a typical militia organisation. In order to do this, I 
shall refer to the idea of Zald and McCarthy  (1987), who argue that people are inclined to join 
organisations for personal gain rather than the pursuit of an ideological goal. Also, the mobilisation 
potential of a movement is linked to a set of social relationships that is an interactive and negotiated 
perception  (Melucci, 1996). It gives a pointer to opportunity or constraint of collective action, shared 
by a number of people in a given environment.  
 
Within New Social Movements theory, which informs the theoretical lens of this research, I 
argue in line with the perspective that informal interaction and incentives are necessary for collective 
action  (Touraine, 1985). Group-oriented behaviour is hidden, until some incentive motivates the 
potential for collective action, because individuals do not act to achieve a common interest without 
some form of coercion or material/well-being inducement. Participation in social movement also 
changes the personal identity of the individuals involved, as it offers a sense of fulfilment and the 
realisation of self  (Gamson, 1992). Similarly, grievance, consciousness or frustration within a 
specific geographical space can propel individual or group involvement into social movement 
organisation. These collective forms of identity are defined by boundaries of friendship or network 
ties that influence their participation through association with individuals or groups  (Klandermans, 
1997). Together, these views aim to provide an experiential view of militancy and a better in-depth 




5.2. Militancy: Criminals or Fighters for Self-determination and Resource Control?  
This section analyses the meaning of militancy from the perception of non-militants and 
militants. One argument of this research maintains that crude oil is not the whole story behind the 
ongoing conflict but, rather, serves as a smoke screen to legitimise contemporary militia action in the 
Niger Delta region. From the preceding chapter, it is clear that, on one level, militancy in the region 
is linked to the actions of Adaka Boro and Ken Saro Wiwa, who expressed a collective identity with 
the ideology of self-determination and resource control. Curiously, the difficulty in separating 
genuine militancy from criminality, is not necessarily a definitional issue in the true sense of it, rather 
these issues are intrinsically rooted in community ties and identity, where is appears separating 
those hiding behind community/ identity is not that clear.  From interviews, however, the expression 
and emphasis given to these events appear to vary between views of non-militants and active 
militias. An example of this shift in meaning can be seen from the interview response of Kponi, a 
non-militant in his late sixties, who points out that contemporary militia action in the Niger Delta, is a 
means of survival influenced by leaders whom he described as the brain 
 
Everybody in the Niger Delta knows who or what 
militancy is all about, that these are groups of young boys 
and girls who have taken to arms as a way of making 
demands, whether these demands are genuine or not 
[…] those demands could be made from a central brain 
somewhere articulating the issues, and he manages to 
get a group of people convinced about it. And many of 
them are people who see it as a way of survival, 
depending on how they understand the issues involved. 
Kponi’s response illustrates aspects of the complex and contradictory roles of leaders, and 
how followers understand those roles in mobilising support for collective action. He further relates 
the meaning of today’s militancy to the macro-political culture of governance, describing it as a 
culture of ‘primitive accumulation’ motivated by the scramble to access wealth. He attempts to 
distinguish the ideals of today’s militias from the actions of Adaka Boro, whilst acknowledging the 
constraints faced by Boro.  
[…] I would say that what is going on is essentially a kind 
of primitive accumulation. Adaka Boro did much better 
than what these militants have done. The only mistake 
Adaka Boro made was that he was unprepared to engage 
in the kind of struggle that he embark upon […] Adaka 
Boro was the man who really articulated something that 
could have been forged into a neat ideology for the 
emancipation of the Niger Delta. 
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Another view on contemporary militia action was also gathered from response of Alaere, a 
key informant and an activist in the region, relates the meaning of militancy to the nature of political 
actors in terms of state–society relations, which gives a blanket covering for all sorts of criminality in 
the Niger Delta. She blames the President for the contradictions in the labelling of militancy.  
[…] it is difficult to draw a line saying, this group of 
militants are criminals and this group of militants are in 
the struggle. They are nicely fused. The criminals hide 
under the disguise, made possible by President Obasanjo, 
who took both criminals and the actual agitators and 
baptised them as militants [...] that blanket covering is 
what took them to where they are now[…] President 
Obasanjo earlier called them common criminals. Now he 
wants to talk with common criminals. 
Stone, a non-militant and activist, on the other hand, views actions, such as kidnapping, 
bank robbery, sea piracy and the extortion of ordinary citizens by cult gangs, as militant activities 
When we talk about militancy, we really do not have a 
clear definition of what we mean. In the context of the 
Niger Delta, criminality has been linked with the word 
militancy and everybody claims to be fighting for 
resource control and self-determination. 
He further adds that, for him, militancy is concerned with the struggle against poverty 
(implicitly a paradox, in the midst of such oil wealth) which finds expression in the political agenda of 
the right to self-determination.  
 
If you go to our communities in Ijaw land, you see 
poverty; nobody needs to tell you that the people are 
poor. They live in shabby houses, there is no portable 
drinking water, no electricity, and the means of even 
accessing the communities are not there. 
Such a view is highlighted by Kpein, a non-militant in his mid-sixties, who places emphasis 
on political self-determination as fundamental to contemporary militia uprising. He points to the 
declaration of the Niger Delta republic made by Adaka Boro, and the subsequent spread of 
contention influenced by Ken Saro Wiwa, which led to the Ogoni uprising and the Kaiama 
Declaration by Ijaw youths (see Chapter Four), as the background to contemporary militia action. 
According to Kpein, these events are genuine reasons for attacks on oil facilities, as well as for the 
kidnapping of foreign oil expatriates in the region. For Kpein, such reasons for militia action also 




[…] So, what we are saying is that these boys have a 
genuine reason. These boys are not criminals. The 
criminal element took advantage of the situation. 
However, just as I have said, in any anarchic situation do 
not blame the criminals […] but the war in the Niger 
Delta became the excuse for the emancipation of the 
Ijaw. We are not saying that there are no criminals, but 
that if the devil were to deliver your baby for you, then 
you have to worship the devil in such a situation. 
The above response by Kpein contains a duality of ideas. On the one hand, he attempts to 
pitch militancy within an ideology and on the other hand, he admits by saying that the situation 
created opportunities for individuals to exploit through varied forms of criminality. He articulates a 
position in which the meanings and motivation for militancy are derived from expressions of self-
determination and collective identity, such as the Kaiama Declaration. Moreover, he accepts that 
this identity-based movement has been hijacked by ‘criminal elements’ motivated by opportunities 
for personal gain. Even so, he does not wish to retreat from the position that, regardless of the 
criminal element, militancy remains a war of emancipation, even if criminals end up becoming the 
fighters in that war. In essence, he considers militancy as the means justifying the end, so if an 
anarchic situation ultimately leads to self-determination, then it is a price worth paying. Indeed, his 
choice of metaphor, in the final sentence quoted above, “if the devil were to deliver your baby for 
you, then you have to worship the devil” leads us to think of the possible birth of self-determination 
and resource control. In a similar response, another non-militant, Alabo, a key activist, insists that 
militia action in the Niger Delta region is a fight for self-determination and resource control. He 
insists that oil companies should negotiate directly with communities on the terms and conditions of 
oil exploration: 
They are fighting for the rights of the Niger Delta people, 
they are fighting for their own rights, they are fighting 
for the rights of those who are yet unborn, they are 
fighting to ensure that the oil and resources in the region 
are our own bona fide property, and that we should 
negotiate with the oil companies and not with the federal 
government as a third party. 
What emerges from the analysis, so far, is that amongst those non-militants interviewed 
there is a level of awareness of militancy being perceived as an expression of grievance to right the 
wrongs of a political structure of resource governance in Nigeria. Although the narrative of militancy 
is seen as an emancipatory struggle linked to ideological figures and events (e.g. Adaka Boro, Ken 
Saro Wiwa and the Kaiama Declaration), interviewees consistently struggle to make that narrative 
clear cut, with militancy arising from a sense of injustice, which earlier figures had tried, in various 
ways, to make clear, but which tends to be portrayed as a debased form of ideological struggle. 
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Moreover, there is recognition that there are other factors at play—arms, criminality and 
opportunism—that provide a complex and deeper meaning of militancy. Although, the interviewees 
struggle with this ambiguity, they believe that the struggle for emancipation and self-determination of 
resources is a valid goal, whilst grappling with the underlying recognition that the motives behind 
those fighting under the label of militant, may not always conform to that agenda. 
From this basis, it is interesting, then, to compare the views of non-militants with active 
militias over how they make sense of their actions as militants. One underlying question of this 
research is: do militants have a shared sense of purpose or is their sense of belonging an 
opportunistic and transitory collective identity? From an interview with Otuogidi an active militant in 
his mid-thirties, it was striking to note that there was no mention at all of a freedom-fighting agenda. 
Rather, the commander articulates the aim of the fighting more in terms of frustration about lack of 
jobs, and lack of participation and access to resource benefits, rather than political self-expression 
as such. Clearly, these ideas are linked, but the emphasis from the Otuogidi’s interview is, 
nonetheless, subtly more pragmatic and less idealistic than in the extracts of non-militants. The 
following quote from Otuogidi (repeated, in part, from section 2.2.1, Chapter Four) shows how we 
can understand the same statements made in a different context and with a different meaning. In 
this particular case, the quote is interpreted as both the motivation for collective action, and as the 
meaning for militancy in the Niger Delta region.  
In the beginning of this struggle, let me speak, see how it 
started, the agreement is that our youths lack 
employment and jobs. We have the oil in our community, 
it is others that are operating in our places and enjoying 
the benefits. That is the struggle. When you hear about 
the struggle, struggle, the Niger Delta struggle, we have 
the oil, but we cannot taste it, it is other people from 
other places who are enjoying oil from our communities. 
 Ololo, another recently active militant, does, however, offer a more detailed description of 
militancy as the fight for freedom and resource control. Interestingly, he seems to want to draw 
some kind of distinction between the terms ‘freedom fighting’ and ‘militancy’, with the latter being a 
more recent label for a longer (and implicitly) more noble struggle. Also, the localised presence of oil 
in the region has induced other forms of mobilising resources (tangible and non-tangible), which 





We started this freedom fighting. The militant name just 
came on recently. We have been fighting for the cause of 
the Niger Delta for years […] so we now change the name 
to militancy. We are fighting with the government to 
enable the government to know the Niger Delta situation 
[…] we cannot go to Abuja to fight them, so we have to 
destroy pipelines, and embark on illegal bunkering 
business5. From that point onwards, the federal 
government became involved and we started shooting 
them. 
To summarise, this section attempts to demonstrate a discernible, shared claims-making 
narrative amongst those involved with militancy across a variety of levels. This is a narrative 
fundamentally based on a sense of identity, and of an identity forged around the notion of having 
been alienated and excluded by others from the political processes and benefits surrounding the 
resources of ‘their’ communities. To this extent, therefore, this I think it is valid to see aspects of the 
militancy as explicable through New Social Movements theory, with its particular focus on identity as 
a crucible for social movements. This does seem to be taken as a dominant and shared narrative. 
However, there is a parallel recognition that this narrative is somehow debased by a reality that is 
more opportunistic and complex. Some, such as Kpein, contend that this is not an issue as long as 
the outcome is the one foreseen by the dominant social narrative (i.e. to create such chaos that in 
the end self-determination is achieved). More commonly, however, interviewees tried to draw 
distinctions between a genuine freedom-fighting militancy, and a more recent phenomenon in which 
this struggle has been corrupted by criminal opportunists seeking a quick profit. 
It is clearly important to those interviewed that whatever obvious imperfections might exist 
within the ranks of the militia, these do not undermine their perception of the on-going validity of the 
dominant, identity-based narrative. This tends to suggest that if one digs deeper into the actions of 
militancy, more complex and malleable motivations may become apparent, which partly inform how 
the labels that militants themselves identify with evolve. Such an interpretation is in line with a 
social-constructionist viewpoint which recognises the possibility of changing meanings as subjects’ 
experiences and social circles develop. In other words, a militant recruited straight from a village will 
operate with a different set of meanings from that same militant, later in his career, if he has become 
self-sustaining and influential within a wider and more exposed community. A further understanding 
of militancy is discussed in succeeding sections of this chapter, which explore the typologies of 
militia leadership and the typical structure of a militant camp, in order to illustrate the various 
ambitions of militants from an examination of their motivations regarding recruitment in the Niger De 




 5.3. Typologies of Militia Leadership  
The nature of the militia leader’s emergence is ambiguous and intertwined within a complex 
web of interactions. From a broader perspective, pre-existing organisations and the context of 
culture are relevant to the emergence of movement leaders, who play complex and conflicting roles. 
They inspire commitment from members, mobilise resources, recognise opportunities, and frame 
demands in ways that gain legitimacy  (Morris and Staggenborg, 2002). Whilst friendship and social 
network ties are necessary elements for the emergence of leaders, it is an individual’s character that 
is the definitive factor involved  (Smelser, 1962). These views find relevance in the number of known 
and unknown militant groups where leaders emerge within fluid boundaries of pre-existing network 
ties, youth organisations, criminal gangs or inter/intra-community disputes over access to resource 
benefit. Militant leaders also seem to align more easily in the process and dynamics of the persistent 
conflict in the Niger Delta region thereby, transforming the meaning and nature militancy.   
These fluid processes change the character and labelling ascribed to militant leaders (from 
criminals to freedom fighters, or vice-versa) in the region. However, in the following section, this I 
shall attempt to provide case/s illustrating how Kurowei, leader of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer 
Force (NDPVF), Seibi, leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), and Oporoza, linked with the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw 
Communities (FNDIC), became militant leaders, or ‘Generals’. Although the ways in which 
individuals emerge as leaders are not exclusive or mutually exhaustive, the case/s presented here 
clearly outline the trajectory for becoming a militant leader in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This 
process is explained through personal experience, local newspapers, and through an analysis of 
interviews from selected militants. 
5.3.1. Leadership through Youth Organisation (NDPVF) 
The emergence of Kurowei as leader of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force is 
intrinsically linked to the platform of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), an umbrella body representing the 
ethnic identities of Ijaw youths across communities in the Niger Delta region. As discussed earlier in 
Chapter Four, the IYC represents a platform for grievance and collective action against the oil 
companies and the Nigerian state. Thus, Kurowei, who became the third elected president of the 
IYC in 2001, used the already mobilised social-network ties and platform of the IYC to subsequently 
launch his Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force in 2003. The NDPVF who is interestingly described 
in a local print media-(the Guardian published on 20th January, 2007), as a self-styled leader and 
‘Africa’s Robin Hood’, commands influence and membership across a vast expanse of communities, 
which extends beyond the Ijaws, his own ethnic tribe, to other ethnic groups, such as the Ogonis 
and Ikwerres in Rivers State.  
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His influence is evident in political elections and community chieftaincy decisions (see 
Chapter Six section 6.3.1). Kurowei, who dropped out of university on two occasions, used his 
NDPVF to launch a series of guerrilla warfare, tagged ‘Operation Locust Feast’ and “Operation 
Fiberesima”, between 2004 and 2005, against oil companies and the Nigerian state. These threats 
witnessed the increased deployment of military and private armies to protect oil facilities, as well as 
talks between the NDPVF leader and political actors of the Nigerian state. The NDPVF also gained 
prominence following a violent conflict with its main rival group, the Niger Delta Vigilante, in which 
the government was implicated through its patronage of both groups, where politicians were alleged 
to have, indirectly and directly, funded militia groups and oil-bunkering activities. Violence is often 
linked to patronage-based politics under the aegis of militant leaders, who take advantage of the 
porous boundaries of these relationships to enhance their positions of power in communities (see 
also Chapter Six section 6.2.1. and 6.2.3). 
 5.3.2. Leadership through Criminal/Cult Gangs (NDV) 
The emergence and recognition of Seibi, leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante, as militant 
leader in Rivers State, has remained a subject of controversial public discussion. Rightly or wrongly, 
the NDV has become known, respected and influential in policy decisions in his community, Okrika, 
and Rivers State in general. Literarily uneducated, Seibi gained prominence from criminal and cult-
gang activities, where his influence also permeated issues of inter and intra-community wars. He is 
known as the leader of Icelanders cult gang, which engaged in fierce bloody battles and killings with 
a rival gang, the Outlaws, over territorial turf linked to patronage at elections, street extortion, drug 
protection and oil thefts, from 2003 to 2008. In order to gain credibility, Seibi transformed Icelanders, 
and pockets of its affiliate groups, into what presently is known as the Niger Delta Vigilante in 2005. 
His expansive control of youths in certain parts of Port Harcourt and his community, Okrika, created 
a leverage of patronage exchange with political actors at elections (see Chapter Six section 6.2.1). 
By 2009, Seibi’s actions became recognised by the state, despite atrocities committed at Port 
Harcourt and Okrika. His recognition became evident when he was flown on a presidential flight to 
Abuja, the country’s capital, to negotiate his acceptance of amnesty for militants by former President 
Shehu Musa YarAdua. This political backing further helped Seibi to gain legitimacy and influence 
within the rank and file of today’s militant leaders in the region. 
5.3.3. Leadership through Inter-ethnic Wars (Oporoza)  
Inter-ethnic wars over land in accessing resource benefits have also provided an 
opportunity for individuals to become recognised as militant leaders. A case in point are the inter-
ethnic wars between the Ijaw and Itsekiri, from 1997 to 2003, following the decision of the military 
authorities of the Nigerian state to relocate local government headquarters from Ijaw town to Itsekiri 
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community in Delta State (see Figure 1.1. in introduction). These crises led to the emergence of the 
Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), a movement aimed at protecting Ijaw 
communities, in which Oporoza played a prominent role in the fierce wars against Itsekiris during the 
crisis. Oporoza, who later became the Grand Commanding Officer of the dreaded Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), is known ordinarily within formal and informal circles as a 
registered contractor to oil companies operating in the Delta region, and also as leader of the 
famous Camp 5 (discussed in Chapter Six). For purposes of clarity, the name Camp 5 does not 
mean numerical order of militia camps in the Niger Delta; the total number of camps with militant 
leaders in the region cannot be ascertained. However, Oporoza’s influence and control of youths is 
evident among most communities across Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa states in the Niger Delta region. 
His famous Camp 5 is considered the apprenticeship ground from which most of today’s militant 
leaders have emerged. This is evident from the interview response of Commander Akpainfoko: 
 
The only people who independently became warlords are 
Kurowei and Seibi. Every other name you hear mentioned 
has something to do with Oporoza. 
 
In addition, Oporoza wields enormous influence within the political circles of oil governance 
in the Niger Delta region, having earned a reputation for bravery and his ardent worship of Egbesu, 
an Ijaw deity and god of War (followers of the Egbesu deity believe it provides protection from death 
during times of war). This recognition enabled Oporoza to collaborate with other pockets of militia 
groups, to lead a new assault against oil companies under the collective platform known as MEND, 
which opened up an opportunity for Oporoza to gain legitimacy and recognition from state and non-
state actors, who patronise his services at elections (see detailed discussion in Chapter Six section 
6.2.1). 
5.3.4. Other forms of Militia Leadership  
As stated earlier in this section, the opportunity for individuals to emerge as war 
lords/leaders is fluid and widely open and there are pockets of unknown militias with small numbers 
of followers who claim to be leaders. From personal field observation, there seems to be a 
distinction between ‘Generals’.  The former are militant leaders recognised by the state and non-
state political actors, and the latter are militants who lack recognition from the state. Thus, becoming 
a General, to a large extent, depends not just on the number of followers, but also on one’s ability to 
network informally with relevant state and non-state actors, to gain recognition. This also defines 
one’s access to reward benefits. I noted this distinction during my field visit to the amnesty camp for 
militants undergoing rehabilitation training. Whilst spending time there, I observed the absence of 
notable Generals who wield influence amongst youths in the Niger Delta region, having gained a 
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new status. In addition, there are individuals who became prominent and widely recognised as 
militant leaders by state and non-state political actors, through strong social ties with dominant 
militia leaders and key state political actors. An instance of such a case is Emomotimi, considered to 
be spokesperson of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). His contribution 
as arms dealer and supplier to various militia groups across the Niger Delta region created a 
situation where he was able to move through his social network to become a high-ranking MEND 
member.  
Another area which provides opportunities for individuals to emerge as militant leaders is 
the local community structure of youth leadership, known as the Community Development 
Committee (CDC). The CDC serves as a platform for direct engagement with oil companies in 
prioritising projects and awarding contracts in communities. However, the CDC is often the subject 
of intense competition amongst youth groups, leading to gruesome murders, such as beheadings, 
and the destruction of homes, mainly over the spoils of contracts and payment from oil companies 
 (Tantua, 2009; Isumonan et al., 2005). In the course of informal conversation, a community leader 
mentioned Azuzuama as an example of someone who had emerged as a militant leader within 
community structures, albeit with social network ties to Oporoza. According to the community leader, 
Azuzuama is seen as messiah, warrior, freedom fighter, philanthropist and leader with overwhelming 
qualities for providing free nursery and primary education and compelling the oil companies to 
improve the welfare and livelihood of his community. This view was also reflected in a written 
pamphlet given to this author in the field, where the writer perceives Azuzuama as a messiah of 
some sort: 
Azuzuama is a militant leader fighting today to secure the 
freedom and total liberation of unborn generations of 
Ijaw people […] where the youths will no longer have to 
survive by the gun. (Toughedi, 2009: 14) 
 
5.4. Structure of a typical militia ‘camp’ 
This section analyses the structure of militancy in terms of mobilisation and recruitment, the 
internal hierarchy surrounding it, and the ambitions of militant leaders. I argue that although militants 
in the Niger Delta region present an ideology which gives them an identity as enemies of the state 
and multinational oil companies, in reality, this is not the case. The political ideology of recognition 
for self-determination and resource autonomy presented by the militants is a superficial appearance, 
but important at particular times in serving particular purposes. These are groups competing to be in 
the best position to gain access and secure resource benefits, using such an ideology as a platform 
to legitimise militia actions (see also Chapter Six section 6.6.1).  
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This chapter looks more closely at key roles within the militia and how people are recruited 
into these roles, including the terms and conditions which keep, or do not keep, members within 
these structures. It attempts to identify (1) what these roles are, and (2) how people move into these 
roles and what keeps members loyal to leaders.  











From the broader literature, militias are defined as locally based private armies with 
command structures. This characteristic of military training enables members to take action and fulfil 
public functions, including the protection of communities against oppression  (Barkun, 1997). Militant 
organisations are, thus, viewed as having the ideology and strategies they adopt against perceived 
enemies, through collective activities and paramilitary manoeuvres  (Freilich et al., 1999). However, 
this does not seem to be the case for militants in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Whilst militants in 
the region seem to have a command structure, the hierarchical structure of militias does not 
necessarily imply loyalty of followers to leaders. What keeps militants within the structure is 
insecurity, in terms of unemployment and access to wealth. The mobilisation process of the militia is 
mainly transactional and rarely connected to the protection of the community, or community ties, as 
the General needs to be in the best possible position to obtain more money, by whatever means, to 
be able to pay his followers. 
 Accordingly, a ‘General’s camp is the largest he can afford to maintain and therefore, 
militant leaders strive to mobilise resources by recruiting foot soldiers, getting food supplies through 
a well-coordinated networks from the creeks and nearby villages to communities/towns, obtaining 
information on the strategies of perceived enemies, and embarking on illegal activities such as oil 




These activities clearly illustrate the degree of network required in order to achieve success 
in movement organisation. One idea regarding the cost of financing a militia camp was revealed by 
an ex-general: 
Let me tell you something, fighting is not a poor man’s 
business. A man with just 10 million naira6 cannot go to 
the creeks because that amount cannot last beyond four 
days. 
This response tells the importance of network for mobilising of resources (both tangible and 
intangible) required for setting up a militant camp in the creeks of the delta region. From a broader 
sociological perspective, the structure of militia organisation in Niger Delta region can be seen in 
terms of transactional groups involving the exchange of services  (Bailey, 2001). According to Bailey 
(2001), leaders of transactional groups often raise the hopes and expectations of followers, as they 
strive to keep their followers loyal by meeting their needs. At the same time, a leader risks losing 
disappointed followers, who may jump ship and find another leader. Likewise, leaders of moral 
groups do face situations where followers/subordinates compete with each other to be considered 
more important than others, within the organisational structure. Alternatively, they may accuse one 
another or their leader of ideological weakness  (Bailey, 2001). This was rightly observed during my 
various conversations with militias at the field, where most members of these militia groups did jump 
boat, when they feel their leaders were becoming greedy or when they feel their welfares are not 
well taken care of by these leaders. Moreover, the view of Bailey (2001) find relevance in explaining 
the structure and roles of militant organisation in this section. 
5.4.1. Structure, Hierarchy and Roles  
In the introductory chapter on the emergence and significance of militancy, it was argued 
that militia organisation in the Niger Delta region is well structured, within fluid and dynamic 
processes. These structures are necessary to enable leaders to maintain order and achieve their 
ambitions. They facilitate how orders are taken from generals or commanders to foot soldiers, in a 
military fashion, even at the risk of losing foot soldiers (see Figure 5.1). This top-down arrangement 
is necessary as a means to an end for militia leaders. Thus, their positioning and control within this 
setting enables the communication of command to subordinates, which is required for generals to 
achieve their ambitions within the hierarchy. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, a typical internal structure of 
militants in the region is marked by a chain of subordinates, with a militia leader known as the 
General at the top, followed by commanders, who are mostly family members, trusted friends, or 
members of the same community.  
                                                 
6 £10,000 pounds. 
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Accordingly, a strong sense of shared community and the decision to participate in 
collective action is said to shift individuals or groups from being sympathisers to being active 
militants  (Weinstein, 2009). 
Under the commanders are foot soldiers, who are mostly recruits divided into sub-units 
called crews. According to Kavelli and Otuogidi, both active militants, about 24 to 30 persons 
constitute a crew with a unit commander. In discussing with key informants and militants, it seems to 
me that the maximum number of crews in a militia camp is not more than ten. There is also a 
secretary, whose duties include making shift-duty rotas for the in and out movements of members, 
and acting as a human resources person in terms of payroll schedules and monthly salary payments 
to members of the camp. By in and out, we mean militia members taking a break/off duty, from 
carrying out activities/schedules determined by militia leaders. This period is used to visit families 
and friends, as well as seek information and recruitment of new members. In addition, the chief 
priest, known as Karowei, carries out spiritual cleaning by selecting members who should and 
should not go out for any “major operation or threats of attack”.7 Under the control of Karowei are 
cooks and informants. These are placed under Karowei in order to monitor what is cooked for 
members to eat, as well as engaging spiritually to divine which forms of information pose a threat to 
members in the camp.  
5.4.2. Spiritual belief: induction 
This section examines the role of spirituality in resistance movements, such as the militants 
in Niger Delta region, where spirituality appears to play a vital role in terms of mobilisation, courage 
and the sense of identity/belonging. Although, it has been argued that belief, deities, and immortality 
are puerile  (Freud, 1927), designed to shield the individual from the truth, there seem to be 
concerns on role spirituality as resource in social movements  (Hutchison, 2012). According to 
Poonamalle (2011) participants in movements are activated by a sense of a sacred that builds an 
“interconnectedness not only people but also with the universe at large”p147.  Taking this into 
account, spirituality informs an interconnectedness amongst militants believe, the Egbesu deity is an 
important in playing spiritual roles in Niger Delta conflict. Hence, spiritual cleansing serves as a 
protection from the deities and gods of Ijaw land, and it is not necessarily as a blessing of some sort. 
It also, broadly echoes the role of deities in other loosely knit societies, such as Apollo in ancient 
Greece, believed to be a representation of peace. In this particular case, Egbesu is seen to offers 
some of form protection against death during wars. Hence, it is clear that militants believe in the 
Egbesu deity and this can be seen through their lived experiences, as reflected by Otuogidi.  
                                                 
7 Kidnapping, pipeline destruction and other forms of claims making through actions. 
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His spiritual experience, outlined below, reveals such rituals to be a necessary part of the 
terms of induction and initiation for membership of a militia group.  
So when I went to join, I saw three other people, and the 
place was a shrine. When we went in, they performed 
some spiritual rites over my body, and afterwards 
Kariowei8 said I was finished. Then they told me to walk 
backwards out of the shrine. As I was walking backwards, 
they shot me twice at close range with an AK-47. At first I 
thought I was dead. However, I only felt severe pain. As 
they shot me, others shouted Kurokeme!9 Kurokeme! 
That was my initiation into the group. 
Otuogidi’s description illustrates role of spirituality, which creates a sense of belonging and 
belief to actuate collective action by members of these militia groups. These aspects of spirituality 
were further commented on by Commander Bulouowei, who also reveals how Egbesu is identified 
with militia membership. 
At first we did not go with arms, we only went with one 
Kpaikpo10 and a flag. The law stated that arms should not 
go first. Only three people went to the flow station and 
shut it down, and when they pinned up the flag, none of 
the guns belonging to armed men would function. Their 
bullets and rifles would not function again. This is the 
oracle. 
The initiation of spiritual power for protection was also demonstrated by Kavelli’s lived 
experiences and encounter with the Joint Military Task Force of the Nigerian Army. He describes 
how the spirit of Egbesu was evoked during fierce battles or confrontations in the swamps and 
creeks of the Niger Delta region.  
Ahhh! Not once, not twice, not thrice, but any of the 
times we confront the JTF with their gunboats, they 
either run away or we capture the boats. We kill every 
one of them because they hate us. Those brandy11, as 
soon as we invoke the spirits the brandy12 just seizes up. 
Karowei would invoke the spirits and just by looking at 
the gun, it would not be able to shoot again. We have 
something we put in the water to invoke the spirits 
during the shootouts, and their entire engine boats will 
stop running, and so we kill them. We have many things 
we use. 
                                                 
8 Priest. 
9 Strong man. 
10 Dane gun. 
11 An automatic machine gun. 
12 Local jargon to describe AK 47 
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More generally, Kavelli explains the strict compliance to rules, by militias, required for their 
spiritual protection. 
When you violate the laws, they fail [...] as soon as you 
violate them, if you go into any combat; you are the first 
person to die. As long as you do not violate them, nothing 
will happen to you. Even if they throw dynamite, 
grenades or rocket launchers, nothing will happen to you, 
because I have seen it so many times during our 
operations. 
These statements show how spirituality, like in many other societies, plays a significant role 
in organisations and social movements in Nigeria. Regarding involvement within the militia of the 
Niger Delta, it occupies a central place. Indeed, Kavelli and Ebuogha make it clear that priests are 
senior members of the militia structure with influence over missions. 
We have a priest and cooks at the camp. The priests are 
those watching our backs. It is their job to select those of 
us who have to go on a mission. If they do not select you 
and you go, you may die. 
Likewise, Commander Ebuogha states: 
In my camp, I am a commander. Before we go out on a 
mission, we perform a ritual involving no guns. We just 
use our strength and the spirits to guide us. When our 
priest gives us things to eat and binds us with ordinary 
cloth, you would think it is ordinary cloth, but if you are 
shot, nothing will penetrate it. 
The methods used for recruitment into the militia are not necessarily the same, with some 
roles requiring specialised skills. For instance, the priest known as Karowei needs to be an ardent 
worshipper of the Egbesu deity, which is fairly rare. Thus, the available Karowei’s operate on a 
freelance contract basis, often moving from camp to camp. As a case in point, Besu, a militant who 
believes he has spiritual powers, mentions these when asked about his role, which also reveals his 
broad network of ties. For people like Besu, becoming a militant is more about entrepreneurship, 
rather than simply about gaining employment or finding a means to survive, like most other foot 
soldiers of militia camps in the Niger Delta region.  
I joined because I had no job. I was a boat driver before 
things became difficult for me. I believe I have spiritual 
powers, so I perform prayers before the boys go out for 
battles. I know all the camps in existence from Rivers and 
Bayelsa, to Delta and Ondo states. 
99 
 
5.5. Mobilisation Process 
The organisational structure of a militant camp is clearly described by Commander 
Otuogidi, an active member amongst the many militant groups in the region. His response illustrates 
the hierarchy and command structure of camp life, revealing how order is maintained between 
leaders, commanders and foot soldiers, as well as illuminating the roles of secretaries and priests. 
However, these militia structures are shaped in accordance with the lived experience of a militia 
leader’s mobilisation strategy and tactics to pursue his goal. An interesting observation of militancy 
in the Niger Delta region is that militia leaders had no prior experience in organising these 
structures; rather, they were developed from lived experience and a knowledge of the history of the 
conflict, such as the strategies and tactics of Adaka Boro’s armed struggle in 1966.  
In the camp, there is a hierarchy and as we were new, we 
were assigned to various groups. Within the camp, we 
have soldiers, the camp boss, cooks, informants and 
priests, and those for duty post. I was assigned to one of 
the soldier groups, as I was a soldier. Those at the duty 
post do duty shift for two weeks. Some would work 
during the daytime throughout the week, and the 
following week, you would be on night duty. 
He goes on: 
We have the General, the head of the camp, we have the 
secretary, we have the camp commandant, in charge of 
the armoury and posting of workers, we have the camp 
boss; we also have the Kariowei, the spiritual leader, who 
provides the spiritual security of the camp, cooks, and 
soldiers. 
Commander Otuogidi’s description shows a more detailed structure of camp life than any of 
the other interviews. It indicates clearly that one cannot view the militias as spontaneous and 
unorganised collections of young men, but rather, in many respects, the term private army might be 
a better description. This view is also portrayed by another active militant, Kavelli, who, amongst 
other issues, commented on the fact that promotion to the rank of commander or general, within the 
structure of militancy, is based on the number of risks taken at the frontline of a battle, or a person’s 
ability to split from in setting up a camp. His response indicates a well-structured organisation, well-
coordinated internally, with a timetable and appointed shifts for members. 
We have two crews in our camp. One month in, one 
month out. In my own crew, we have up to six-hundred 
and seventy-something boys. The General, Azuzuama, is 
the overall boss, and then we have the commander. 
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The organisation of militants is also seen to be well-structured from the interviews of non-
militants. For instance, Alabo, a key activist, argues that militias in the Niger Delta region are much 
better organised than the Nigerian army, having demonstrated the skill, competence and ability to 
withstand Nigerian military force. He based his argument on the formidable structure of the militia, 
which enables it to engage effectively with the Joint Military Task Force in the region.  
As he puts it: 
It is well-structured; even better than Nigerian army. It 
has a command structure from the lowest rank to the 
top. There are the lieutenants, welfare units, surveillance 
units, intelligence units, operational units, and execution 
units, the strikers, very formidable, very formidable. In 
my opinion, it is better than the Nigerian army, which is 
why the Nigerian army cannot withstand them, apart 
from the federal government’s use of sophisticated 
weapons. 
   5.5.1. Mobilising for Material Gains: Becoming a Militia 
As a way of recruiting members to participate in collective action, militia leaders draw on 
the political ideology of self-determination and resource control. This serves as a moral justification 
for mobilising membership, whilst presenting opportunities to gain oil benefits to satisfy the personal 
ambitions of leaders. Although individuals who join militia groups are drawn by material incentives 
(money) in exchange for services determined by leaders, during my observations, I found that foot 
soldiers often expressed disappointment, pointing out the ideological weakness of their leaders. For 
instance, Kavelli’s response below indicates an awareness of a political agenda as a means and 
motivation for militancy, but suggests that he quickly became disillusioned with the realisation that 
militia leaders appeared to be using militancy simply as an opportunity to gain influence and wealth 
for themselves. The issues of opportunism and political instrumentation between militants and 
government political actors are discussed in detail in Chapter Six. However, Kavelli clearly has an 
awareness of the issues of oppression and a desire for emancipation. This is all part of claims 
making and a shared perception of the militants and the social movement within his community, but 









I thought they were fighting for the freedom of the Niger 
Delta. But when I joined the movement, I began to see 
that our leaders in the government were not fighting for 
the Niger Delta, but to enrich themselves and then 
abandon the rest of us. I joined it because that kind of 
oppression in the Niger Delta is too much. The way the 
military is maltreating us is too much. At the same time, I 
found out that our leaders are using us. They are just 
using us to get what they want. They are fighting not for 
the freedom of the Niger Delta. They are fighting to make 
themselves rich. 
Prior to Kavelli’s engagement in militia activities, he was involved in criminal activities of oil 
theft, as a means of survival. His frustration over the destruction of illegal bunkering activity by the 
Joint Military Task Force pushed him into joining the movement. His responses reveal how 
individuals can change from pursuing criminal activities to becoming militants. It illustrates aspects 
of the complex labelling of genuine and non-genuine militancy in the Niger Delta region. Kavelli was 
just “surviving” in Port Harcourt before joining the bunkering business back in his own community 
(implicitly, because this gave more money), and from there he went into militancy. 
I was at Port Harcourt doing any odd job to survive, 
before joining the bunkering business. Then I came back 
to my village, Okpoama, to join Lodo13 in bunkering 
business. While with Lodo all our goods were burnt 
during clashes with the JTF. Then I had to relocate to join 
Azuzuama’s camp. 
A commander with the Bayelsa State Government Volunteer Force, which was established 
to curb piracy and the incessant kidnapping on the waterways, was less explicit in his engagement 
with militia activities. However, Kavelli’s comment presents a duality of thought; an awareness of the 
political ideology of emancipation as motivation for militia membership, which then led to 
disillusionment when he realised that the ideology behind Adaka Boro’s actions of self-determination 
merely served as an opportunity for militia leaders to make themselves rich. This indicates a desire 
for emancipation, as well as a sense of shared belief and solidarity.  For Kavelli, and many others 
like him, things did not appear to be the way they were made out to be, which also reminds us of 
Kponi’s (a non-militant) earlier comment that the meaning of militancy in the Niger Delta region 
depends on how militant leaders frame or articulate demands in mobilising support for participation 
and collective action. In addition, it is important to emphasise, however, that these are not factions in 
the sense that one militant group has a basis in ideological values, while another does not, and yet 
another is criminal. As shown in the preceding section, all the militants essentially subscribe to the 
                                                 
13 A criminal gang leader. 
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core ideological narrative at some level, but their individual motives for taking part may also include 
issues such as the desire to get an income and to escape from poverty. 
 
5.5.2. Mobilisation as a Means for Gaining Employment 
In addition to the narrative of self-determination contributing to the armed violence in the 
Niger Delta, poverty is also identified as a factor motivating people to become militants. Commander 
Otuogidi makes this very clear in his comment below. The lack of employment and the expectations 
of oil wealth, reasons expressed by Kavelli, only add to the discourse over why individuals or groups 
join militia organisations in the region. For militants like Otuogidi, besides frustration linked to 
unemployment, the face-to-face interaction through friendship ties is also an influencing factor in 
joining a militia organisation in the region.  
Actually, before I joined, things were very rough for me. 
No job, nothing. So one of my friends, we used to call him 
General, saw me in the village and asked me what I was 
doing for a living and I told him I was doing nothing. So he 
invited me to come and join him; that at least I would be 
getting something to survive on. Before then I used to 
know a few boys who belonged and I saw how they 
survived. That was how he invited me. 
Otuogidi’s understanding of militancy is more about survival, having seen how membership 
of a militia organisation provided some material benefits in the region. A theme of his is ‘something 
to survive on’. Thus, from commander Otuogidi’s lived experience; he was penniless and struggling 
in the village before being recruited into membership of a militia group, through a friend. For these 
militants, therefore, the reason for joining appears to be less about ideology, than about gaining 
access to oil benefits as a source of livelihood and survival.  
 5.6. Militia ambition and reward distribution 
Changing identities is often the primary goal of movement organisations. Whilst identity 
builds solidarity amongst the membership of militia, the primary aim remains to change the individual 
self  or relationships in ways that extend beyond movement goals  (Epstein, 1991; Lichterman, 
1999). Movement leaders often pursue personal interest at the expense of organisational goals, as 
different types of leaders may influence and shape their goals at different stages of a movement 
organisation. These arguments find relevance within the hidden ambitions of militants in the Niger 
Delta region, where militia leaders ride on ideological platforms of self-determination to access 
wealth for themselves. They become major players having influence and networks with political 
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actors in government. For instance, Kavelli views his experiences within a broader political culture of 
oil governance, as being embedded in the understanding of militia struggles in the region. 
Everything about Nigeria is politics. That is where the 
corruption is. As a militant, I have come to understand 
that struggle [...] see Azuzuama14 is now a politician15, 
before he was not a politician. To pay his boys is very hard 
for him, despite the money he sees now. So if you look at 
it, it is still the Niger Delta people who are making the 
Niger Delta people suffer, not the Hausa–Fulani, Yoruba 
or Igbo. It is still the Ijaw who are making the Ijaw suffer. 
That is the problem we have. 
Kavelli’s statement reflects the dominant view of self-determination and minority status 
which further tells us that membership of militia is about achieving the ambitions of members. He 
believes it is the Ijaw manipulating and exploiting each other, in order to gain access to resource 
benefits. As he puts it: “it is still the Ijaw who are making the Ijaw suffer” and not the perceived 
political domination of the Hausa–Fulani, Yoruba or Igbo majority ethnic groups in Nigeria. Militant 
leaders have gained a new status and recognition from negotiating monthly payments on behalf of 
their followers. The privileges of militia leaders now put them in a new social class of affluence and 
luxury, as recalled by Otuogidi from a conversation at a night club. 
All our Generals are driving big! big!![raises voice] cars 
and building houses in Yenagoa. They are now politicians 
staying in government houses, driving around with their 
girlfriends, whilst we are suffering. 
Commander Otuogidi continues: 
That is General Gobos’16 convertible sports car. He has 
two different convertible cars. Jeeps are up to three [...] 
his boys would have killed him. This is someone who 
escaped from Ahoada prison and was given arms by 
Ateke Tom17 for the movement18. Today Gobos is 
untouchable. 
 
                                                 
14 A militant leader. 
15 Politician, in this context, is viewed from the interaction and influence of militant leaders with 
political actors. 
16 A Militant leader. 
17 A militant leader. 




Reward distribution has also been a subject of discussion among militia followers. Whilst 
collective action does not necessarily mean an equitable distribution of oil benefits or rewards for 
services rendered by followers, foot soldiers, who take the main risks at the frontline, express 
disappointment with their leaders over this issue. According to Kavelli: 
At our level, as strikers, compared to people like Don 
Wanny, we see nothing. Sometimes  Azuzuama gives his 
commanders about 500,000 naira each, although he is 
not supposed to give them that kind of small money 
because men like Don Wanny, they are strong, they have 
done a lot.19 
And: 
When we are in camp, the second-in-command receives 
about 1.6 million naira as a basic salary every month […] 
for us, the ordinary soldiers; he pays 70,000 to each crew 
member. Every month they pay you 70,000 naira, but we 
are the people who are taking the highest risks, we die 
for nothing.20 
In the following quote, Commander Okpouogidi describes how oil companies and the 
government pay large sums as payoffs to the militant groups (the figures he mention equate to 
between £14,000 and £20,000) whereas an individual soldier might receive just £10 or £20 out of 
those payoffs.  
Sometimes they [the oil companies and the 
government] pay 3.5 million naira, or 5 million, and other 
times less, depending on the negotiations. Now I came to 
find out that from those monies we normally collect, 
when that money is being paid, what we get, what they 
give us, we, who face the greatest risks of shooting, what 
they give us is too small. You see the Ghana Must Go bag 
they bring for payment, but when we go back to camp, 
they only give 3,000 or 5,000 naira to those who carried 
out the operation. This is too bad. I went there to make 
money. I had no job and that is why I went there—for the 
money.21 
                                                 
19 Don Wanny is the commander of a company within a militia; he has done a lot, i.e. he is an 
effective commander and has led many assaults. 500,000 naira is equivalent to about £2000. 
20 1.6 million naira is equivalent to £6400; 70,000 naira is equivalent to £280. 
21 Ghana Must Go bag is a very large canvas holdall bag commonly used throughout Africa and 
called Ghana Must Go since they came to symbolise scenes during the mass expulsion of 




The Bayelsa Volunteer Force commander reports a similar scenario where the oil company 
paid a large settlement fee to the militia in order to secure the return of their facility. These payoffs 
are commonly negotiated between oil companies and militant leaders or their representatives: 
The oil company paid 35 million naira. At first, the oil 
company paid 4 million naira although they demanded 5 
million naira to open negotiations […] Later; I left 
Highest, as I did not get a fair share of the money that 
was agreed on for the Ogboinbiri operation. I braked out 
from them […]22 
These insights into the division of spoils from militant operations reveal a further element in 
the motivation to become involved. If the poor just want to make enough to survive, those who 
already have connections and influence can use the militia to generate significant additional income 
and, even more importantly, further political connections and influence.  
And Alabo questions: 
Look, there are categories, freedom fighting, you are 
fighting for a people naturally, a people without 
bargaining that you want to get rich. Freedom fighters 
are contended people. You do not need to get fifteen 
jeeps, you do not go everywhere in the world to get 
houses, no. Have you seen Nelson Mandela’s house in 
Nigeria? Have you seen Nelson Mandela with fifteen jeeps 
in his house? Have you ever heard of Martin Luther having 
so many millions of naira? 
From this, it can be seen that militancy provides various forms of opportunity. For the 
ordinary foot soldiers, it can be a means of getting something to survive, but for those who become 
leaders, it can become an avenue to very substantial wealth and influence, which then feed off each 
other to generate more opportunities for gathering wealth and influence. It is clear, however, that this 
can create a sense of unease or resentment amongst those who are taking the risks without getting 
much reward, and amongst leaders, such as Alabo and Kpein, who are not active militants. There is 
a sense that some leaders have violated expectations in terms of how much money they have 
acquired and a troubling undercurrent that perhaps these leaders are little different from the 
oppressors (e.g. government, politicians) in the dominant ideological narrative that was explored in 
the preceding section. As we saw there, however, this narrative remains dominant and therefore the 
interviewees find various ways of attempting to maintain the narrative whilst acknowledging this 
unease. 
                                                 
22 Highest is a militant leader. Braked out from them is a Pidgin English phrase meaning broke away 




In this chapter, we have seen that militant groups have a well-structured hierarchy, which is 
more like a contract team, where followers do not seem or feel they owe militant leaders much 
gratitude for being recruited. They evaluate their leaders on the basis of ambitions of status, 
recognition and wealth. Furthermore, money is central and material means of attracting and keeping 
followers. Also, relative access and use of resources tend to distinguish small camp generals from 
Generals. In addition, those interviewed during the course of this research have revealed a variety of 
motivations for their personal involvement in militant activities. Clearly, there is a nexus of 
intersecting issues around feelings of dispossession and awareness which most of the interviewees 
expressed. These views represent a cultural history that is imbued with a struggle for ‘freedom’ 
expressed through desire for control of resources.  
Although most of the respondents demonstrate an awareness of these issues, there are 
interesting variations in emphasis between the more intellectual and influential respondents, and the 
soldiers and commanders with less influence. The former tend to prioritise the freedom-fighting 
agenda as being the dominant motivation and tend to portray the militancy as being fundamentally 
about freedom, even where they recognise that it may have become a corrupted and imperfect 
means of achieving that goal. The latter, on the other hand, tend to have a more immediate and 
pragmatic resentment about lack of employment and immediate benefits arising from resource 
extraction in their communities and see their militant activities as a means to securing those 
benefits, even if in a debased form. It is clear from the interviews, however, that these political 
motivations, whether idealistic or pragmatic in form, co-exist in the minds of many militants with the 
more immediate motivation of achieving some means of “survival”. This mix of motives is perhaps 
nicely captured in a comment made by Commander Akpainfoko:  
Actually, we are fighting for the Niger Delta cause, but 
later on, we are hungry, we are not working, we stay in 
the villages, throughout the whole year, nobody is going 
to school, so we all decide to take up the fight. 
The opportunity to make a living, therefore, is a key motivation, with some militants being 
recruited directly into the militias in the context of their desperation to “survive” (e.g. Commander 
Otuogidi), while others went into militant activities having become involved in bunkering, through the 
same need to make a living. We have also seen that the leading commanders may be motivated by 
the potential to secure both wealth and political influence through their control of militant groups and 




Chapter Six: The Significance of Militancy 
6.1. Introduction 
This empirical chapter examines the space of ‘porous boundaries’ that shape a particular 
form of conflict, which give rise to the number and significance of militants in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria (see Figure 6.1). It is split into three sections, which are not mutually exclusive but rather 
an interlocking web of features linked to the significance of militancy. The chapter attempts to 
describe and explain: (1) the role of political elites at elections and its link with oil theft and informal 
payments to militias, (2) the ascendency of youths in terms of gaining social power to influence  
political and commercial cult/criminal activity as well as community chieftaincy tussles, and (3) the 
unity and fragmentation of militant groups that reveal a threat and opportunity, whereby today’s 
militants carry out coordinated attacks on oil facilities to heighten the ideological struggle of self-
determination and resource control in the public media. The united platform of militants, I argue, is 
only a front-stage political performance, creating a breathing space for engaging political elites and 
oil multinationals, while also competing amongst themselves to gain recognition in accessing 
resource benefits. The unity and fragmentation of militant action tend to complement one another, 
whilst transforming the ideological frames built up around militia action into the meeting of personal 
needs.  








In broad terms, societies, or any part of a given society, are not always in harmony but in 
constant competition over resources  (Buechler, 2000). Within the context of this research, oil is 
central to the dynamics of contest within variegated layers of formal and informal relationships, 
which enable militants of today to be seen as a force to be reckoned with. Whilst it is difficult to 
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discern the number of clandestine militant groups in the region, but it is estimated at 26,35623 (see 
Figure 6.1.). These militants, however, did not emerge out of a spontaneous, frenzied mobilisation, 
but through a series of historical events within the formal and informal structures of oil governance in 
Nigeria vis-à-vis the Niger Delta region.  
In previous empirical chapters (4 and 5) of this research, an attempt was made to situate 
the ideological battles of self-determination and political repression (see Figure 6.1), as well as the 
meaning, typologies, hierarchy and ambition of militancy, within the context of oil governance, in 
order to address the key question of how militants make sense of their actions, and the contested 
meanings of militancy. The meaning of militancy is not straightforward, but a socially constructed 
phenomenon, with internal fluid leadership structures that are dynamic and often based on the ties 
of community, family and friendship, or one’s ability to network with other militias, political actors or 
external bodies. Conversely, I emphasise that the motivation for membership of militia is not driven 
by the notion of self-determination and resource control, but ambition to gain recognition and access 
to oil wealth. Although the actions of Adaka Boro and Ken Saro Wiwa signalled flashpoints for 
agitation and rights to self-determination and resource control (see Chapter 4), these notions, over 
time, seem to serve the dual purpose of: (a) making claims to entitlements, and (b) seeking 
recognition and access to oil wealth. Furthermore, the ideology of self-determination and resource 
control which can be broadly seen as useful disguise  (Wood, 1985) seem to serve a dual purpose. 
It helps to legitimise militia action on the one hand, and spaces of opportunities to negotiate with the 
state and multinational oil companies.  
Moreover, militants are not a homogenous or monolithic entity and they do not belong to 
any single group, even though they frequently couch their differences in ideological terms to seek a 
particular end. Rightly or wrongly, militants have successfully gained international, national and local 
recognition which informally positions them as ‘new actors/chiefs’ to externally represent and 
internally control communities. They make formal claims through actions known to the public and 
media, and relate with state and non-state actors and multinational oil companies on issues that 
should improve the welfare and living conditions of communities in the Niger Delta. However, the 
formal and informal positioning of militias also induce unity and competition amongst militant groups 
that impact negatively on traditional structures of communities in the region. Militia actions have, 
more or less, dismantled local authority structures, rendering local chiefs relatively inconsequential 
in community policy decisions. Although militants have steadily gained legitimacy, recognition and 
space with regards to oil-wealth distribution, they appear to lack a clear and convincing ideological 
path.  
                                                 




Part of the argument of this research maintains that the phenomenal rise in militancy 
cannot be isolated from the roles of political actors and youth/cult gangs. These roles are intertwined 
in a web of interlocking episodes of patronage relations involving guns, money and oil-theft 
activities, in exchange for votes to fulfil political ambition. For the purpose of clarity, the terms youth, 
cult gangs and militancy present mutual realities that impinge on one another; thus, they are used 
interchangeably in this chapter. Whilst I do not wish to generalise by labelling all youths in the Niger 
Delta as militants, it is clear that the widespread frustration, insecurity and porous boundaries 
between the interaction of state and non-state actors  (Peterside, 2007), create ideal conditions for 
individuals or groups (irrespective of biological age) to become militants. The region symbolises a 
breeding ground for the mobilisation and recruitment of state and non-state actors to instigate forms 
of violence to achieve various ambitions. Besides, to ignore the role of youths in an understanding of 
militancy would be grossly misleading, in presenting myopic view of conflict in the Niger Delta 
region.  
In the following chapter, an attempt is made to pitch the porous boundaries which underlie 
the significance of militancy within a number of features. Specifically, the role of political elites, the 
ascendance of youths, the fission and fusion of militias as Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) is examined. In doing this, two key themes, opportunism and competition will be 
integrated to underlie the analysis of this chapter. These themes find expression within the 
perspectives of patronage and contentious politics  (Tilly, 2003), where the government is seen to be 
part of the object of claims making and collective violence. According to Auyero (2008), contentious 
politics highlight grey zones, that reveal a clandestine invisible connection between state actors and 
the instigators of collective violence. These relations are enacted from the mechanism of, what Tilly 
(2003) describes as, brokerage, bringing individuals and groups who are previously excluded into 
mainstream socio-political alliances. It reveals the production of new connections/relationships from 
previously unconnected individuals or groups. It also informs clientelism—interaction that brings 
about recurring action  (Tilly, 1984).The clientelism and patronage herein, refers to the distribution or 
promise of resources (money, guns) by political actors or candidates seeking political office 
 (Kitschelt, 1993) in exchange for citizens’ votes. They highlight a particular form of transaction—the 
exchanges of votes for direct payment or protected access to particular goods or service. 
Besides, the nature of relationship and militia response to their action, reveal the idea of 
framing  (Benford and Snow, 2000) which explains how the re-alignment of events can give new 
insight and interpretation. Framing describes how events can add new meanings to something 
based on, but independent of, an initial meaning and understanding. More so, the idea of labelling in 
terms of access to policy benefit  (Wood, 1985) and the principle of fusion and fission  (Evans-
Pritchard, 1940), will together, form the background and analysis of this chapter which aims  
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(1) to identify the features and processes that shaped the rise of militancy from a 150-man 
militia to 26,356 militants (see Figure 6.1) between 1966 and 2009, and (2) to address the research 
question of how militias make sense of their actions and how these impact on the structure of oil 
governance in the region. Although this chapter highlights structure–agency relations linked to the 
significance of militancy, the dynamic interaction and shifting ideological frames of militia action is 
the central focus of departure. 
6.2. The Role of Political Elites: The looseness of things 
This section attempts to identity and describe the complex web of roles played by political 
elites, from elections and oil theft, to the informal payments made to militants in Rivers and Bayelsa 
States (see Figure 1.1). It aims to unravel the porous boundaries attributable to the significance of 
militancy in the Niger Delta region. In analysing the roles of political elites, an assumption is made 
that violence is a site-specific phenomenon within historical processes and events, often linked to 
the wider social interaction of material transformation and power relation (Homer-Dixon, 1994). 
Furthermore I argue that individuals and groups perceive and evaluate their world individually or 
collectively  (Bourdieu, 1984) to inform inter-subjective interest linked to macro-political structures in 
governance. More so, the idea of human agency is central to social action, given that individuals 
process social experiences, including devising ways of coping with life under various situations 
 (Long and Long, 1992). It is on these grounds that I see militant as agents who think, reflect, desire, 
and make sense of their actions. The action are based on cultures inherited from interactions and 
their environment. As a result, their actions are shaped by the macro dynamic social world. Thus, 
the specific context and location of political elites, youths or militants, does shape their specific 
frames of action and behaviour in the Niger Delta vis-à-vis Nigeria.   
6.2.1. Elections 
One feature which permeates the activities of militancy is the political culture of transition, 
in terms of regime change at elections. Violence is an integral part of elections in Nigeria, which can 
be argued as instrument for accessing wealth, status or forms of security. This mechanism is linked 
to a clandestine informal exchange of guns, money, and protection of space for oil bunkering24, in 
return for votes. These processes of resource exchange can be seen as avenues for social and 
economic transformation that enable political elites and militias to achieve ambitions and positioning 
in deciding who gets what, when and how, in accessing oil wealth in Nigeria vis-à-vis the Niger Delta 
region. Today’s militants do not commit to any particular party of ideological conviction. They are 
patronised by political elites to achieve specific goals. The patterns of patronage are fluid and based 
on short-term interest and gratification. These fluid relationships inform the recurring episodes of 




contention, a view rightly noted from the interview response of Kponi, a non-militant, who highlights 
the temporary relationships between politicians and militants, and how militants have created other 
forms of contention and survival strategies.  
In terms of the militants and politicians, there was some 
kind of coalition at the time, or a kind of togetherness. 
The youths, having acquired these militant spirits [...] 
some politicians saw them as veritable tools to achieve 
political ambition, and they started paying and using 
them. Some politicians ended up using militants to 
become governors [...] the militant group that was used 
to achieve this political objective found itself alone, and 
they started attacking the state through the destruction 
of pipelines and all forms of criminality. They have to find 
ways to survive … 
These cases of patronage relations were evident in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 governorship 
and presidential elections in the Niger Delta region. For instance, in Rivers State (see Figure 1.1) 
prominent militia leaders, such as Kurowei of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) 
and Seibi of the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), both at some point had close ties and relationships 
with the governor of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). A key interviewee, Stone, supports 
this by saying that Kurowei’s NDPVF was instrumental to Peter Odili winning the 1999–2001 
governorship elections, when the NDV had its support from opposition candidates of the All Nigeria 
People’s Party (ANPP). By 2003, in the governorship re-run election Governor Odili switched sides, 
changing allegiance from the NDPVF to the NDV, a rival group in the state. This new alliance 
caused a bloody clash in Rivers State involving the use of sophisticated weaponry. The fierce battle 
between the NDPVF and the government-backed NDV led to a number of deaths, especially in the 
Buguma and Okrika communities, territories under the control of both militia leaders. 
 According to Stone: 
Kurowei came into Buguma […], which led to many 
deaths. Come to think of it, one AK-47 riffle costs about 
five-hundred and something thousand naira, and then a 
youth that is from a very poor region can have up to 2000 
of them […] they were financed by politicians. The initial 
set of weapons that came in, came in through politicians. 
I cannot say in confidence, but I also know they do oil for 
arms.  
Stone points to politicians financing arms and their proliferation at elections, insisting that it 
was impossible for youths from an impoverished region to afford the cost of so many arms in their 
possession. Interestingly, the government backed violence through the NDV against the NDPVF at 
the 2003 governorship elections in Rivers State, had labelled the NDPVF leader a criminal, a label 
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that implies how power relationships are expressed at various levels of personal interaction  (Wood, 
1985). Labels show how power relations of class interest are constructed and sustained. Aspects of 
labelling can also be seen in Kurowei’s attempt to dispel being seen as a terrorist, bandit or criminal 
following a broken alliance, by reframing it as an emancipatory struggle of self-determination with 
reference to Adaka Boro and Ken Saro Wiwa. These were evident in Kurowei’s media25 comments 
prior to ‘Operation Denni Fiberesima’, where he began targeting oil facilities to exert pressure on the 
federal government in mid-2004.   
We must avoid falling into the throes of what Adaka Boro 
foresaw forty years ago. Let them call us terrorists, let 
them call us bandits, but it is important and critical that 
we remain resolute in the pursuit of the ideals of our 
fallen heroes, like Isaac Adaka Boro, Ken Saro Wiwa and a 
host of others. 
The above statement present the ideas of Hunt and Benford  (1994) that tell how 
individuals can use frames to manipulate reality by selectively omitting and emphasising different 
aspects of their world. In this instance, we see how the NDPVF leader systematically framed a 
ruined patronage relationship with political actors, to prevent being labelled a criminal. Interestingly, 
the threat from Kurowei’s NDPVF induced a space for negotiation with Nigeria’s President Olusegun 
Obasanjo in October 2004, which later collapsed following a series of disagreements over the 
process for peace. By 20 September, 2005, the NDPVF leader was imprisoned for treason. The 
front-stage performance of labelling used by the government also played out at macro-level political 
discussion on militancy, where Nigeria’s President Obasanjo invited militia leaders to negotiate for 
peace. According to Nigeria’s President Obasanjo:26 
We are talking to those I described as rascally elements 
from the Niger Delta in an effort to open the lines of 
dialogue and peace, as they feel aggrieved… 
President Obasanjo had earlier labelled militants in the Niger Delta region as ‘criminals and 
rascals’, only to withdraw his comment and create an opportunity for dialogue with them. Alaere, a 
key activist, notes that the introduction of violence became an opportunity for all sorts of people to 
be termed militants in order to gain legitimacy, rather than focusing on issues of widespread 
frustration and grievance, which spurred on the threats of self-determination and resource control in 
the Niger Delta region. Alaere points out: 
                                                 
25 Ijaw nation, 2009. 




[…] criminals also hid under the same guise. They were 
lucky. They had a man who wanted to trivialise the issue, 
Obasanjo. And so he took both the criminals and actual 
agitators and baptised them all as militants. So they now 
have a common baptism […] your name defines your 
character. Everybody now has a blanket covering. That 
blanket covering is what took them to where they are 
now […] if you want to remedy that, your best first step 
is to go back to the main issue and begin to address the 
problem, not the individuals that Obasanjo had earlier 
called common criminals. 
Similar events of politicians and militia alliances were witnessed in Bayelsa State. Agregha, 
a community chief, describes the role of a militia leader at the 2007 governorship elections as an 
‘ugly situation’ fraught with violence and the intimidation of citizens who had no opportunity to vote 
for candidates of their choice. He maintains politicians of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 
used all sorts of ‘do or die’27 tactics to win the 2007 elections, in order to encourage further 
corruption and looting of monthly oil revenues by state politicians. Oil revenues are distributed 
monthly by federal government from a central purse in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, to all states based on 
the principle of derivation (see also chapter 2 section 2.3.3 and figures 2.2 /2.3) 
According to Agregha: 
Even before letting go of arms in the rerun elections [...] 
the situation was ugly in southern Ijaw communities. One 
of the militant leaders ordered that all the election 
materials be brought to his community, even those 
belonging to other communities. And all the thumb 
printing28 was done in that guy’s place, by his order. We 
are not even allowed to vote. So the looting will 
continue… 
The above comment reveals how violence at elections is fuelled by the relationship 
between government political actors and security agencies, and militants. These porous boundaries 
of relationships are also shown in the media29 statement of Oporoza, a militia warlord, believed to 
control large expanses of territory in the Delta State (see map in figure 1.1 introduction page) 
I personally installed most of the politicians in 
government… 
Oporoza’s claim cannot be far from the truth, given the influence and strong ties he wields 
with most politicians across the Niger Delta region. He played a major role in mobilising support from 
                                                 
27 A slogan used for winning elections by any means available. 
28 Using fingers and palm-kernel shells as casted votes. 
29 National News, 14 September, 2009. 
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other militias and youths during the regime change, which ushered in President YarAdua and Vice-
President Goodluck Jonathan in 2007 and 2011. For instance, prior to presidential and governorship 
elections in 2007, at the height of threats from militants in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’s out-going 
President Olusegun Obasanjo held meetings with top ‘Generals’ of militant groups on 5 and 8 April, 
2006, at the country’s capital. The meeting, led by Oporoza, was seen as a strategic move for the 
ruling People’s Democratic Party to retain power in 2007. These views were expressed by Kponi, 
who mentioned that President Obasanjo, having served his two terms for eight years, intended to 
hand over to his ruling party. According to Kponi: 
[…] all the meetings of politicians in the camps of 
militant leaders are nothing but an attempt to seek 
support and collaboration to win elections. That is why 
these boys can do anything and get away with it. 
The comment from Kponi bring out a particular ‘reality’, moreover, given the regime change 
in 2007 that altered the geo-political structure of power in Nigeria. The country’s national political 
power, since independence in 1960, has revolved around the country’s three major ethnic groups 
(see Chapter 2), through either military or democratic regimes. Thus, the 2007 elections, which 
coincided with rising tension from the actions of militias in the Niger Delta, provided an opportunity 
for politicians to form alliances in order to facilitate the South–South region contest the presidency. 
These ambitions became glaringly obvious when Niger Delta governors began a campaign for 
resource control which militants used as a reason for militia action at hidden creeks and camps. 
These political agitations seem to pay off as Dr Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw from the Niger Delta, 
gained the Vice-Presidential ticket with Umaru Musa YarAdua as Presidential flag bearer under the 
People’s Democratic Party for the 2007 elections. On 29 May, 2007, both men were sworn in as 
President and Vice-President. By 28 June, 2007, roughly a month later, Vice-President Goodluck 
Jonathan visited Oporoza at the militia leader’s den, known as Camp, to negotiate for peace in the 




6.2.2. Significance of Oil theft: ‘Bunkering’ 
Let us look at the so-called gain from oil bunkering. Who 
is actually benefiting? Does any real money go to any 
community? There is large-scale bunkering going on, yet 
you will find people wallowing in poverty, sometimes 
abject poverty. There are always a few that succeed in 
building a new house and buying a new car […] some 
government officials are probably compromised in these 
activities; if not, how can we explain the lack of 
government action? 
The above response from Inemo, an environmental-rights activist, illustrates how the 
activity of oil bunkering is well-known by political elites and the militias. To Inemo, militancy is only 
one strand of a complex web that is propelled by foreign oil traders, shippers, refiners and high-level 
political and military elites. Oil bunkering provides funding for elections and quick money for both 
state and non-state actors. However, oil bunkering has been in existence since the mid-1970s, but it 
only became part of a public discourse in the 1990s, becoming more widespread as more 
sophisticated weapons and greater violence were used  (Isumonan et al., 2005). These forms of 
violence, such as the spread of contention (see Chapter 4), along with incessant inter/intra-
communal warfare, and a sense of rising insecurity caused by the activities of criminal gangs, 
gradually resulted in opportunities for oil bunkering in the Niger Delta region. Oil bunkering is at the 
centre of informal governance in Nigeria. In 2005, David West, a former minister of petroleum in 
Nigeria, reported the unofficial revenue loss from oil bunkering activity as $4 billion per year (Human 
Rights Watch, 2005). The informal governance of oil bunkering, seen as a shadow state  (Reno, 
2002), is intrinsically linked to complex local and international webs of connections. This complexity 
were also revealed from local print media; Guardian  (2010), which reported relations in oil theft, 
from comment made by  Alamieyeseigha, a former governor of Bayelsa State (see map in figure 1.1. 
introduction page) in the Niger Delta: 
Crude oil is not garri30 you sell across the counter; it has 
to be processed. Nigerians know it; the international 
community knows where our stolen oil is taken to. It is 
only that we are not decisive; it is a leadership problem 
[...] how many times have I and Mr President gone to the 




                                                 
30 An easily affordable source of food in Nigeria. 
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His statement provides insight into relations between politicians and militias, and how 
militancy is resourced and legitimised. Whilst absolving militia/youths from the complex process of 
oil-bunkering activities (the complex process referred to is the technique required to steal crude oil 
from wellheads and not the process of human interactions), he tends to shift the blame to the weak 
and ineffective government, claiming that the youths/militants are merely being used for surveillance 
at bunkering points (Peterside, 2007). The exchange of ground rent payment for protection to local 
gangs/militant leaders also increased the power and recognition of militant leaders. Having provided 
private armies to oil cartels, militant leaders also learned the sophistication involved in bunkering 
and they began to engage directly in oil theft, making more money without paying for security. One 
case is the rise to prominence of Kurowei, the leader of the NDPFV, and Seibi, of the NDV. Both 
leaders became wealthy from the informal governance of oil theft. Kurowei has constantly denied his 
involvement in oil theft saying, “he cannot steal what belongs to him”, referring to the struggle of 
resource control.  
For leaders like Kurowei, it is the Nigerian state that is stealing crude oil from the Niger 
Delta region, as he believes Nigeria’s structure of governance should be based on fiscal federalism 
and self-determination, and the right to resource control.31 Added to the thriving shadow economy of 
oil bunkering, is widespread frustration and unemployment, which provides a source of survival for 
youths, as well as factional wars over the control of strategic areas for oil theft. According to Human 
Rights Watch (2005), the intensive fighting between the NDPFV and the NDV in Rivers State is 
about access routes for oil theft, under the guise of chieftaincy tussles or some other form of 
structured political violence. As noted earlier, the patron–client relationship involves guns and 
money for votes by political elites, in exchange for privileged protection for militias to engage in oil 
bunkering. One such case is Kurowei and Seibi at the governorship and presidential elections in 
Rivers State where militia leaders had privileged rights to manoeuvre in oil bunkering.  
In other cases, clashes involving Nigerian security agencies and militants are often seen as 
clamping down on militants, whilst what usually happen behind these scenes are disagreement over 
local fee payments. According to Peterside (2007), militia leaders were able to establish governable 
spaces by control over oil theft. As a result, threats from the government to clamp down on militants 
from activities of oil bunkering are fiercely contested by militia leaders. Conversely, these leaders 
resort to ideology of self-determination as a platform for fighting back. For instance, the clash 
between Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF) and Oporoza, on the 13th and 15th of May, 2009 at 
Gbaramatu, wherein the government declared Oporoza ‘wanted dead or alive’ in Delta State, was 
the result of an informal disagreement over payment of the ‘local fee’. The government raiding of 
Camp 5 may be seen by the public media and political front as a clamp down on militants. According 
                                                 
31 The Tide, newspaper report, 9 October, 2003. 
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to Okobo, a key informant, who gave insight to these clashes, the reason behind the clash was the 
seizure of an oil ship belonging to undisclosed top retired military elite, who refused to pay the local 
fee in Oporoza’s territory. The disagreement left eleven army officers, who had been guarding the oil 
ship, dead from gun battle with Oporoza’s militias. At other times, international pressure to curb oil 
bunkering puts the Nigerian state against firm resistance from militias, as noted by Nigeria’s former 
minister of petroleum, who links oil bunkering to the proliferation of arms, earlier emphasised by 
Stone in chapter 6, section 6.2.1) 
[…] bunkering alone cannot explain arms proliferation 
[…] other factors could include the vigorous attempt by 
the federal government to check oil bunkering, triggered 
the determination of bunkerers to continue in their very 
lucrative trade. 
This resistance by the federal government to bunkering is also evident from the interview 
with Kavelli, a member of a militia group, who mentioned government attacks on bunkering 
locations. He perceives oil bunkering as not being an illegal activity, and sees state repression as 
disrupting their means of survival. His view corresponds with the idea that such collective action by 
the militias is a survival strategy.  
[…] because we do not want to steal or do evil things, 
but now the government does not want to allow us to do 
anything. They keep killing us, and destroying and 
burning our boats and that is why we formed MEND. 
Sometimes we shoot steadily for hours, but only two or 
three persons amongst us will die, but then we have 
killed many of them. 
Contrary views were expressed by Bibi, a key informant, asserting that the oil-bunkering 
activities of militants only serve as a means of funding the political quest of self-determination and 
resource control. He believes there are ‘genuine militants’ engaging in oil-bunkering activities to 
sustain the ‘struggle’. His response further reveals the complex web of political and economic 
patronage within the dynamics of militia contention and boundaries of state–society relationship, 







We have genuine militants who are concerned with the 
freedom of the Niger Delta. Some are armed, whilst 
others are intellectual. Some were into oil bunkering to 
fund the armed struggle. […] we now have militant by 
day and political thug by night: those who are into armed 
struggle but rent out their services to politicians to 
achieve power. All the Niger Delta governors are 
implicated in this, as well as federal politicians who have 
oil bunkering interests; we have militant by day and 
criminal by night: those who commit odd crimes to get 
rich. They found a lucrative side-line and their interests 
coincided with the dark forces that control the oil thefts 
of the Niger Delta—the corrupt elite of high society in 
Nigeria. 
A similar response was also narrated by Otuogidi, an active militia. His comments again 
reveal the opportunities which sustain militancy, from how arms are supplied, to the strategies 
involved in keeping contracts with oil companies on-going from cooperation with militants, the staff 
of oil companies, and the Joint Military Task Force (JTF), which are meant to secure oil facilities in 
the Niger Delta region. Otuogidi’s experiences as a militant made him understand the reality from 
the illusion of ideological struggle for self-determination. For militants like Otuogidi, political elites 
can never be trusted, as he opens up complex relations that give relevance to militants. 
My brother, from experience, I have come to realise that 
our society is very bad. The government is involved, the 
so-called JTF is involved, and the oil companies too are 
involved. Why I conclude this is because the boats we use, 
the speed boats we use, while I was in the camp, Agip Oil 
Company bought those new boats for us. One double 75 
and one single. I witnessed it myself, when those boats 
were being delivered. You see, the game is that when a 
particular camp acquires a particular territory and 
control of it, it now tends to ensure the security for all 
the pipelines in that territory, for all the companies, so 
that other groups cannot come and vandalise these 
pipelines. Now, from time to time, we negotiate over the 
price that the Agip Oil Company pays for securing these 
pipelines. Like in our own area, they were paying 1.5 




                                                 
32 About £4,000 pounds. 
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Commander Otuogidi continues: 
Now, as time goes on, when we feel the money they pay 
for security is not enough, we blow up the pipelines or 
threaten to blow up the pipelines, and they would then 
come and negotiate a new price. [   ] The military is also 
aware of our activities; they have their own quota in any 
negotiated payment we make with the oil companies. 
Before we make any “movement”, we would call the JTF 
commander to inform them that we are going to pass 
along this route to carry out operations and warn them 
not to patrol that area. And they would cooperate. It is 
the same thing, too, when the JTF wants to go on patrol; 
they would call us to tell us the route they are going to 
patrol. Now, in every movement we make, the JTF and 
some staff from the oil companies have their quota too. 
So that is the game. 
Explaining further on the sources of arms: 
We have arms dealers, people who supply us. Most of 
them are in the government too. Those top military 
generals in the Nigerian army. From my personal 
experience, my boss, who knows them, has contact with 
these dealers. I had an experience where we went to sea, 
and anchored somewhere, and when I saw a helicopter 
dropping two drums my thinking was that it was fuel, but 
when we went back to camp, I saw it was bullets. So you 
can see that everybody is involved in this game. 
Otuogidi’s experiences reveal a web of interaction involving the oil companies and the state 
security in facilitating and legitimising activities of militancy. The payments for surveillance contracts 
partly illustrate a source of competition and cooperation for militia groups to sabotage oil pipelines, 
as each group is desperate to gain privileged access to oil-company patronage (this competition is 
explained in detail in section 3). The pervasive nature of oil-bunkering activities in the Niger Delta 
region continues to raise doubts over the amount spent yearly in securing oil facilities despite a 
heavy security presence. These doubts, for an interviewee such as Kponi, are attributed to a culture 
of primitive accumulation, created by the elites of Nigeria’s society, where various layers of actors 
scramble to gain access to oil benefits. The cultural values of Nigeria are viewed as an opportunity 
for militants to present an emancipatory struggle as a means of survival. 
[…] I would say that what is going on is essentially a kind 
of primitive accumulation. If you take it from the point of 
view of the entire Nigerian system, which has been 
operating in an ideological vacuum anyway, the militants 
are just trying to get their own part of the National cake 
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6.2.3. Informal payment of money by State actors to militia leaders 
Informal payments of money by some governors to militant leaders in the Niger Delta 
region illustrate one aspect of the porous boundaries legitimising militancy. These payments serve a 
dual purpose: (a) an opportunity for state governors to capitalise on the tension and insecurity in the 
Niger Delta to increase spending on a “security vote” from the state treasury (these amounts are left 
solely to the discretion of state governors to spend without questioning), and (b) a means to 
strengthen relations with key militias during election times. At the level of the public media/political 
arena, these payments are viewed with mixed reactions. Pato, a key informant, regard the payments 
made by some state governors to militant leaders as ‘buying peace’, given the fall in oil production, 
which affected the monthly revenue accruing to oil bearing states. Interestingly, the payments made 
to militias also induced the appearance of a proliferation of militia camps, as the state political actors 
gave recognition to militia leaders having strong network ties with other political entrepreneurs or 
key political actors of the state. According to Pato: 
Apparently, what happened was the fact that when the 
violence reached a certain level, state governments in the 
Niger Delta, in an attempt to engage and buy temporary 
peace, decided to place most militant leaders and 
commanders on the government payroll. And so when it 
became clear that several large sums of money were 
being paid on a monthly basis to these leaders, it created 
some discomfort when the money did not filter down 
through the ranks of these militant camps [...] several 
issues led to the creation of new camps. Those that broke 
away also got their own payment directly from the 
various state governments. 
 
Although the exact amount of money paid to militia leaders is uncertain, field conversations 
and interviews seem to place it between £20,000 and £30,000 pounds, or their equivalent, in 
monthly payments to eight key militant leaders in Bayelsa State. These payments were made from 







[…] until now [2012 at time of writing], even after the so-
called amnesty, the ex-militants still carry guns at 
Olugbobiri33 when guiding their leader, even though the 
federal government had granted amnesty and mop guns 
in the creeks […] a governor who cannot embark on any 
concrete project can waste over 8.6 billion naira34 on 
militants in three years [2007–2010], stalling all 
development projects in the state. While millions have no 
jobs and cannot afford their daily bread, one man is 
collecting 30 million naira35.[…] when the effect of the 
money was weighing heavily on the state government 
allocation, the governor wanted to stop the payments, 
but the ex-militant leaders threatened they would make 
the state ungovernable for him, hence, he continued the 
payments. 
This narrative of Chief Ikpaikpai shows a demonstration of power and influence within 
informal governance structures of the state by militias. However, with the regime change in 2010, 
the payments were stopped by the new political actors, albeit with low-level informal relationships. 
Also, further analysis indicates the distribution of payments trickled down in uneven patterns within 
the structures of militant groups. As a case in point, Kavelli, an active militant, discussed payments 
made by the government to militants, and how these payments were unevenly distributed within 
militia structures.  
[…] Yes, it is still the government that is paying our 
salaries while we are in Camp. These are secrets that I am 
telling you. It is still the government that is paying! I have 
seen things, I cannot speak about […] us, the ordinary 
soldiers, they pay us 70,000 naira36 but we are the people 
taking the risks, we die for nothing. Apart from the 
things we do37, the government still pays. You see, I know 
the amount because my uncle Jack, my father’s first 
cousin, receives a salary of 1.6 million naira38 from the 
government every month. The money will not even last a 
month; because we deal in drugs [...] the government is 
so corrupt that nobody wants to say the truth… 
 
                                                 
33 A community in Bayelsa State. 
34 £33 million pounds. 
35 About £20,000–25,000 pounds. 
36 About £270 pounds. 
37 Oil bunkering and kidnapping for ransom. 
38 About £6,000 pounds. 
122 
 
6.3. The Significance of ‘Youths’ 
The socio-cultural category of youth is more of an 
ascribed social role than a physical state of being. 
(Bourdieu et al., 1986: 164) 
The influence of youths is fundamental to understanding the dynamics and significance of 
militancy.  Terms such as restive youths, cult gangs and militants are common words used 
interchangeably in everyday discussion of Niger delta conflict. These terms, which pervade daily life, 
are the lenses through which violent actions of militants are more generally interpreted. Broadly 
speaking, categorising the term ‘youth’ is argued as ambiguous (Rodger, 2008), as it relates more to 
individual behaviour patterns and activities, rather than one’s age. For example, the western world 
views adulthood from the legally considered age of eighteen-years-old, whilst this may not be the 
case in developing countries (Rodgers, 2008). Besides, cultural boundaries that separate youth from 
adult status are subjective and based on individual will or judgment (Mario, 1997). Hence, 
individuals may not be necessarily considered as adult, until they take on adult responsibility and 
behaviour patterns (Bourdieu, 1986). It sees the social role played by individuals, as being the 
deciding factor, rather than a physical state of being.  
In the attempt to define ‘youth’ within context of the Niger Delta, which appears to be mainly 
categorised by the biological age brackets of 15–45 years, we argue in line with the perspective of 
Rogers (2008) that age alone does not define youth, but rather dependent on characteristics such 
as one’s ability to network and strengthen bonds with political elites, how dependent one is, or how 
frustrated one is, are what constitutes ‘youth’ in Niger Delta. Therefore the frustration amongst youth 
is intricately embedded in varied forms of violence and insurgency as noted by Gore and Pratten 
 (2003), where youths are used as tools for violence and disorder. Consequently, the characteristics 
of youth in Niger Delta region became influential in issues of chieftaincy.  
6.3.1. Youths and Chieftaincy 
The rise in the number of militia activities is firmly situated within the increasing influence of 
youths in local communities. This influence has increased predominantly due to the presence of oil 
in the region. The growing influence of youths is traced to the early 1990s that witnessed inter/intra-
community violence, involving the use of small-scale weapons by youths  (Isumonan et al., 2005). 
These wars, along with the patronage relationships of oil companies with community chiefs, are the 
dominant features for ascendency of youths. Prior to the 1990s, traditional authority resided solely 
with the chiefs. Traditional governance was composed of households/compounds with communal 
ownership of resources (mainly farmland or fishing pots), vested in the hands of family heads as 
presiding chiefs. These households/compounds constituted a unit of social aggregation in the 
management of resources, disputes and cohesion, with the chiefs seen to represent communities 
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with the external world (mainly oil companies and political elites). However, the influence of oil 
engendered a new twist to the role and responsibilities of local chiefs, situating chiefs in an attractive 
position. This positioning enabled chiefs to engage directly with political elites and staffs of 
multinational oil companies on issues of concerning community development, royalties and other 
forms oil benefits. As a result, chieftaincy became lucrative and fought-after position, to further forge 
alliances and the fragmentation of communities. Chieftaincy therefore, became competitive and 
intense, with increasing dissatisfaction amongst youths who now perceived themselves as being 
marginalised and manipulated by the chiefs.  
Youths who felt left out from rewards of oil benefits, began to create their own governable 
spaces through various forms of violent gangs and organisations for survival. To illustrate this, 
Kurowei, who used the platform of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) to become a militia leader, had a 
running battle over chieftaincy with Seibi, who emerged as a militia leader through a cult group 
known as Icelanders, which later became the Niger Delta Vigilante. It is also claimed that the 
government of Rivers State had an interest in who became chief, as Kurowei controlled a 
community in Buguma, so the government hired Seibi to create tension, and intimidate and influence 
the chieftaincy decision in the government’s favour. According to Stone, a key informant interviewed: 
In terms of the community, I can cite an example. In 
Buguma there was this chieftaincy tussle over who was to 
become the next Amanayabo of the Kalabari Kingdom 
and the militants played a major role with gun battles 
between Kurowei’s NDPVF and government-backed Seibi 
of the NDV in installing the current Amanayabo of 
Kalabari. 
Stone’s narrative shows a micro-level violent conflict intersecting with the broader 
framework of militancy in the Niger Delta region. The battle between the NDPVF and the 
government-backed NDV over the chieftaincy at Buguma in Rivers State, a community that is host 
to major oil companies, shows the complex configuration of chiefs, politicians and militia of sorts, in 
a scramble for position and recognition to access oil benefits at the local community level. In a 
similar manner, youth influence over chieftaincy decisions was also witnessed at Okrika, another 
Ijaw community in Rivers State. Okrika community became notorious from the late 1990s up until 
2004, with persistent inter/intra-community warfare, which helped to mop-up arms in the region. The 
chieftaincy crisis within Okrika community reached the heights of bloody confrontation involving 
factions of a criminal/cult group, the Bush Boys, backed by the opposition political party, the All-
Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), and Icelanders (later the NDV), which had support from the ruling 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Iburo, an eye witness interviewed, reflected on the event, seeing 




A town gripped by such paralysing fear, where men were 
brutally killed, daughters beaten and raped […] elders 
and chiefs that were once respected, revered and seen as 
custodians of traditions and customs became objects of 
ridicule and subjected to unimaginable humiliation. In 
some instances, they were subjected to public flogging 
for speaking up. Nobody dared stand up to these vandals. 
Okrika culture and festivities were breached. Funerals 
and burials became impossible to hold. Okrikans were 
made to beg and pay money to these vandals against 
their will in order to bury their dead. 
The influence of youths did not only permeate chieftaincy decisions, but was also present in 
negotiating contracts or development interventions with oil companies on behalf of communities. 
The oil companies have also learned the act of protecting and maintaining business activities in line 
with the challenges they face, on a daily basis, in the region. They patronise youth leaders who 
demonstrate superior capability in the conquering of territories and threatening of oil facilities. This 
was evident in my conversation with Bibi, a key informant, who reflected on a case concerning the 
Ogbungebene community in Bayelsa State. Aggrieved youths of the community, excluded from a 
pipeline surveillance contract awarded to a youth leader who controlled the area, went on a 
rampage, threatening the community chief and destroying oil pipelines, presenting the damage as 
spillage in order to demand compensation payment.  
6.3.2 Youths and Cultism 
Politicians have not only learnt the act of using police and 
other security agencies against the people; they have also 
perfected the art of using cultism against society. 
Cultism is linked to the ascendency and influence of youths in the Niger Delta region. In 
broad terms, the definition of cultism is ambiguous, and it is not this author’s intention to engage in 
the expansive debate on defining the meaning of cult/cultism in this research. However, for the 
purpose of clarity, the concept of cult/cultism refers to political and commercial groups, where 
members relate to certain values and practices  (Langone, 1993). It is characterised by dependency, 
loyalty and protection from leaders, with a mechanism for reward and punishment. Within the Niger 
Delta, cult gangs can easily transform into militias by relabelling in order to suit prevailing conditions. 
Such conditions are economic and political in nature, and often linked to use of gangs for violence at 
elections. These youths/cult gangs, to a large extent, represent a social process of transformation 
from criminality to militancy, and vice-versa, that further blur lines of identity, criminality and militancy 
in the Niger Delta region. The gangs are united by a common interest and territorial boundary, and 
found mainly in urban slums known as ‘watersides’ residential areas or rural communities, with 
affiliations to other social organisations having secret initiations and rites in universities. 
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Cult gangs are strongly patronised by politicians and governments in the Niger Delta 
region, which helps in creating a fluid transition from criminal to militant, and vice-versa. For 
instance, cult gangs in Rivers State, such as Bush Boys, Icelanders, Greenlanders, Dey Gbam, Dey 
Well, the Italians, KKK, Angels, etc. were dominant criminal gangs with territorial areas of control. 
These groups later became submerged into conquered rival factions or through cooperation, into 
two prominent and widely known militant groups, known today as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer 
Force in 2001, and the Niger Delta Vigilante in 2003. Cult/criminal activities were an established 
feature in Port Harcourt, Rivers State. Various cult gangs had a reputation for stealing phones, 
committing assault and robbery, and engaging in frequent shootings. These activities rendered the 
state capital completely helpless, as people were forced to be in-doors as early as 5pm. According 
to Stone, the cult groups terrorised the city in ways that grounded social and economic activities, 
making the government look incompetent in handling the rising insecurity in the state.  
At some point in Port Harcourt, there was a lot of cult-
gang activity, people not being able to move freely on the 
streets, and if you went to some areas of Port Harcourt, 
you would be stripped of your possessions; there was 
much crime and the government was quiet about it. It 
was as if the government could not do anything about 
what was going on in society. 
Relations between cult gangs and political elites provided an easy transition from cult gang 
to militant. According to Alaere: 
In Rivers State, we had militants who had once been part 
of cult groups. Before this, cult groups came from groups 
of political thugs […] when they were political thugs, 
created by politicians and political parties, their business 
was to get whoever was in the opposition out of the way, 
or be in charge of security during elections, writing the 
results because nobody was allowed to vote. 
She further explained about the protection cult gangs received from politicians, which 
enabled them to intimidate and perpetuate crime in the state.  
[…] they began to form oppressive groups to oppress 
the common man who owns a shop, knowing that if 
anything went wrong, my commander can call my 
general, who is in touch with the government, and the 
government can get in touch with the commissioner of 
police and I would be released. Or my general worked 
with the commissioner of police during elections, he 
knows him one-on-one, so I cannot be put in jail. 
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Similarly, leaders of cult gangs are paid by drug traffickers to provide security protection. 
These leaders, in turn, paid settlement fees to the district head of police in the area  (Peterside, 
2007). This settlement to police made it impossible for these area to get raided, thereby, giving an 
opportunity for other crimes to perpetuate in these area. Therefore, instances of raids were rare, and 
if it happens, it is mainly linked to the non-payment of settlement fees or the greed of cult leaders. 
The use of cult gangs by political elites was evident at the July 2002 elections in Bayelsa State. For 
instance, Morris alleged, the campaign manager of the ruling People’s Democratic Party used the 
Isonguforo cult group to intimidate people and rig the election in favour of the ruling party. The clash 
with a rival cult group, the Isenasawos, which was backed by the opposition party, left a number of 
youths dead. 
A key theme clearly emerging from this section is opportunism, created from an interlocking 
web of interactions of political actors, which tended to give legitimacy and recognition to militancy. 
The section describes the process of formal and informal relationships, at various levels, to describe 
the features that give significance to militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. It clearly 
demonstrates a proliferation of new forms of struggle in which every subject position is constituted 
within an unstable structure  (Pichardo, 1997). Moreover, the section point to how the success of 
militancy is attributable to opportunity structures, made available from political transitions to 
democratic rule, which open up access to power shifts in the ruling alignment and the availability of 
influential allies (Tilly, 2003). By regime change, we mean how the interaction of government and its 
political actors provide an opening for those actors poor in resources to use in the creation of 
movements  (Tarrow, 1994). Thus, the functional roles of political elites in instigating violence at 
elections in order to fulfil political ambitions with the militias/youth/cult gangs, coupled with the 
lucrative avenue of oil-bunkering activities that provide resources for mobilisation, are the 
mechanisms for the significant rise in number of militants in the region. 
6.4. MEND: A pseudo community 
This section explores the unity and fragmentation of militias, under a common platform of 
collective identity, as members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). 
Specifically, it aims to give insight to MEND’s build up and how it evolved in terms of its internal 
politics/evolution, its external pressures and opportunism and combination of external and internal 
pressures. One argument of this research is that militancy cannot be isolated from the cultural 
environment in which it is embedded. They evolve in response to the changing political 
opportunities, which impact differently on individual and collective identities of militant groups. These 
identities seem more personal than ideological, even though they frequently couch differences in 
ideological terms to meet particular ends. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
represents a clear example of a pseudo community that comes together at certain times to act as an 
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external representation of communities. It makes claims and demands on behalf of communities in a 
formal manner, and acts at other times as an individual entity in order to compete for resource 
benefit. Their collective identity/action only serves as an ornamental platform in legitimising militia 
action. Viewed broadly, the unity and fragmentation of militants relate to the principle of fusion and 
fission  (Evans-Pritchard, 1940) in explaining how social unity and differentiation between segments 
result from different forms of violence.  
In analysing the fusion and fission of militia, we can assume that collective identity defines 
the boundaries of a social movement, as only those who share the same belief and sense of 
belonging may provoke collective action. It does not necessarily imply homogeneity, as individuals 
within groups may not act in the overall interest of the group  (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). In 
addition, the collective identity of militants in the Niger Delta can be categorised in line with Whitter’s 
 (1995) idea, as people with distinct problems have a common platform of shared knowledge of their 
environment. They construct strategic action, which is seen as a subjective process of conscious 
strategic decision-making  (Moore, 1999). Also, militancy in the Niger Delta region goes with varied 
forms of labelling and familiar forms of actions that send a message. It constructs a prototype of 
actions based on previous experiences by adopting a particular form of action (Tilly, 1995). These 
tactical identities send an unspoken message that says: “we are people, who do these sorts of 
things, in this particular way”  (Polletta and Jasper, 2001),which defines the identity of members 
themselves.  
6.4.1. MEND: Evolution  
MEND emerged in late 2006, following a series of individual fragments of militant groups 
engaging in attacks on oil facilities for reasons that are mainly economic. Although the coalition of 
militias which emerged as MEND is linked to agitation and protest, it also illustrates coalition building 
However, some key events, such as the political tension which led to the imprisonment of Kurowei, 
leader of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, and Emomotimi, a commander of MEND and 
former governor of Bayelsa State, along with the government’s heavy deployment of military troops 
in the Niger Delta, spurred the need for militia coalition. For instance, Otuan, a key activist, who 
reviewed the coalition of militant groups comprising leaders of the Movement for Survival of Ijaw 
Ethnic Nationalities (MOSIEND), the Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA), the Federated Niger Delta 
Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), the Arogbo Freedom Fighters (AFF) 
and the NDPVF, points to the need for coordination with a strategy of shadow leadership, given the 
disorganised form of action by varied militant groups, and the increasing threat of federal 
government attacks on communities in the Niger Delta region.  
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The key issue is the imprisonment of our kinsmen. The 
imprisonment of our Governor and Kurowei was 
motivated by President Obasanjo. You can see from our 
encounter with the Nigerian army after Operation 
Climate Change that we need to change tactics, since 
everybody now claims to be in the struggle, doing 
different things. 
In general, MEND’s coordinated attacks from 2006 until the period of amnesty in July 2009, 
accounted for about 300 deaths and for 119 oil workers being held hostage39. Its actions within this 
period drastically reduced the daily oil production from 2.6 million barrels of oil per day to just 
700,000 barrels per day40, despite the $3 billion dollars spent by the federal government and oil 
companies yearly on security to protect oil facilities in the Niger Delta region. This spending 
obviously shows that MEND’s success cannot be based only on its strategy and tactics, or display of 
skills with regards to the use of weaponry, but also depends on the boundaries of relationships, 
within an antagonistic cooperation, where threats of militias create opportunities of cooperation with 
political actors and oil companies. The ideology behind the attacks of MEND appears to be a front-
stage political performance, eliciting mixed responses from interviewees. For instance, in MEND’s 
first series of attacks on Shell Petroleum Development Company facility, and the abduction of four 
foreign oil workers on 6 January, 2006, the spokesperson Jomo Gbomo conveyed political reasons 
for its action in the public media41 by reciting the ideology of resource control with demands for the 
release of the NDPVF leader and Chief D. S. P. Alamieyeseigha. Both men are Ijaws, and were held 
for treason and misappropriation of state funds, respectively. According to Jomo Gbomo: 
Our ultimate goal is the control of oil wealth in the Niger 
Delta by its indigenes. This we desire to achieve through 
the use of arms, as fifty years of dialogue has borne no 
fruit. 
Whilst reiterating the ideology of resource control and ethnic identity to draw public 
sympathy in legitimising militia action, the federal government’s response was reprisal attacks by the 
Joint Military Task Force on oil-bunkering areas or communities suspected to be under the control of 
militia leaders. These government attacks, intensified with counter-attacks from MEND, resulted in 
an increased number of hostages, as mentioned by Otuan, a key activist: 
 
 
                                                 
39 Niger Delta Technical Committee Report, 2009. 
40 Official records from Nigeria’s special adviser on amnesty for Niger Delta militants. 
41 The Dispatch, newspaper report, 9 January, 2006. 
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[…] MEND’s first incident of kidnapping was on the 6th 
of January, 2006, as a result of Chief D. S. P 
Alamieyeseigha’s 42 incarceration in the United Kingdom. 
It was MEND’s demands that secured the release of 
Alamieyeseigha and the NDPVF leader […] but after the 
government agreed with MEND to release four foreign 
workers, the same government made a massive attack 
[…] which angered the boys, who then went and 
kidnapped sixteen more foreigners as hostages. So that 
was the start. The original groups that did this were using 
hostages as human shields to win political points and not 
for ransom purposes.  
Otuan believes MEND’s actions to have been political, as opposed to criminal, a view that 
coincides with Pato’s, another key informant, who also insists MEND’s actions were not intended to 
be violent, but to express political demands, even though both interviewees could not separate the 
militia’s political demands from those involved in kidnapping for ransom. According to Pato: 
Take, for instance, the activities of MEND. It was not 
interested in taking hostages for ransom, wanting 
instead to drive home a political point, but some saw it as 
a way of making money from the process, which is 
basically what has happened until now. The real key 
issues of the Niger Delta, even as the government 
implements the Amnesty programme, are in the 
background. 
For militia foot soldiers like Kavelli, the unified platform and actions of MEND resulted from 
government attacks on oil bunkering. He believes oil bunkering is legal and not stealing, the 
perception of militia leaders which is passed on to their followers to discourage hidden agendas. 
MEND’s actions, which appeared as front-stage political demands and back-stage economic 
concerns, partly inform the processes and conditions at various levels of militia contention. On one 
side of the coin, MEND leans on the ideology of self-determination and resource control with political 
demands for the release of its kinsmen, and on the other side, it kidnaps for ransom and to protect 
oil-bunkering activities. This is a view Otuogidi, an active militant, seems to agree with from his own 
experience: 
Actually, MEND’s aim as a body is freedom fighting. We 
are fighting to control our natural resources, but at the 
end of the day, I discovered that this is not what we are 
really fighting for. Everybody is fighting for his own 
selfish interest. 
                                                 




These mixed responses refer to the dynamics of contention and shifting ideologies, a 
shadow of reality, which blurs the lines of public discussion in terms of understanding militia action in 
seeking justice and self-determination, on behalf of impoverished communities in the Niger Delta 
region. However, the collective actions of MEND, viewed from a series of attacks on oil facilities 
between 6 January, 2006 and December, 2012, and its engagement with government and political 
elites, opened up a new vista of opportunity for militant groups. This time, there was a phased 
implementation of the amnesty programme for militant groups across the Niger Delta region. As 
pointed out earlier in section 2.1 on elections, Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan’s visit to the 
dreaded Camp 5 on 28 June, 2007, signalled the start of the peace process and new relationships 
with militia leaders. By 2 July, 2007, the Vice-President inaugurated the Niger Delta Peace and 
Conflict Resolution Committee (NDPCRC) to mediate between MEND and the Presidency. This 
historical development paved the way for the process of granting amnesty on 25 June, 2009. The 
amnesty programme, which involved disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and the 
reintegration of militant groups, also became a process which brought recognised militia leaders into 
an informal form of brokerage, with the opportunity to hoard resource benefits. 
6.4.2. MEND: External Pressures 
What we have now, littered around the corridors of 
power, are loud mouths seeking relevance and big 
mouths spewing threats […] What they all forget is that 
the population of snitches has also increased 
geometrically. 
The government’s introduction of amnesty into the dynamics of militancy further illustrates 
the shifting ideology of self-determination. It highlights the process of bringing militants into formal 
and informal macro-structures of resource benefit, which opens a space for key militia leaders to 
access mainstream reward distribution. The government introduction of amnesty to militants, alludes 
to idea of control, regulation and management  (Wood, 1985), wherein a policy agenda is 
established within structures of political discourse. In this particular case, establishing a policy of 
managing and controlling militants through a regulatory programme of amnesty, within the context of 
power and collective action. In alluding to Wood’s (1985) labelling in development policy, what can 
be inferred here, in regard to amnesty, are expressions of power at varied levels of personal and 
interpersonal interactions. It also informs how policy benefits of institutions or government are 
constructed and sustained, which in turn raises concerns of conditionality, differentiation and 
dependency. Moreover, the amnesty policy tells how structures of formal and informal interaction, 
over access to resources  (Adger et al., 2005b), are based on the exercise of power through 
resistance and cooperation. These accounts illustrates to how the bureaucratic process and 
procedures of amnesty announced by Nigeria’s President in May, 2007, appear to have two distinct 
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but interconnected components which determine a militant’s access to oil wealth. These are (a) the 
policy of amnesty towards individual militants (leaders and foot soldiers), and (b) the policy targeting 
senior MEND commanders through special package reward in the form of government contracts.  
These policies serve as a dragnet to keep both militant leaders and their followers under 
the control of government politicians in exchange for awards of contracts to militant leaders and 
training/education programme for followers. Thus, the regulation and point of entry into an amnesty 
welfare programme requires being a militant either through family, friendship ties, or network to a 
militant ‘General’ Therefore, the first condition for the amnesty reward distribution system for both 
militant Generals and followers (MEND) is to disarm within sixty to ninety days (June–October, 
2009). This condition also include signing accord with Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution 
Committee (NDPCRC), a government agency mediating on behalf of Nigeria’s President. Prior to the 
granting of amnesty on 25 June, 2009, the federal government under the presidency of Umaru Musa 
Yar Adua had invited MEND commanders for talks and negotiations at the nation’s capital, Abuja. 
Unfortunately, he died in early 2010, before the actual implementation of the amnesty programme 
began under Dr Goodluck Jonathan, who took over as Nigeria’s president. However, the process of 
the amnesty programme between MEND and the federal government from June, 2009 to late 2011, 
led to pronouncements, opportunities, hoarding and splits within MEND. A case in point is the oil 
pipeline attack by MEND splinter group on the 11th of December, 2009. The group mentioned 
delayed talks in implementing the amnesty programme, and infrastructural development in the Niger 
Delta region as reasons for the attack.  
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
can confirm that a warning strike involving thirty-five 
fighters armed with assault rifles, rocket launchers and 
heavy-calibre machine guns was carried out at 0200 hrs 
today43 on major Shell/Chevron crude pipelines. Whilst 
wishing the President speedy recovery, a situation where 
the future of the Niger Delta is tied to the health and 
wellbeing of one man is unacceptable. 
According to MEND’s statement in the media44, its spokesperson Jomo Gbomo accused 
the NDPRC of using the health of the late President YarAdua to delay talks in order to exploit the 
amnesty process and offer bribes to faction militant leaders in the form of contracts. Interestingly, 
the statement below also inform the development of ‘political entrepreneurs’ exploiting the process 
of mediation. 
                                                 
43 The Punch, newspaper report, 11 December, 2009. 
44 The Punch, newspaper report, 11 December, 2009. 
132 
 
[…] Abbe and his cohorts45, rather than encourage the 
presidency to address core issues as demanded by true 
agitators for justice in the Niger Delta, is still busy 
inaugurating one dubious committee after another to 
continue stealing funds allocated for the development of 
the Niger Delta. We also note the government has been 
offering bribes to militants who surrendered their birth 
rights under the amnesty programme in the form of 
contracts. 
Apparently, the statement was made from a faction within MEND’s high command which 
emerged following the death of late President YarAdua. The disagreement over the processes of 
amnesty within the ranks of MEND induced a split into two main factions: the Emomotimi faction and 
the Oporoza faction. The former had close ties with the late President YarAdua, whilst the latter had 
close ties with President Goodluck Jonathan. These alliances caused the attacks and the accusation 
of the bribe of a contract to the Oporoza faction, which seemed to exclude the Emomotimi faction 
during President Jonathan’s regime. In addition, signs of disagreement emerged when the Oporoza 
faction thought that Emomotimi, who was earlier considered MEND’s spokesperson and leader prior 
to President YarAdua’s death, had used his close relationship with the late president to manipulate 
the process of negotiation to his advantage. He was accused of hijacking the negotiation process 
without due consultation with other members of MEND. The alleged hijack of the amnesty process, 
following a meeting with late President YarAdua on 1 October, 2009, was rebuffed in a media46 
statement accredited to the Emomotimi faction of MEND: 
[…] resolving the Niger Delta crisis is not a tea-party 
affair that should be left in the hands of fighters who 
fought in the creeks; it is a matter for our intellectuals 
who are schooled and grounded in the dynamics of the 
struggle of how to handle such things. 
Emomotimi was referring to the Oporoza splinter group as not being educated enough to sit 
at the negotiation table. In response to Emomotimi’s statement, the Oporoza group also issued its 
counter statement below... 
We generals in the Niger Delta struggle to know that we 
are all school drop-outs, who have signed our death 
warrants and sacrificed our lives for the Niger Delta 
liberation. We know we cannot speak big grammar, but 
no individual should feel larger than life with the chains 
of university degrees hijacking the struggle of our lives. 
                                                 
45 Nigeria’s Defence Minister and members of the Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Reconciliation 
Committee (NDPCRC). 
46 Vanguard, newspaper report, 22 November, 2009. 
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During my field conversations, I observed that most militants in the Niger Delta region lack 
any formal education, which they also admit. Most could hardly read or write. This goes to show that 
the mobilisation and success of a movement do not necessarily depend on how well-educated one 
is, rather, the knowledge and values inherited from the environment in which individuals live in is 
key. It is what informs the strategy and tactics and repeated forms of actions in the region. In 
addition, the internal pressures of MEND, which lead to splinter groups, given the opportunities 
introduced by the government, also, illustrate the strength of relationship between militants and 
political elites.  This is shown from the print media newspaper47  in which a splinter group of MEND 
pledge support for President Jonathan elections in 2011 with threats of intimidation against any 
opposition. 
We have all unanimously endorsed that the President is 
our brother and leader. We will not hesitate to 
undermine any element of undue opposition against him. 
Finally, we are going to collaborate with the Ijaw Youth 
Council in putting together institutions to ensure free and 
fair elections in Ijaw land. We are ready for politicians 
who think that they can get away with rigging the 
elections in 2011 and 2012. 
The official amnesty to militants, informally strengthens the relationship with the Presidency 
and key political actors in the Niger Delta region. For militant leaders, the amnesty programme 
offered an opportunity to gain recognition and access to oil wealth. For foot soldiers, the amnesty 
became a sort of social benefit, where they began to receive monthly stipends. Consequently, the 
amnesty programme, offered an opportunity whereby militias would have remained excluded from 
mainstream political structure and culture of oil governance in the country. Nevertheless, President 
Goodluck Jonathan had control of most of the key militant leaders in the Niger Delta region, through 
the instrument of the welfare package for militants. This also laid a strong support base for his 2011 
presidential re-election.   
6.4.3. MEND: External and Internal Pressures:  Differentiation and Exclusion 
The split within MEND were born out of dissatisfaction amongst MEND’s high commanders 
over the process of negotiation, as well as over some gaining special treatment in terms of contracts 
awarded by federal government. The government applied a combination of formal and informal 
processes of engagement and negotiation in its amnesty programme. Thus generals with strong ties 
and relationships with politicians and the presidency were wealthier than other generals. Moreover, 
a feud within MEND, which witnessed factional attacks on oil facilities and kidnapping, is linked to 
complaints concerning the government’s grant of a pipeline surveillance contract to Oporoza’s 
                                                 
47 Punch Newspaper 23/03/2010 
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MEND. A case of such factional attack was evident on 7 January, 2010, in which the Emomotimi 
faction of MEND accused President Goodluck Jonathan of doing nothing for the people of the Niger 
Delta region.  
Our attack on oil installations is imminent, seeing that the 
government of Goodluck Jonathan has nothing to offer 
the people of the Niger Delta. 
Apparently, these events were happening around the time of President YarAdua’s illness 
which eventually led to his death in early March, 2010. With Vice-President Goodluck, from an Ijaw 
ethnic minority in the Niger Delta, taking over the reins of power as president, this meant new 
informal alliances with key militia leaders, whilst those with strong ties to late President YarAdua 
would wane. It also meant that the ‘special agreement’ President YarAdua had with militants prior to 
the process of amnesty implementation, had to be reviewed in favour of his new allies. These soon 
became evident as the Emomotimi faction of MEND struck on 7 January, 2010.48 Interestingly, the 
splinter group leaders of MEND, never went to war over differences in the processes of amnesty 
implementation; rather, each splinter groups carried out attacks on oil pipelines as a means of 
gaining recognition and where they are then called to federal capital for negotiations. Another case 
in point is that which took place on 30 July, 2010, six months after its earlier attack. In a media 
report49 following the Emomotimi MEND’s attack at Agip oil facility in Bayelsa State, spokesperson 
Gbomo Jomo showed interest in engaging in dialogue with the federal government, whilst framing its 
actions around resource control.  
[...] whilst we prefer dialogue to armed conflict, MEND 
will not participate in aimless talks that avoid the core 
issue of resource control. We will shun any gathering that 
beats about the bush and any meeting that does not deal 
with the root issue that created the problem on the 
agenda. Our fight is not for Jonathan’s presidency or for 
social amenities, but for the recovery of our stolen land. 
Our plans are not tailored to fit into the political agenda 
of any individual, but for the emancipation of the people 
of the Niger Delta. 
Whilst these attacks were going on, the government, on the other hand, was making 
attempts to lure aggrieved militias into the amnesty programme, despite the deadline given for all 
militants to disarm. The arrest and subsequent imprisonment of Emomotimi in South Africa, 
following the explosions that occurred during Nigeria’s fiftieth anniversary, led to the few remaining 
factions left being finally drawn into the amnesty welfare programme. In addition, the grievances of 
                                                 
48 Ijaw nation, 9 October, 2010. 
49 National newspaper, 30 July, 2010. 
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those side-lined after welfare package of the amnesty were vividly described in a media comment 
accredited to a JTF commander in the region. 
[…] a close look at the Niger Delta situation today will 
reveal that some key former militant commanders and a 
few lucky apprentices are now well-established 
businessmen. They have gone legitimate with loot 
garnered during the creek years. They now live in 
splendour and affluence. Similarly, the on-going rumble in 
the creeks has been orchestrated by former apprentice 
militants who feel left behind by their superiors and who 
also want to be Generals  (Antigha, 2010) 
The resultant coordinated attacks on oil facilities by disgruntled splinter groups of MEND, 
following the process of amnesty implementation, highlight how key militia leaders with strong ties to 
the political establishment have gained recognition and wealth, at the expense of other militants. For 
example, Oporoza, a well-known militia leader, was allegedly awarded a pipeline surveillance 
contract worth $103.4 million dollars50 through a front company known as Global West Vessel 
Specialist Limited. This seems to have caused anger amongst members of Oporoza’s militia group, 
who felt excluded, as the benefits did not filter down to lower levels of the group, a view expressed 
by Firstborn, a commander within Oporoza’s militia: 
We left our families and homes to live in the creeks as 
commanders of MEND, living like animals for the purpose 
of emancipating our people from marginalisation by the 
federal government, before embracing amnesty, but 
Oporoza and his cohorts have refused to allow us to 
benefit from the struggle. 
Bowei, a member of Oporoza’s militia, also pointed out the process of exclusion from the 
amnesty benefit, which was blamed on Oporoza. 
[…] when the amnesty programme was proclaimed by 
the then President YarAdua, we made every effort to 
convince Oporoza, but he was obstinate. We were able to 
persuade him to accept the amnesty offered by the 
federal government, but to our dismay, he was flown to 
Abuja and back to Gbaramatu for official disarming 
without consulting us. 
 
 
                                                 
50 Daily Independent, newspaper report, 24 February, 2011. 
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Whilst internal wrangling from the preferential treatment given to Oporoza caused 
discomfort amongst members of Oporoza’s militia structure, a MEND splinter group, the Niger Delta 
Liberation Force (NDLF), led by Gojo, also felt short-changed, as a General of the same ranking as 
Oporoza threatened to resume attacks51 following failed negotiations with the NDPCRC mediation 
team. 
[…] we accepted the federal government amnesty 
without negotiation […] we therefore declare that we 
are no longer part of the fraudulent amnesty which is full 
of deceit and betrayal […] we have resolved to resume 
fresh attacks and this time we will operate on land and 
sea, and we urge all foreign diplomatic missions to call 
home their nationals in the Niger Delta region 
immediately, as we cannot guarantee their safety. 
Soldiers of the Joint Task Force should stay away from oil 
wellheads and our area of operations, as we may be more 
violent than during the earlier first phase of the oil war. 
The renewed threats of attack also indicate instances of opportunity hoarding where 
political elites and militia leaders with stronger ties manipulated the amnesty process to their own 
advantage, whilst coordinating affairs on behalf of other militant groups. Thus, the NDLF threat, 
which was later carried out, was similar in sequence and ideology, and known to government and 
fellow militias, to Tilly’s (2003) ideas of contention. Interestingly, the episodes of militia actions 
reflect similar patterns, with the usual statements portraying them as emancipatory struggles with 
hidden agenda. The desire for militia action, as stated below, is, however, a legitimate smokescreen 
for less reputable agendas of militant groups in the Niger Delta region. Nonetheless, the threats and 
renewed threats from aggrieved members of MEND gradually came to an end with the imprisonment 
of Emomotimi and the death of Gojo, who died in a gun battle with the Joint Military Task Force 
(JTF) around Ayakoromo community, which was also completely destroyed during the raid. 
From his actions so far, President Jonathan does not 
understand why MEND struck. This government believes 
the fight in the Niger Delta and the loss of thousands of 
combatants and civilians was solely to do with the lack of 
roads, schools and other social amenities in the Niger 
Delta. MEND is fighting to reclaim the land of the Niger 
Delta stolen over fifty years ago by oil companies and 
certain collaborating Nigerians. 
 
                                                 
51 The Guardian, 21 November, 2010. 
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These performances show how a diverse understanding, within a fluid and cohesive 
clandestine network, of the exchange of patronage, helps in shaping and sustaining militancy in the 
region. They reveal a shifting in the framing and transformations of self-determination and resource 
control to personalised agendas—a view succinctly noted by an interviewee who simply gave his 
name as Shine ya eye, during  field conversation: 
Can you imagine the MEND war-horse being hinged on an 
insignificant amnesty programme? I thought MEND 
fought for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta people. 
Everything has suddenly narrowed down to the amnesty 
allocation of agitation. 
The ideological shifts at play behind militia actions are further shown in a media statement 
made by the military commander of the JTF in Niger Delta region. He highlights his experiences by 
describing militancy as an enterprise within various networks and relationships: 
[...] a small but powerful group of individuals within the 
region view the JTF as human-rights abusers and war 
criminals. These allegations are intended to hoodwink the 
federal government to demobilise the JTF, so that they 
can have their way. The reality is that this powerful cartel 
is the group behind the Niger Delta crisis. They employ all 
kinds of smear tactics to achieve their aim. This group is a 
blend of professionals, such as lawyers, journalists, 
businessmen, retired public servants and politicians, and 
non-professionals, such as ex-militants. They are people 
the Niger Delta least suspect could be part of their 
problem. The so-called militant struggle is an enterprise 
masterminded by these powerful individuals and their 
underlings.  (Antigha, 2010). 
 
6.5. MEND:    Exploitation and Opportunity hoarding 
On the other hand, there is recurring evidence of exploitation and opportunity hoarding as 
witnessed by a number of militia foot soldiers, interviewed regarding amnesty implementation for 
militants. At the informal state and individual level are various procedures showing different 
interpretations of events that emphasise differentiation, and the categorisation of needs, aspirations 
and roles. At this level, militia leaders exaggerate the number of their followers, reduce the amount 
meant to be paid to them, or delay payments to members in order to enhance their dependency. 
This was evident from field conversations and interviews with some militia members. For instance, 
Kariowei, a free-lance militant who moves from one militia camp to another, disputes the official 
figure of 26,356 militants across the Niger Delta. Although without a precise number, he maintains 
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the real figure is far less than what the public has been made to believe. His view supports that of 
Otuogidi, another militant, who also questions this figure, revealing how militia leaders can take 
advantage of the amnesty programme for their own selfish interests.   
[…] like in Bayelsa State, I know we are not more than, 
say, twenty camps, but the record they presented is 
about sixty-something camps […] like in my camp we are 
not more than twenty-seven members, but when the 
approval list of amnesty camps came, my boss presented 
150 members. Now also there was a procedure during the 
amnesty, where passport photographs are required, and 
my boss brought in all his relations and friends who are 
not from the barracks (camps). They are not barrack 
boys, so when they cut their money, they cannot 
complain. 
Although Otuogidi’s camp is relatively small compared to other camps of militia leaders, his 
revelation provides a general picture of opportunity hoarding from the processes of reward 
distribution for beneficiaries of the amnesty programme. In addition, Otuogidi doubts if the amnesty 
will work, seeing how militia leaders gain status, recognition and wealth which does not filter down 
the ranks, despite fighting for resource control as claimed. He perceives the amnesty reward 
process as rather heightening violence during the time to come, basing his assertion on shared 
hidden secrets, and the strategy and tactics of militia actions in the creeks. According to Otuogidi: 
[…] most of our leaders now have big cars and big 
buildings, while we are still like that […] so this amnesty 
thing, I do not think it will work. It will not work because 
if, today, I have served you as my boss and I know all your 
secrets, the source of your spiritual power, where you get 
your arms, and I know I have been working for you and 
you are not doing right by me […] we do not benefit at 
all because when the federal government approves 
65,000 naira52 there is an arrangement between our 
Ogas53 and the banks, so they can still cut our money. Out 
of that 65,000 naira, they pay some people 30,00054, 
others 20,000 naira55 or even 15,000 naira56, however 
much they like. 
 
                                                 
52 About £250 pounds. 
53 Militia leaders. 
54 About £120 pounds. 
55 About £76 pounds. 
56 About £58 pounds. 
139 
 
6.6. Competition: Fission of Militias 
The exercise of patronage exchange often triggers disputes between splinter groups and 
social groups, when they compete for social power and material resources  (Devine, 1999). 
According to Devine, the size or number of a group is fundamental to leaders in order to maintain 
power and security; thus, leaders devise strategies to recruit as many followers as possible. Faction 
leaders require power to compete with other similarly organised groups in order to influence or gain 
control over material resources. These ideas explain how militia splinter groups appear in the Niger 
Delta region, where militias compete for territorial space. Based on this author’s experiences as an 
Ijaw and field researcher, there are two ways in which factions are expressed by militants 
themselves.  A faction is normally referred to as a splinter group or groups, with the same 
characteristics, that often compete with each other for territory in order to control some political or 
economic activity in that area. Secondly, members of militant groups are identified by the names of 
leaders and the communities which these leaders influence and control.   
Complementary to the collective actions of militant groups are the individual struggles for 
physical space known as camps. These camps are situated in between communities, and range 
from loosely dispersed to tightly coordinated networks of militia groups, hidden in the swamps or 
creeks of the region. Militant leaders in the Niger Delta region are recognised by the territorial 
spaces they occupy. These spaces are necessary for leaders to label themselves as Generals and 
gain recognition from government and oil companies. More so, the boundaries of these camps are 
often tense, members fight and kill for supremacy, or split in separate ways. Militia leaders that are 
better resourced (guns, money, members) tend to control more governable spaces. This displays 
how humans, as interacting agents, are differently disposed and unequally resourced within the 
boundaries of specific networks  (Crossley, 2002). In this section, using cases of family/community 
and friendship ties this author will illustrate how these splits occur and how militias gain control of 
particular territory. 
6.6.1. Territorial Controls: Family/Community Ties and Proxy Wars 
Individual militias identify with family/community ties in contested territories. These 
communities are mainly oil-bearing and host oil company operations. The idea behind these 
identities is to draw community support in mobilising followers from the immediate community, to 
gain recognition to “represent” the community internally, and to award contracts from oil companies. 
Whether feared or loved, militia leadership for territories are fiercely contested, often putting oil 
communities into positions of constant tension and fear of attack over territorial control. Otuan, a key 
interviewee, points out how these territories are contested through family/community ties, whilst also 
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highlighting how most militia leaders in Bayelsa State were once apprentices to Oporoza in Delta 
State (see Figure 9).  
[…] Shuajo57 left Oporoza for his mother’s community 
to open a camp at Ikebiri. De yong58, also from 
Oporoza, held sway in his community and controlled 
that area, and Fishbone59 had a camp in his community 
area. So it was more of a community or clan-based 
thing, except for Oporoz who controlled more 
communities and extensions. 
Curiously, Otuan repeatedly mentions Oporoza in his interview responses, revealing strong 
and friendly ties between militants at particular times. Oporoza represents a central figure of identity 
amongst militants in the Niger Delta region. His Camp 5 in Delta State appears to be the training 
ground for most militia leaders of today, who were given support from Oporoza, in terms of boats, 
guns and foot soldiers, in opening up camps at their respective communities. However, the opening 
of camps is contested keenly between those coming from the ‘outside’, but who identify themselves 
as belonging to a particular community through parentage, with already existing militia/youths in 
these communities. This gives a picture of “outsider–insider” community battles of either resistance 
or cooperation, where militias that are better resourced gain control of conquered territories, as aptly 
noted by Buluowei, a high-ranking militia commander. According to Buluowei, existing community 
youths who feel oppressed by pipeline contracts awarded to “outsiders” often fight back to chase 
them out. 
At first, communities who have oil wells and pipelines 
were not in charge of the security contracts. They 
later discovered that the money which had been made 
from these oil wells was in the hands of other militant 
leaders that were not from their community. They 
would now find arms to chase out those controlling 
the security contract in their community. 
If one man has about fifty to a hundred guns, he 
immediately opens a camp to fight other camps for a 
security contract. Like Gobos60 and Continent61. 
Continent was the chief security officer in charge of 
the pipelines in Gobos’ community and other 
territories; Gobos had to fight back to take control of 
the pipeline contract in his community. 
                                                 
57 Militia leader in Bayelsa State operating under his own name as territorial identity. 
58 Militia leader. 
59 Militia leader. 
60 Militant leader. 
61 Militant leader. 
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The ability to access resources (guns and money) largely determines the opening of camps 
and in Buluowei’s opinion, militia leaders that are better resourced and connected to other militias or 
political actors control more governable territories. This is irrespective of community support. In 
similar situations, the proximity of camps within the same territories can create problems of 
identifying boundaries of control. Such tightly clustered boundaries induce tensions and power 
tussles over pipeline contracts. Buluowei recalls a case in which Continent and Shuajo, who once 
had friendly ties, later battled for supremacy in order to expand territories.  
When Continent opened his camp at the entrance 
between Korokorosei, Ikiebiri and Ologbobiri, he 
started negotiating with Octopus62 to be given 
security contracts for all the pipelines and wells in that 
territory. While Continent was making his 
connections, Shuajo arrived from Oporoza’s63 camp in 
Delta State and opened a camp immediately at Ikiebiri. 
His camp was called Kurukurubou. Shuajo started 
operating as a camp owner along with Continent in 
the same territory. Again, Isaac64 also came back to his 
community Ogboinbiri to open a camp to rival 
Continent in the same community. 
Buluowei recalls cases of how militants collaborated to oust the supremacy of existing 
leaders in particular communities. Again, we see that members, who are resourced through other 
networks and connections, often return to their own communities to fight for territorial spaces of 
control. 
During that time, Gobos, Gidiboy and Fitpro65 came to 
open a camp, attacking and killing Prince Dogilo to take 
over his territory. The trio of Gobos, Gidiboy and Fitpro 
later had a disagreement over control for supremacy, 
which led to the killing of Fitpro by Gobos, who now 
gained control of all the territories around that area. 
Other instances of splits arising from the ambitions of trusted commanders of militia leaders 
are also mentioned in the course of field interviews with Buluowei. His response highlights the 
fluidity of militia relationships and how disloyalty is spurred on by greed or the frustrations of 
individual members of militia groups in Niger Delta region. It also reveals the patronage received 
from oil companies that also play safe in securing its oil facilities and operations from being 
attacked. Oil companies tend to give recognition and award pipeline surveillance contracts based on 
                                                 
62 An entrepreneur who works with the oil companies. 
63 A militant leader. 
64 A militant leader. 
65 These are all criminal gang leaders who later became militant leaders. 
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the supremacy of militia leaders. This recycles processes that sustain and give significance to 
militancy.  
This struggle started when Lodo was in charge of security 
of all pipelines and wellheads around Soku. Then Dogilo 
was working with him. Then came a time Prince Lodo 
authorised Dogilo to take charge of some areas, since the 
coverage was too vast for Lodo to handle. They divided 
the area into two. After the division, Dogilo became 
arrogant; he no longer respected his master Lodo. They 
both clashed and Dogilo was chased out of the territory. 
Then Dogilo had to relocate to Okigbene, his community 
in Bayelsa State. 
However, despite internal tensions, frustrations and wars amongst militants in the Niger 
Delta region, militias cooperate amongst themselves. This unity and fragmentation can be argued as 
a source of organisational strength and unity of discourse, which presents a common front. For 
instance, Pato, a key activist in the Niger Delta, argues that although militias disagree amongst 
themselves, they often have common concerns which bring them together. 
There were rivalries, but they also had common concerns. 
There were rivalries, there were misunderstandings but I 
think that it also had to come to the point where they 
also have to come together. Some had areas of influence, 
especially areas of bunkering, that they were engaged in. 
The areas of common interest were probably more than 
the areas of division. 
Commander Otuogidi, an active militant, elaborated on these areas of common 
collaboration amongst militants, in terms of mobilising resources, such as food supplies, money and 
logistics, as part of their strategies and tactics.  
Yes, we cooperate from time to time. Like my boss, who 
sometimes goes to Gobos’ camp to collect our salaries, 
fuel, food and other things Gobos was helping our camp. 
Any operation we go to, Gobos is aware of, so whatever 
comes up, he has his own share too. Like our monthly 
allowances which come from Gobos. These allowances 






Otuogidi further explains how militants coordinate and network in building up resources 
from their collective activities/actions in the Niger Delta region.  
The big camps have more soldiers and sophisticated guns, 
which the smaller camps sometimes borrow for their 
field operations. We have some understanding, where 
one camp would kidnap expatriates and transfer them to 
another camp in another location for custody. 
 
6.7. Impact of Militia Action on Community  
Militant leaders, having acquired guns and money, become more daring in establishing 
governance spaces, where they owe no alliance whatsoever to local chiefs. 
[...] militants found out they could do quite a number of 
things without the help of politicians, so they set up their 
own kingdoms, what they call militant camps, where 
whoever is within that enclave is under their authority. 
Even the traditional rulers that operate in those places, 
they intimidate them enough to either put chiefs under 
their power, or set chiefs aside, as being inconsequential, 
ineffective or ineffectual—the chiefs cannot do anything. 
So they do whatever they want. And wherever they are, 
everybody there is intimidated, so scared that you cannot 
complain, you cannot even report them. The best you can 
do is be part of what is going on. 
The above comments bear similarities with those of Otuan and Pato, when asked how the 
actions and activities of militants have impacted on communities in the region. Their responses also 
show how the territorialised spaces of militia have completely dismantled the local community 
structures of authority. According to Otuan, such governable spaces and the presence of the Joint 
Military Task Force reveal an unexpected alliance between militias and the JTF to oppress and hold 
communities hostage. He buttresses his argument by making a comparison between the Oporoza-
led militia actions in Delta State to what is happening in Bayelsa State.  
We felt we were held hostage by both the Joint Military 
Task Force of the Nigerian army and the Ijaw militant 
groups in our communities. If somebody wants to do 
anything in the community, you must first ask permission 
of the militants or militant leaders. So we saw these were 




Our host communities are now slaves to these militant 
leaders, just as the JTF has also enslaved us. They were 
not making any attempt to drive away the JTF, whereas, 
in Delta State, Oporoza drove away all the JTF and closed 
all the flow stations. Here, from Yenagoa waterside, you 
must continue to raise your hand for the JTF to allow you 
to go anywhere. So we now start to ask ourselves, what 
kind of struggle is this? If you are actually there to 
liberate the people, you are not supposed to hold the 
communities hostage as well as allowing the JTF to 
operate freely. 
6.8. Conclusion 
This chapter analyses why and how militancy quickly gained prominence and significance 
within a short period of time and space in the Niger Delta region. This number when viewed from the 
development and emergence of 150 Man militia, initiated by Adaka Boro in 1966 and its significant 
rise to 26,356 militias from 1999 to 2009 (see figure 6.1) clearly, points to spaces of opportunities.  
Prior to 2002/3, the term ‘militant or militancy’ was hardly mentioned or known in the daily 
discuss/vocabulary in Niger Delta region, but for the quick ascendance of militants, who are now 
firmly rooted in mainstream political thinking and action. This phenomenal rise and significance of 
militancy gives a pointer to broader ideas and perspectives of  (a) Homer-Dixon  (1994) that view 
violence from social interaction, material transformation and power relations within specific 
environment, (b) ideas of Tilly (2003) on political opportunity and brokerage which inform the 
success and significance of militants within mainstream political structure of resource governance 
In this chapter, I attempt to pitch the significance of militancy within porous boundaries, 
which reveal processes of social and political transformations in Niger Delta region. These 
boundaries inform the spaces for exchange of resources and values (guns, money, status, 
recognition and wealth) from social interactions between political elites and militant leaders. From 
analyses thus far in this chapter, elections, oil theft and informal payments to militant leaders, 
present the porous boundaries of social relations, which tells how militancy quickly gained 
prominence. They reveal the spaces of opportunities made available from the political culture of elite 
relationships with militants. The relationships, thus induces the processes of social and political 
power transformations of individuals and groups, as evident during elections in the Niger Delta vis-à-
vis Nigeria. Elections, therefore is central and key to understanding how militants quickly gained 
recognition and significance in Niger Delta region. It gives pointer to structure-agency relations that 
is conducive for the success of violent actions of militias, as well as the political culture and context 
for its significance.  
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Accordingly, the violence at elections in Nigeria is arguably informed by a culture of 
resource extraction and governance, learned from the nature of structure and agency relations (see 
chapter 2, section 2.3.2). As a result, elections tend to present a culture of competitive struggles for 
power in order to access and control resource benefits. Therefore, the cultural context of violence at 
elections reveal the social and political processes of transformation. The social and political 
transformation referred herein, is a process of change (through violence) for social and political 
positioning of power to influence, gain recognition, status and access to control resource wealth 
between political elites (structure) and the militants (agency). For this reasons, the cultural context of 
violence at elections in the region is part of the social and political processes of transformation, 
either individually or collectively. Similarly, these processes of transformation, appraise the cultural 
norms and ideas that the militants hold individually or collectively about the role of political actors. In 
order word, the roles played by political elites herein, reflexively generate expectations or reactions 
from militias, which appear to complement each other   in terms of the social and political positioning 
of power and influence to access resource benefits.  
Consequently, the established state of violence at elections alludes to the idea of violence 
as specific site that which reveal social interaction, material transformation and power (Homer-
Dixon, 1994) from the structure-agency relations of a given society. In this particular case, a 
violence that reveals the political culture of institutions (structure), and accounts for the action or 
inactions of militants (agency) that leads to a relationship of interdependence, involving exchange of 
guns, money, tangible and intangible resources, in order to achieve social or political change. 
Furthermore, the porous boundaries of interactions between political elites and militants evident 
herein, tells on the political opportunity and brokerage which Tilly (2003), talks about. The 
boundaries of interactions in terms of oil theft and informal payment of money by state political 
actors to militia leaders, disclose on the one hand, the processes of material transformation in terms 
of money for peace, which is exchanged for increase in oil production and revenues for state 
political actors. On the other hand is the exchange of oil for guns from the complex configuration of 
actors involved in oil theft. These boundaries, create the opportunities for militants to position 
themselves in influencing policy decisions that gives them recognition.  
Finally, what gives significance of militancy, alludes to the statement of Melluci (1996) that 
illustrates “an interactive and shared definition, produced by several individuals and concerned with 
the orientation of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which action takes place” 
p44.  This view coheres with evolution of MEND, although the processes in which MEND emerged 
and evolved, in building coalition, shows they are homogenous or monolithic in some sense. MEND 
represents example of a pseudo community that integrates at certain times as external 
representation of communities by making claims/demands, and fragmenting at other particular times 
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as individual entities competing for resource benefits. However, the fusion only serves as an 
ornamental platform in legitimising militia action.  Therefore, fusion of militias as MEND does not 
necessarily mean a collective, homogenous interest of members, as common platforms only serves 
particular purpose at particular times. Nevertheless, the unity and fragmentation appear to be 
consistent with each other. 
Nevertheless, MEND, represent a collective identity within spaces of opportunities from 
complex layers of varied actors and structures. The actions of MEND inform a framing of ideology 
within unity and fragmentation of its members. As a result of the processes of unity and 
fragmentation, from MEND’s interactions and negotiations with state and non-state actors, as 
demonstrated in the chapter, it failed to sustain its political ideology of self-determination and 
resource control, rather members of these militia groups, achieved a social change of recognition 
and wealth. In sum the analysis of chapter in varied forms of militia action over resource 
entitlements, territoriality and competition, and attempts to illustrate the ways in which claims are 
made, contested and negotiated with state political actors and multinational oil companies. It also 
examined the homogeneity/heterogeneity of militants in terms of what polarises and what unites 
them as MEND. Moreover, I explore the processes through which collective identity of militias are 
constituted in gaining ‘legitimacy’ and significance. . Similarly the perspective of Benford and Snow 
 (2000) which explains how interactions and alignment of events, provide new insight and 
interpretations, and how such events is amplified and transformed into something patterned on, but 












Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 Mineral resource extraction and its structure of governance, is key to understanding 
resistance or violent conflict from individuals or groups. This is particularly so, when such resource is 
located within regions with boundaries set along of community and ethnic identities. Moreover, 
mineral resources, and the politics around it, is important for understanding identity movements, as 
well as, how they evolve in gaining prominence, not just in Nigeria but, in other countries in Africa or 
the global world. In this study, I have attempted to demonstrate how the significance of mineral 
resource (crude oil), triggers a particular kind of armed conflict, within a complex web and 
relationships of actors. It reveals some features or elements that may have similar bearing in other 
resource-endowed countries. Globally, resource rich environments are often prone to conflict  (Ross, 
2004), that  reflect expectations and hope of access to resource benefits; or disappointments, 
frustrations, or feelings of injustice. In other words, mineral resource is in itself, a double edged 
sword  (Maconachie, 2008), given that the structures and processes of resource extraction, cohere 
with dynamics of power that underlie complex configuration of actors  (Unworth, 2010). This 
complex configuration reveals varied interests, from local and community to identity based 
movements - both of which are covered in this thesis.  
In the thesis, I argue that militants in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria did not emerge from 
a spontaneous or frenzied mobilisation, but through a series of historical process of events within 
the structure and culture of resource governance (oil). These episodes of contention are pitched 
within key events such (1) the perception of minority status from communities in the Niger Delta 
region prior the discovery of oil; (2) the ideological battle for self-determination and resource control 
initiated by Adaka Boro’s Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) in 1966; (3) the Kenule Saro Wiwa’s 
Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP); and (4) the Kaiama Declaration by the Ijaw Youth 
Council (IYC). These key historical events laid a platform for identity based armed groups, which 
subsequently metamorphosed into today’s Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND). Interestingly, the violent conflict in Niger Delta region is a highly fluid one, rooted in 
community/ethnic identity (Ijaws or Ogonis), in which militia movements have emerged. This fluidity 
enables individuals and groups to hide behind community agitation, frustration or perception of 
injustice, to carry out violent acts, whether rightly or wrongly, formally or informally, against the 




As a result, militias in Niger Delta region can be seen as identity movements, in the sense 
that they are localised, neatly fused and rooted in communities across the Niger Delta. Hence the 
violent groups are not militias in a classic sense of the word, but armed groups that are rooted in 
communities and cultural norms, where the boundaries between been youth and militia is not that 
clear; where being a community member and an accomplice for criminal activity is also not clear 
because these are all tied to a constructed identity. Identity here, implies imagined or concrete 
communities  (Polletta and Jasper, 2001), shared construction of meanings which are layered on 
and impact on pre-existing ties, interest or territorial boundaries. In addition, the meaning of 
militancy is not straightforward since it is a socially constructed phenomenon, with internal fluid 
leadership and dynamic structures based on community or friendship ties or on one’s ability to 
network with other militias, political actors and actors of multinational oil companies. Thus, the 
trajectory of militancy in Niger Delta region is one that operates within networks and community 
identity, where it becomes difficult to separate ‘genuine militants’ from ‘criminals’. Furthermore, the 
motivation for being a militia is not driven by the ideological notion of ‘self-determination and 
resource control’, but by the prospect of economic benefits and the ambition of militant leaders to 
gain status, recognition by access to oil wealth. In addition, militias in Niger Delta appear to seek 
social change by violently engaging the Nigerian state and oil companies in ways that create 
opportunities to improve their quality of life, individually or collectively. At the political ‘front-stage’, 
‘militants use the ‘freedom fighting or emancipation’ label and notion of self-determination’ to 
legitimise action, a process that eventually paves the way for the social change they seek to 
achieve. 
Consequently, the Niger Delta conflict is a response to the political structure and cultural 
transformations of resource governance, articulated around the formation of specific identities. The 
fluid platforms in which militants in Niger Delta engage in challenging the legitimacy and authority of 
the State and multinationals, to gain prominence and significance, offers insights to the sociological 
dynamics of governance and resource extraction for countries with similar experiences. What is of 
particular interest is when – as this thesis shows - relatively small local based armed groups gain 
recognition within the political structure of governance by scaling up their activities. Accordingly, 
militias in Niger Delta region, offer three main insights on the significance of militancy as an identity 
based movements; namely: (1) the significance of collective identity/agency; (2) opportunism; and  




7.2. Understanding Militancy as Collective Agency/Identity  
The concept of collective identity is seen as an effective tool and strategy of militias in the 
Niger Delta region.  Resources and opportunities alone do not necessarily provide explanation for 
the success and significance of militants in the Niger Delta region. The collective identity of militias 
play a part in its strength to bargain or negotiate with external agents such as the state, oil 
companies and the Joint Military Task Force (JTF). Identity implies, individuals or groups have the 
ability and knowledge to act independently or collectively.  Individuals as agents can create plausible 
grounds as justification for challenging institutions.  By definition, collective identity entails solidarity 
amongst  groups of individuals having commonly shared meanings, opinions or beliefs  (Touraine, 
1985; Tilly et al., 2001); or the shared definition of a given situation, that is produced by individuals 
or groups at different levels of interaction  (Melucci, 1995). As a process, collective identity, informs 
the internal dynamics, motivation or goals of a group  (Gamson, 1982; Hunt and Benford, 1994; 
Polletta and Jasper, 2001). They inform cultural meanings and how these are created and 
transformed into action. Indeed, repeated interactions in identity construction reveal the dynamic 
processes in which actors understand and negotiate their actions. Therefore, it involves a mental 
judgement about ends, means and the field of action  (Fominava, 2010).           
A number of key historical context of events underpinned the cohesion of identity 
movements across the Niger Delta region. These identities hinge on the localised presence of crude 
oil and political structure of resource governance, which induced expectations and common 
interpretation of meanings amongst individuals and groups in the region. Firstly, the feeling of 
domination and oppression from external political structures of governance, created a sense of 
solidarity and identity amongst ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This sense of 
identity was evident from the early quests of minorities for regional autonomy, and the struggles for 
political power amongst the ethnic nationalities of Nigeria, which established the boundaries of 
majority–minority ethnic identities. These events, with a localised awareness of the value of the 
discovery of oil, facilitated the first militia action in 1966.  
A second significant factor which facilitated the emergence of militancy as a collective 
agency, and the particular form in which it appeared, was charismatic leadership. The emergence of 
the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), led by Adaka Boro, induced a united platform and 
dominant discourse for both militants and non-militants across the Ogoni and Ijaw communities in 
the Niger Delta. The actions of Boro defined the framing of events in such a way that they became 
the basis for similar patterns of recognised activities  (Goffman, 1974) - in this particular case, the 
framing of structural conditions of injustice and a shared belief to incite collective action with 
repeated forms of claim making and recognition.  
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The actions of Boro show how events can be modified and interpreted within existing ideas 
and beliefs of individuals/groups  (Benford and Snow, 2000). 
A third feature that contributed to the emergence of militancy in the Niger Delta region was 
the role of the state. The militarisation of the region was a threat that heightened tensions and 
violent conflict which, when viewed from a sociological perspective, can be described as an arena of 
contested entitlements  (Nauman, 1996), a theatre of struggles, where the politics of recognition 
were played out. In this particular case, it was a conflict that required the government to adjudicate 
how the protests of the Ogonis and Ijaws shaped particular forms of identity and collective action. 
These collective actions also informed how knowledge of a particular environment was shared 
reflexively, within sets of constructed meanings. This partly demonstrates the political opportunities 
or constraints available for the success or failure of movements, and state capacity for repression. 
These coupled with political transformations in terms of legislative laws of resource extraction, which 
strengthened state power and authority, helped trigger the current violent conflict in the Niger Delta 
region.  
In sum, the repressive nature of response by the Nigerian state against protest tends to 
rather strengthen a belief and collective platform for individuals and groups in the Niger Delta region. 
The construction of collective identities was evident in the Ogoni uprising and conscious awakening 
of Ijaw youths (see chapter 4) who began mobilising against perceived oppression and repression, 
first by a non-violent approach through seizing oil platforms; and then resorting to arms – a move 
which led to a proliferation of groups. Events such as Operation Climate change and ‘Ogele 
procession ‘(also see chapter 4), nurtured a collective identity of Ijaws that triggered collective action 
of militants in the region. These mobilisations subsequently metamorphosed to the widely known 
Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND). Thus, the trajectory of collective identity of 
today’s militia’s movement’s hinges on the historical processes and context of resource extraction, 
which is seen as dispossessing the rights of ownership and participation of Ijaws and Ogoni’s.  
Furthermore, these forms of identity struggles show the increasing power of individuals or 
groups within the social and political environment of the Niger Delta. In addition, the Ogoni uprising 
and Kaiama Declaration also informed the cultural meanings in which the lives of individuals and 
groups intersect with macro political transformations and contention over resource benefits. 
Nevertheless, identity is only established when individual lived experience intersects with the 
collective. Examples include the shared experience or knowledge by unemployed and uneducated 
youths who became ‘militants’; or of course, Adaka Boro who was once a teacher and policeman but 




Culturally, the identity formation of Ogoni’s and Ijaws informs the unified platform that 
rallied around issues of sustainable environment and the abrogation of laws which constrain rights to 
participation. In addition, the conscious awakening and identity formations in the Niger Delta region 
broadly informs an understanding of collective violence  (Tilly, 2003), in which individuals/groups 
goals or beliefs are based on knowledge from their environment.  
7.3. Understanding ‘Spaces’ of Opportunity 
Movements do not exist in a political vacuum, but emerge and act in accordance to the 
nature and culture of a given political system or environment. They operate within formal and 
informal structures that provide both incentive or disincentive for mobilisation   (Wald et al., 2005; 
Evers, 1985). Consequently, the space for militia interaction is key to understanding their success. 
These spaces are anchored in relations of power and militia position themselves between different 
actors. In this thesis, I identified three spaces for interaction, which serve as platforms for social and 
political transformation and which directly or indirectly reinforce and sustain conflict in the Niger 
Delta region. These are (1) Elections (2) Oil theft / ‘bunkering’ and (3) Informal Payment of Money to 
Militants by state political actors.  
The transition from prolonged years of military rule to civil democracy (1966 -1999), appears 
to have created the leverage and opportunity for an increase in the number of militants from around 
150 in 1966 to current official figure of 26, 356 militias in 2009 (see chapter six). Elections and 
electoral politics play a key role in understanding this growth. Elections in Nigeria and the Niger 
Delta region in particular, are seen as means to an end. Winning elections into political office in the 
region, gives political power to directly access and control resource benefits.  As a result, elections 
inform an established intersubjective state of violence within forms of patronage, in terms of 
exchange of guns and money for votes. This exchange further positions ‘militants’ in terms of 
achieving their desired social change (status, recognition, wealth). Hence, elections tends to serve a 
dual purpose, on the one hand, they give political power to politicians to directly access oil wealth, 
on the other, the strengthen the bargaining power of militias to indirectly improve the quality of their 
livelihoods individually or collectively.  
However, the positioning of militants within the spaces of interactions with state and non-
state political actors had a direct impact on the macro political structures of governance in Nigeria. It 
induced a shift of political power within the geo-political structure of Nigeria. The actions of militants 
in the Niger Delta region introduced a recognition of ethnic minorities, especially for the Ijaws. This is 
reflected in the role of militants (see chapter six) in President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan’s 
ascendancy as Nigeria’s first ethnic minority President from the South-South, geo-political zone of 
the country. A second feature that gives prominence and significance to militants is oil theft.  
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Oil provides quick money as well as a source of funding for individuals seeking political 
authority. The clandestine network of oil theft involves a highly complex configuration of actors. As 
evident in this study, oil theft involves a network of multinational oil companies, politicians, military 
elites, and local youths/ militias. This configuration partly informs how militants are resourced in 
terms of their capacity to mobilise guns and ammunition. Oil theft accounts for the informal diversion 
of oil wealth into the private pockets of individuals in Nigeria. These informal structures impact 
heavily on the nature of political power transformation in the country.  
A third factor which gives significance to militancy is the informal payments made by 
state Governors to militant leaders in the Niger Delta region (see chapter six). This informal 
structure of relationship is seen to legitimise and sustain the actions of militias in the region. For 
political actors, such transactions help secure their positions of political power. These 
transactions, which can also be viewed as an exchange of ‘money for peace’, are closely 
monitored and controlled.  As illustrated in chapter six, the porous boundaries between militant 
leaders and politicians, helps facilitate spaces for interactions.  
7.4. Understanding principles of fission and fusion: Territoriality 
  In this thesis, I used the idea of fission and fusion (Evans Pritchard 1940) to describe the 
dynamics of relations within the militia. Thus, militant leaders of various groups trace their identity to 
a particular community in order to mobilise support from the community against external threats, 
usually other militant leaders. Accordingly, militant leaders recognise the need to strengthen family 
and community ties in order to protect their territory against more distant community members of 
other militant groups. The protection of territories is vital and necessary for militant leaders to gain 
recognition, and be awarded pipeline surveillance contracts from multinational oil companies or the 
Nigerian state. The control of territories engenders fierce battles among militia groups (see chapter 
six) 
However, when militia groups face common threats from externals (the Joint Task Force 
(JTF) of the Nigerian state or multinational oil companies), competition for territorial spaces of 
control is abandoned and coalitions are built to confront these external threats. In this sense, 
militants are not a homogenous or monolithic entity and they do not belong to any single group. 
However they will come together in order to deal with external threats. In coming together, they often 
turn to the ideological notion of ‘self-determination and resource control as a collective unifying 
motif. The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), represents a good case of this in 
that various known and unknown militia groups united under a common platform in order to show 
strength to a common threat. Militant groups therefore ‘antagonistically cooperate’ with each other, 




  The porous boundaries of interactions and relationships are key and fundamental to 
understanding how violent movements are resourced and mobilised. This informal arrangements 
gives insight to success of violent conflict and how such arrangements are sustained by state and 
non-state actors. Indeed, the resource context which individuals or groups intersubjectively construct 
meanings to justify violent action against state authority or perceived enemies, reveals processes of 
social change and material transformation. In the case of the Niger Delta region, the positioning of 
power appears to have established a subjective state of violence, whereby violence is seen as 
means to an end. Consequently, violence informs part of the socio-political processes of 
transformation in the society. The successful use of violence leads not just to resource access but 
also to social honour in terms of status and recognition. Whilst the presence of mineral resources 
can, create meanings, around which identities are mobilised to induce collective action, as illustrated 
by the Ijaw struggle, success of violent social movements depends mainly on spaces of interactions 
and relationships made available by the political culture of a given society, not identity. Identity only 
serve as platform to legitimise action, as it cannot succeed without being resourced; guns, money 
and membership which require strong links to the structures of political power. A key element of the 
finding, is the fluidity of the boundaries where militias can easy move to become elected into political 
office and where community youth can easy become militia leaders. This easy transition becomes 
key to understanding the significance of militancy. Beside the issue of identity of these militias that is 
problematic, the fact political actors and other non-state are also embroiled in patronage exchange 
of gun, money oil theft and votes, within an established state of violence in the region, opens the 
space for militancy to recur.    
 
Empirical /Conceptual contribution of this thesis 
 
1. Bringing the voice of militants who are key actors to understanding the conflict and governance 
of resources in the Niger Delta region and demonstrating how macro structure political structure 
of resource governance impact differently of individuals and groups, from a bottom up approach 
 
2. Adopting New Social Movement (NSM) approach from a critical lens that focuses on Identity, 
and beliefs and how these are tied to mobilisation, articulation and contestation in the struggles 
for power and access to resource benefit. The identity within context of this research, is one 
that is fluid and mobilises, thus enabling members to use different identities in different 





3. It comes against the greed not grievance debate, by showing that the violence and criminality is 
very much embedded within dominant interest from the process of political culture and structure 
of resource governance in Nigeria vis-à-vis Niger Delta. Thus, the greed-grievance informs a 
recursive social order and disorder that sustains the violence and significance of militancy. And 
this are clearly demonstrated in my empirical chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this thesis.   
 
4. The research adds to the existing literature on relations of power and distribution of natural 
resource. This is particularly so as my research demonstrates that the distribution of resources 



















Adebayo, A. G., 1988. “Revenue allocation: A historical analysis of the Nigerian experience” In: 
Olaniyan, R. O. (ed). Federalism in a changing world. Office of the Minister of Special Duties, The 
Presidency. Lagos. 
 
Adger, N., Brown, K.A. & Tompkin, L., 2005. The political economy of cross-scale networks in resource 
co-management. Ecology and Society, 10(2). pp, 1-14. 
 
Agbu, O., 2004. Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy in post-transition Nigeria. Research report 
No. 127. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
 
Aka, E., O., 1995. Regional inequalities in the process of Nigeria's development: Socio-political and 
administrative perspective. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 10(2), pp. 61-80. 
 
Ake , C., 1985. Political Economy of Nigeria. London, Longman. 
 
Anikpo, M., 1991. State formations in precolonial Africa, analysis of long distance trade and surplus 
accumulation in South Eastern Nigeria. Port Harcourt, Pam Unique. 
 
Anikpo, M., 1996. Hegemonic legacies: Issues in the sociology of Nigeria's underdevelopment. Port 
Harcourt, Uniport Press. 
 
Ako, R., 2011. The Struggle for Resource Control and Violence in the Niger Delta. In: C. Obi & S.A. 
Rustad, eds. Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the complex politics of petro-violence. 
London: New York: Zed Books pp 42-54. 
 
Antigha, T., 2010. Understanding the Joint Task Force: Guest Columist, This Day Newspaper, 25-26th 
December, 2010. 
 
Arato, A. & Cohen, J., 1984. The German Green Party: A movement between fundamentalism  and 
modernism. Dissent, 31(3), pp. 327-32. 
 





Auyero, J., 2003. Contentious lives: Two argentine women, two protest and the quest for recognition. 
Durham, Duke University Press. 
 
Auyero, J., 2008. Patronage and contention. Contention, Change, and Explanation: A Conference in 
Honor of Charles Tilly. The Social Science Research Council, New York. 
 
Awe, B., 1999. Conflict and Divergence:Government and society. African Studies Review, 42(03), pp.1-
20. 
 
Ayakoroma, B. F., 2010. From Boroism to ethnic nationalism and Militancy in the Niger Delta. Towards 
a cultural agenda for the Izon Nation. Abuja, National Institute for Cultural Orientation. 
 
Bailey, F.G., 2001. Strategems and spoils: A  social anthropology of politics.  Boulder, Westview Press. 
 
Barkan, D., Gboyega, A. & Stevens, M., 2001. State and local governance in Nigeria. Public sector and 
capacity building program. Africa Region, The World Bank. 
 
Barkan, S., 1979. Strategic, tactical and organisational dilemmasin the protest of movements against 
nuclear protest. Sociological Problems, 27(1), pp. 19-37. 
 
Barkun, M., 1997. Religion and the racist rights. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Benford, R., D, & Snow, D., A,, 2000. Framing process and social movement: an overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26(2000), pp. 611-639. 
 
Berg, B., L, 2004. Qualitative Research Methods. Boston, Allyn & Bacon. 
 
Blumer, H., 1962. Society as symbolic interaction,. In: Rose, M. A., ed. Human behaviour and social 
processes. London, Routledge. 
 
Boas, M., 2012. MEND: The Nature of an Insurgency. http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/11/mend-the-
nature-of-an-insurgency/. [Acessed 5/9/2015] 
 
Boro, I. A., 1982. The Twelve-Day Revolution.  Benin, Idodo Umeh Publishers. 
 




Breiger, L., Ronald, 2004. The analysis of social network. In: Hardy, M.  & Bryman, A., eds.  Handbook 
of Data Analysis. London, Sage Publications. pp .505-526. 
 
Bryman, A., 2008. Quantity and quality in social research. London, Routledge:  
 
Buechler, S. M., 1995. New social movement theories. Sociological Quarterly, 36(3), pp. 441-464. 
 
Buechler, S., M, 2000. Social movements in advanced capitalism: The political economy and cultural 
construction of social activism.  Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Calhoum, C., 2002. Symbolic capital: Dictionary of social sciences. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Castells, M., 1997. The power of identity. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Clifford, J., 1983. On ethnographic authority. Representations, 2,(1), pp. 118-146. 
 
Collier, P., 2000. Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminality Activity. Conflct Resolution, 44(6), pp. 839-53. 
 
Collier, P., Hoeffler , A. & Rohner, D., 2006. Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War. 
. Centre for Study of African Economies, : Department of Economics, University of Oxford 
pp. 1-22. 
 
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A., 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), pp. 
563-595. 
 
Collier, P., 2007. The Bottom Billion.: Oxford University Press, USA. 
 
Coulthard, C., Carmen, R. & Ladem, R., 2007. Identity trouble. New York, Palgrave Macmillian. 
 
Courson, E., 2011. MEND: Political marginalisation, repression and petro-insurgency in the Niger Delta 
African Security, 4(1), pp. 20-43. 
 
Courson, E., 2009. Movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND): Political marginalisation, 
repression and petro-insurgerncy in the Niger Delta. Discussion Paper 47. The Nordic African Institute. 
 




Cuvelier, J., Vlassenroot, K. & Olin, N., 2014. Resources, conflict and governance: A critical review. The 
Extractive Industries and Society, 1(2), pp. 340-350. 
 
De Koster, K., Devise, I., Flament, I. & Loots, G., 2004. Two practices, one perspective, many 
constructs: on the implications of social constuctionism on scientific research and therapy. Brief 
Strategic and Systemic Therapy European Review, 1(1), pp. 1-7. 
 
Devine, J., 1999. One foot in each boat: The micro politics and micro sociology of NGO's in 
Bangladesh. PhD Thesis, Universty of Bath, United Kingdom. 
 
Diani, M., 1992. The concept of social movement. The Sociological Review, 40(1), pp.1-25. 
 
Dinerstein, A.C., 2010. Autonomy in Latin America: Between resistance and integration . Echoes from 
piqueteros experience. Community Development Journal, 3(45), pp. 356-366. 
 
Emeseh, E., 2011. The Niger Delta crisis and question of acesss to justice. In: C. Obi & S. Aas Rustad, 
eds. Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the complex politics of petro-violence. London: 
Zed books, pp. 55-70. 
 
 
Dode, O.R., 2005. Fiscal Federalism and Social Conflicts. Journal of the Centre for Ethnic and Conflicts 
Studies, 1(2), pp. 116-127. 
 
Du Plooy, G. M., 2001. Communication research techniques: Methods and applications. Cape Town, 
Juta. 
 
Duncombe, J. & Jessop, J., 2002. Doing rapport and ethics of "faking frienship". In: Mauthner, M., Birch, 
M., Jessop, J.. & Miller, T., eds. Ethics in qualitative research. London, Sage Publications. 
 
Efemini, A., 2005. Managing Conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. CASS Newsletter, Port 
Harcourt, Vol No 1. 
 
Ejobowah, B., J, 2001. Africa Today. Africa Today, Book Reviews. 
 
Ennis, J., 1987. Fields of action: Structure in movements, tactical repertoires. Sociology Forum, 2(3),pp. 
520-533. 




Epstein, B., 1991. Political protest and cultural revolution. Berkeley, University of California Press.  
 
Evans-Pritchard, E., E., 1940. The Nuer: A description of modes of livelihood and political institutions of 
Nilotic people. London, Oxford Clarendon Press. 
 
Evers, T., 1985. Identity: the hidden side of social movements in Latin America. In: Slater, D. ed. New 
Social movements and the state in Latin America. Amsterdam, CEDLA. 
 
Fearon, J.D. & Laitin, D.D., 1996. Explaining interethnic cooperation. American Political Science 
Review, 90(4), pp. 715-735. 
 
Finlay, L., 2003. The reflexive journey: Mapping multiple routes, In: Finlay, L. & Gough, B. eds. 
Reflexivity: a practical guide for researchers in health and social sciences. Oxford, Blackwell 
Sciences.pp. 3-20. 
 
Fominava, F. C., 2010. Collective identity in social movements: Central concpets and debates. 
Sociology Compass, 4(6), pp. 393-404. 
 
Freilich, J. D., Almanzar, N. A. P., & Rivera, C. J.  1999. how social movements organisations explicitly 
or implicitly promote deviant behavour: The case of the militia movement. Justice Quarterly, 16(3), pp. 
655-683. 
 
Freud, S., 1927. The future of an illusion. New York, Penguin. 
 
Frynas, J.G., 2000. Oil in Nigeria : Conflict and litigation between oil communities. Hamburg, Lit Verlag. 
 
Gamson, W., 1992. The Social Psychology of Collective Action. In: Morris, D, A., & Mueller, C. eds. 
Frontiers of social movement theory. New Havan, Yale University Press. 
 
Gamson, W., 1995. Constructing Social Protest. In: Johnston, H. & Klandermans, B. eds. Social 
movement and culture. Minneapolis, Minneapolis University Press. 
 





Geertz, C., 1983. Local Knowledge: Further essay in interpretive anothropology. New York, Basic 
books. 
 
Gluck, S., Berger & Patai, D., 1991. Women's word's the feminist practice of oral history. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Goffman, E., 1959. Presentation of self in everyday life. New York, Doubleday Anchor Books,  
 
Goffman, E., 1974. Frame analysis: An essay on the organisation of experience. New York: Harper and 
Row. 
 
Gore, C. & Pratten, D., 2003. The politics of plunder: The rhetorics of order and disorder in southern 
Nigeria. African Affairs, 102(102), pp. 211-240. 
 
Guba, E., Lincoln, Y. & . 1998. Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. In: Denzin, N. & Lincoln, 
Y. eds.  The landscape of qualitative research: Theories and issues. London, Thousand Oaks, Sage 
Publications. 
 
Guichaoua, Y., 2009. Oil and Political Violence in Nigeria. Online: 
http://www.academia.edu/347995/Oil_and_Political_Violence_in_Nigeria.  [Accessed 22/8/2011]. 
 
Guigni, M., 1999. How social movements matter: Past research, present problems, future development. 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Gusfield, J., 1994a. The reflexivity of social movements: Collective behaviour and mass society theory 
revisited. In: Larana, H., Johnson, J., & Gusfield, R. eds. New social movement: From ideology to 
identity. Philadephia, Philadephia Temple University Press. 
 
Hammersley, M. & Atkinson, P., 1983. Ethnograhpy: Prinicples in practice London, Tavistock. 
 
Homer-Dixon, F.T., 1994. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflicts: Evidences from Cases. 
International Security, 19 (1), pp. 5-40. 
 
Honneth, A., 1996. The Struggle for recognition. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 




Huizing, A., 2007. The value of a rose: Rising above objectivism and subjectivism. Elsevior Ltd. 
Human Rights Watch, 2005. Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria, Rivers State; A Human 
Rights Watch Briefing paper. http//htw.org/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0205/ 
Humboldt, V, A., 2008. Reflexive Methodology: A lecture series on doing post-positivist research. 
University of Nijmegen, Netherlands. 
Hunt, S, A, & Benford, R. D., 1994. Identity talk in the peace and justice movement. Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography, 22(22), pp. 488-517. 
 
Hutchison, E., 2012. Spirituality, religion and progressive social movements: Resources and motivation 
for social change. Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Social Work: Social Thought,  31(1-2), pp. 105-
127. 
 
Langer, A., & Brown, G., 2012. Conflict, post conflict and state fragility: Conceptual and methodological 
issues. In: Langer, A., & Brown, G. eds. Edgar handbook of civil war and fragile states. Chelterham, 
Edward Edgar. pp. 1-15. 
 
Ibeanu, O., 2002. Petro-business and petro politics in the Niger Delta. Review of African Political 
Economy, (21)91, pp. 163-167. 
 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS)., 2010. An upside down view of governance. Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex. 
 
Ikein, A., 2003. Socio-economic and environmental challenges and the quest for sustainable 
development in Nigeria's oil rich Niger Delta: A Commentary. Journal of Sustainable Development in 
Africa, 6(1), pp.1-16. 
 
Ikporukpo, O.C., 2004. Petroluem,fiscal federalism, and environmental justice in Nigeria. Space and 
Polity, 8(3), pp. 321-354. 
Isumonah, V. Adefemi/Tantua, Ben/James, Nengi 2005.'The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in Bayelsa State.' In: Ibeanu, Okechukwu and Fatima Kyari Mohammed (eds.) Oiling 
Violence: The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta. Lagos: Frankad 
Publishers 2005, pp.57-100 
162 
 
Jacoby, T., 2008. Understanding conflict and violence: Theoretical and interdisciplinary approaches.  
London, Routledge. 
 
Jerome, A. 2005. Managing oil rent for sustainable development and poeverty reduction in Africa. UNU-
WIDER Jubilee Conference. The Future of Development Economics. Helsinki. 
 
Kaiama Declaration, 1998. Ijaw youths of the Niger Delta. Kaiama, Bayelsa State. 
 
Kapucinski, R., 1982. The shah of shahs. New York, Vintage.  
 
Key, P. J., 1997. Research design in occupational education. Occupational education. Oklahoma State 
University. 
 
Kaldor, M., 2013. New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in Global Era. Cambridge Press. 
 
Kilgour, E.,2002. Shells Impact in the Niger Delta.  
Online ibrarian.net/.../Shell_s_Impact_in_the_Niger_Delta_Eileen_Kilgour.pdf. [Accessed: 23rd April 
2009). 
 
Kitschelt, H., 1993. Social Movements, political parties and democratic theory. Political Studies, 528(1), 
pp. 13-29. 
 
Klandermans, B., 1997. The social psychology of portest. Cambridge, Blackwell. 
 
Klandermans, B. & Oegema, D., 1987. Potentials, networks, motivation and barriers: Steps toward 
participation in social movement. American Sociological Review, 52(52), pp. 519-31. 
 
Knorr-Cetina, K., 1981. The micro-sociological challenge of macro sociological. In: Long, N., & Long, A.  
ed. Battlefield of Knowledge. London, Routledge.  
 
Krueger, B., Alan, & Maleckova, J., 2002. Education, Poverty, Violence and Terrorism: Is there a causal 
connection?. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper 9074. 
Massachusetts. 
 





Laing, R.D., Philipson, H. & Lee, A.R., 1966. Interpersonal perception: A theory and method research. 
London, Tavistock Publications. 
 
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M., 1980. Metaphor we live by. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M., 1999. Philosophy in the flesh.  New York, Basic Books. 
Lane, S., Sawaia, B., Wiesenfeld, E. & Sánchez, E., 1995. La psicología social comunitaria en Brasil. 
Psicología social comunitaria: contribuciones latinoamericanas, pp. 69-115. 
 
Langone, M., D,, 1993. Recovery from Cult: Help for victims of psychological and spiritual abuse. New 
York, W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
Lee, D. & Newby, H., 1983. The problem of sociology: An introduction to the discipline. London, Unwin 
Hyman. 
 
Le Billion, P., 2005. Fueling War: Narural Resources and Armed Conflict.  International Institute for 
Strategic Studies , Abingdon,: Routledge. 
 
Levin, D.M., 1988. The opening of vision: Nihilism and the postmodern situation. London, Routledge. 
 
Leydesdorff, S., Passerini, L. & Thompson, P., 1996. Gneder and memory. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Lichterman, P., 1999. Talking Identity in the public sphere: Broad visions and small spaces in sextual 
identity politics. Theory and Society., 28(1), pp. 101-41. 
 
Limpanitgut, T., 2009. Methodological considerations in quantitative study: Examining the relationship 
between job attitude and citizens behaviour.  Paper presented at the 18th Summer Academy European 
Doctoral Programmes Association in Management and Business Administration (EDAMBA), Soreze, 
France. 
 
Long, N. & Long, A., 1992. Battlefields of knowledge: The interlocking of theory and practice in social 
research and development. London, Routledge. 
 
Maanen, V., 1983. Qualitative Methodology. Bevery Hills, Sage Publication. 
Maconachie, R., 2008. Diamonds, governance and local development in post-conflict Serra Leone: 




Madden, R., 2011. Being Ethnographic.  London, Sage Publications. 
 
Malinowki, B., 1922. Argonauts of the western Pacific. London, Routledge. 
 
Manning, P., 1992. Erving Goffman and modern sociology. Standford, Standford University Press.  
 
Mason, T. & Fett, P., 1996. How civil wars end: A rational choice approach . Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 40(4), pp. 546-568. 
 
Mattewman, S., Lane West-Newman, C. & Curtis, B., 2007. Being Sociological.  London, Palgrave 
Macmilian. 
 
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J., D, & Zald, M., N., 1988. Social movements In: Smelser, J, N. ed. Handbook 
of Sociology. Newbury Park, Sage publications. 
 
McAdam, D. & Snow, D., A,, 1997. Social movements: Reading on their emergence, mobilisation and 
dynamics. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. & Tilly, C., 2008. Dynamics of contention.  Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
McCarthy, J. & Zald, M., N., 1977. Resource mobilisation: A partial theory. American Journal of 
Sociology, 82(6), pp. 1212-1241. 
 
Melucci, A., 1989. Nomads of the present : Social movements and individual needs in comtemporary 
society. London, Hutchinson Radius. 
 
Melucci, A., 1995. The process of collective identity: In Johnson, H., & Klandermans, B. (ed). Social 
Movement and Culture. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Melucci, A., 1996a. Challenging Codes. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 





Moore, K., 1999. Political protest and institutional change. In: Guigni, M., MCAdam, D., & Tilly, C. eds. 
How social movements matter. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Moore, M., Schmitz, H. & Unsworth, S., 2009. assuring our common future in a globalised world: The 
global context of conflict and state fragility”. DFID background paper for the 2009 White Paper “Securing 
our Common Future”. 
 
Morris, A. & Staggenborg, S., 2002. Leadership in social movements. Online: 
www.sociology.northwestern.edu. (Accessed: 24/4/ 2009). 
 
Morris, W., M,, Leung, K., Ames, D. & Lickel, B., 1999. Views from the inside and outside: Intergating 
Emic and Etic insights about culture and justice judgment. Academy of Management, 24(4), pp. 701-
796. 
 
Mueller, C., McClurg, 1992. Building Social Movements. In: Aldon M., & McClurg, C. eds. Frontiers in 
social movements. New Haven, Yale University Press 
Muhammad, A., 2007. Federalism and political stability in Nigeria: Current peril and future hopes. 
Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 9(4), pp. 187-210. 
 
Nauman, N., 1996. Rethinking security, rethinking development. Islamabad, Sustainable Development 
Policy Institution. 
 
Ndehfru, J., 2009. Federalism, resource control and the Niger Delta question. Nigeria Journal of Oil and 
Politics, 2(2). pp.39-52.  
 
Nelson, C., Treichler, P., A, & Grossberg, L., 1992. Cultural studies: An introduction. In: Grossberg, L. 
ed. Cultural Studies. New York, Routledge.  
 
Nnoli, O., 1978. Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishers. 
 
Obi, C., 2001. Global,State,and Local Intersections,Power, Authority and Conflicts in the Niger Delta Oil 
Communities. In: Callaghy, T.M., Kassimir, R. & Latham, R. eds. Intervention and transnationalism in 
Africa: Global-local netwoks of Power. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Obi, C., 2008. Nigeria's Niger Delta: Understanding the complex drivers of conflict. Lecture series on 




Odukoya, A., O, 2006. Oil and sustainable development: A case study of the Niger Delta. Human 
Ecology, 20(4), pp. 249-258. 
 
Offe, C., 1985. New social movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutional Politics. Social 
Research, 54(4), pp. 817-868. 
 
Ogon, P., 2006. Land and forest resource use in the Niger Delta: Issues of regulation and sustainable 
management.Online:www.globetrotter.berkeley.edu/bwep/greengovernance/papers/Ogon2006.pdf 
[Accessed 10/31/2006]. 
Ojie, A. & Okaba, B., 2005. Ethnicity, democracy and African development crisis. Journal of the Centre 
for Ethnic and Conflicts Studies, 1(2), pp. pp 52-67. 
 
Okoko, K., 1996. Revenue allocation and the oil producing states in Nigeria. Owerri, Springfield. 
 
Okowa, W., 2000. Oil and Corruption. Port Harcourt, Page Publishers. 
 
Okowa, W., J, 1989. A critical appraisal of National Development Plans and Policies since 
independence. Port Harcourt. 
 
Okowa , W., J, 1994. Oil, systemic corruption, adbulistic capitalism and Nigerian development policy: A 
political economy. Port Harcourt, Pam Unique Publication. 
 
OKowa , W., J, 2005. Oil, babylonian matthewnomics and Nigerian Development.  Port Harcourt, 
University of Port Harcourt Press. 
 
Olofsson, G., 1988. After working-class movements? An essay on whats new in social movements. 
Acta, 31(1), pp. 15-34. 
 
Omeje, K., 2005. Oil,conflicts in Nigeria:Contending issues and perspectives of the local Niger Delta 
Issue. New Political Economy,10(3), pp. 321-334 
 
Omeje, K., 2006. Petrobusiness and security threats in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Current  Sociology, 
54(3),pp. 477-499. 
 
Omotola, J., Shola, 2010. Liberation movements and rising violence in the Niger Delta. Studies in 




Orogun, S., Paul., 2003. Plunder, predation and profiteering: The political economy of armed conflict 
and economic violence in modern Africa. Global Development and Technology, 2(2),pp. 283-313. 
 
Oronto, D., Okonta, O., Dimieari, V.K. & Watts, M., 2004. Oil and Militancy in the Niger Delta: Terrorist 
Threat or Another Colombia.  Niger Delta Economies of Violence Working Paper No 4. 
 
Orubu, O., C, and, Odusola, A. & Ehwarieme, W., 2004. The Nigeria oil industry:Environmental 
diseconomies, management strategies and the need for community involvement. Human Ecology, 
16(3)203-214. 
 
Osaghae, E., E, 1994. Ethnicity in Africa or African ethnicity: The search for a contextual understanding. 
London, James Currey Ltd. 
 
Osaghae, E., Eghosa., 1991. Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in Nigeria. African Affairs, 90(359),pp. 
237-258. 
 
Osaghae, E., Ikelegbe, A., Olarinmoye, O. & Okhonmina, S., 2007. Youth militias, self determination 
and resource control struggles in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria. Leiden: African Studies Centre. 
Accessed February, 19, p. 2011. 
 
Osuntokun, J., 1979. The historical background of Nigeria federalism. In: Akinyemi, A.B.  (ed). Reading 
on Federalism. Ibadan, Heinemann Educational Book Ltd. 
 
Otite, O., 2000. Ethnic pluralism, ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. Ibadan. Shameson C.L. Ltd. 
 
Owen, I., Roy, 2006. Pschotherapy and phenomenology : On Freud, Husserl and Heidegger.  Lincoln, 
Universe Books. 
 
Oyedika, N., 2010. Criminality takes over Niger Delta. The Guardian, Sunday, 21st November, 2010, 
pp. 71-73. 
 
Parkin, F., 1982. Social Closure and Class Formations. In: Giddens, A., & Held, D. eds. Classes, Power 
and Conflicts: Clasical and Contemporary Debates. Berkeley, University of Califonia Press. 
 




Peterside, J. S., 2007. On the militarisation of Nigeria's Niger Delta: The genesis of ethnic militia in 
Rivers State. Niger Delta Economies of Violence Working Paper No 21. 
 
Peterside, S.J., 2005. The genesis of ethnic militia in Rivers State. Journal of the Center for Ethnic and 
Conflict Studies,  2(1), pp. 30-51. 
 
Pfaff, S., 1995. Collective identity and informal groups in revolutionary mobilisation: East Germany in 
1989. Social Forces, 75(75), pp. 91-118. 
 
Philip, R., 2007. Language, culture and identity: An ethnolinguistic perspective. London, Continuum 
International. 
 
Pichardo, A., Nelson, 1997. New social movements: A critical review. Annual Review of Sociology, 
23(23), pp. 411-430. 
 
Platt, J., 1988. What Case Studies Do. Studies in Quantitiative Methodology, 1(1), pp. 1-23. 
 
Plotke, D., 1990. Whats so new about new social movement? Socialist Review, 20(1), pp. 81-102. 
 
Polletta, F. & Jasper, J., M,, 2001. Collective identity and social movement. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 27(1), pp. 283-305. 
 
Post, K. & Vickers, M., 1973. Structure and conflicts in Nigeria: 1960-1966. London, Heinenmann. 
 
Prus, R., 1996. Symbolic interaction and ethnographic research: Inter subjectivity and the study of 
human lived experience. Albany, State University of New York Press. 
 
Putnam, L.L., 1983. The interpretative perpective: An alternative to functionalism. In: Putnam, L., & 
Pacanowsky, M.E. eds. Communication and organization: An interpretative approach . Beverly Hills, 
Sage Publication, pp. 31-54. 
 
Quilley, S. & Loyal, S., 2005. Eliasian sociology as a central theory for the human sciences. Current  
Sociology, 53 (3), pp. 807-828. 
 





Reich, W., 2010. Three problems  of intersubjectivity-and one solution. American Sociological 
Association, 28(1), pp. 40-63. 
 
Reno, W., 2002. The Politics of insurgency in collapsing state. Development and Change, 33(5), pp. 
837-858. 
 
Richardson, I., 2000. Evaluating ethnography. Qualitaive Inquiry, 6(2), pp. 253-255. 
 
Rodgers, D., W, 1999. Living in the shadow of Death: Violence, Pandillas and Social Disintegration in 
Comporary urban Nicaragua. PhD Thesis, Cambridge  
 
Rommetveit, R., 1979. On the architeecture of intersubjectivity. In: Rommetveit, R. eds.Studies of 
language, thought and verbal communication. London, Academic press. 
 
Rommetveit, R., 1985. Language acquisition as increase linguitic structuring of experience and symbolic 
behavior control. In: Wertsch, J.V. ed. Culture, communic Orion,and cognition: Vygotskian perpectives. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ross, M., 2004. Mineral wealth and equitable development. Washington, DC, World Bank. 
 
Ross, M., 2008. But seriously: does oil really hinder democracy? . UCLA Department of Political 
Science. 
 
Ruggiero, V. & Montagna, N., 2008. Social movements: A reader.  London, Routledge. 
 
Scheff, T., 2006. Goffman unbound: A new paradigm for social science.  London, Paradigm Publishers. 
 
Schlesinger, P., 1987. On national Identity: Some Conceptions and Misconceptions criticized. In: 
Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J., eds. The Social Movement Reader: Cases and Concepts. Oxford,  Blackwell. 
pp. 219-264. 
 
Seale, C., 2004. Researching Society and Culture.  New York, Sage Publications. 
 
Selverston, M., 1993. Politicised ethnicity as social movement: The 1990 indigenous uprising in 
Ecuador. Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies, Columbia University. 




Smelser, N., J, 1962. The "norm-oriented movement" from theory of collective behaviour. New York, 
Free Press.  
 
Snow, D., A, & Benford, R., D., 1992. Master frames and cycles of protest.  In:  Morris, A., & Mueller, 
M.C. ed. Frontiers of social movement theory. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
 
Stewart, F., 2008. Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic 
societies. London, Palgrave Macmillain. 
 




Tamuno, N., Tekena, 1970. Separatist agitations in Nigeria since 1914. Journal of  Modern African 
Studies, 8(4), pp. 563-584. 
 
Tantua, B., 2009. An Assessment of the potential for participation in rural development projects in oil led 
economy of Nigeria. MPhil Thesis, Aberystwyth University,UK. 
 
Tarrow, S., 1994. Power in movements: Social movements, collective action, and politics.  Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Thompson, A., 2004. An Introduction to African Politics.  New York, Routledge.  
 
Tilly, C., 1984. Social Movements and national politics. In: Bright, C., & Harding, S. eds. State making 
and social movements: Essays in history and theory. Michigan,  University of Michigan Press. 
 
Tilly, C., 1995. Popular contentions in Great Britain; 1758-1830. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Tilly, C., 2003. The politics of collective violence.  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tilly, C., McAdam,, Doug; & Tarrow, S., G, 2001. Dynamics of contention.  Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 




Touraine, A., 1985. An introducion to the study of social movements. Social Research, 52 (4), pp. 749-
787. 
 
Tuodolo, O.F., 2007. Corporate Social Responsibility,local communities and TNCs in the oil and gas 
sector of Nigeria. PhD, University of Liverpool. 
 
Turton, D., 1997. War and ethnicity: Global connections and local violence in North-East Africa and 
Former Yugoslavia Oxford Development Studies, 21 (1), pp. 77-94. 
 
Ujah, E., 2011. FG, States, local governments  share N455.billion naira  from federation account. 
Vanguard Newspaper page 8.   
 
Ukiwo, U., 2007. From Pirates to Militants: A Historiacl Perspective on Anti-state and Anti- Oil company 
mobilisation among the Ijaw of warri Western Niger delta. Afrcan Affairs, 106(106), pp. 425-610. 
 
Ukiwo, U. 2011a. The Nigerian State, oil, and the Niger Delta. In: Obi C & A. Rustud, eds. Oil and 
Insuregncy in the Niger Delta : Managing the complex politics of petro violence London: Zed Books, pp. 
17-27. 
 
Vinthagen, S. 2006. New Global Wars–A Challenge for Nonviolence. In:  Paper presented at the 
Swedish peace research conference, Göteborg University, Sept., 2006. www.resistancestudies.org/files 
[Accessed 14/01/2015 
 
Vold, G., B,, Bernard, T., J, & Snipes, J., B., 2002. Theoritical criminology. New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Wald, K., D,, Silverman, A., L, & Fridy, K., S,, 2005. Making sense of religion in political life. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 8(1), pp. 121-143. 
Walsham, G., 2006. Doing interpretive research. European Journal of Information Systems, 15(1), pp. 
320-330. 
 
Watts, J. M., 2004. Antinomies of community:some thoughts on geography, resources and empire. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 29(2), pp.195-216. 
 
Watts, J., Michael, 2007. Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate?: Conflict and Violence in the Niger 




Weinstein, J., M, 2009. Inside rebellion.  Cmabridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Whitter, N., 1995. Feminist Generations: The persistence of the radical women movement. Philadelphia, 
Temple University Press. 
 
Wiegratz, J., 2012. The Neo-liberal harvest: The proliferation and normalisation of economic fraud in 
market society. In: Winlow, S., Atkinson, R. ed. New directions in crime and deviancy. London, 
Routledge. 
 
William, W., 2002. Citizensip question and environmental crisis in the Niger Delta:A critical reflection. 
Nordic Journal of African Studies, 11(3), pp. 377-392. 
 
Willink, H., 1958. Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities 
and the Means of Allaying Them. Her Mayesty's Stationery Office. In  Akinyele, R, T (1996). States 
Creation in Nigeria: The Willink Report in Retrospect . African Studies Review, 39, pp 71-94.  
 
Wood, E.J., 2015. Social Mobilization and Violence in Civil War and their Social Legacies  In: Donatella 
Della Porta  & M. Diani, eds. Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Behavior 
Oxford. Oxford University Press 
 
Wood, G., 1985. Labelling in Development Policy: Essays in Honour of Bernard Schaffer.  London, 
Sage Publications. 
 
Yagboyaju, A., Dhikru., 2005. Ethnicity, political corruption and poverty: A trigonometric force against 
peaceful coeexistence amd participatory democracy in Nigeriias Fourth Republic. Journal of the Centre 
for Ethnic and Conflicts Studies, 1(2), pp. 68-88. 
 
Yee, W., C, & Andrew, J., 2006. Professional researcher or good guest? Ethical dilemma invoved in 
researching children and families in the home setting. Educational Review, 58(4), pp. 397-413. 
 
Yeri-Obidake & Zuokeme, E., 1985. Ethnicity, petroeconomy and national intergration in Nigeria. Ph.D, 
Syracuse Univesity. 
Yin, R.K., 2003. Case study research : Design and methods. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, California Sage 
Publications. 
 
Zald, M., N. & McCarthy, J., D, 1987. Social Movements in Organisational Society. New Brunswick, 
New Jersey, Transaction Publishers. 
173 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
